Social learning mechanisms of knowledge exchange:Active communication, information seeking and information transmission in infancy by Bazhydai, Marina
 SOCIAL LEARNING MECHANISMS OF 
KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE: 
active communication, 
information seeking and 
information transmission in infancy 
 
 
Marina Bazhydai, B.A., M.A., Ed.M. 
This thesis is submitted 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
September 2020 
Department of Psychology  
 ii 
Declaration 
I hereby declare that the work presented in this thesis has not been submitted, in 
whole or in part, for the award of a higher degree at this or any other university. I further 
declare that this thesis is a product of my own work and the intellectual content of this 
thesis reflects my own thinking. All experimental studies included in this thesis were 
completed under the supervision of Professor Gert Westermann and Dr Eugenio Parise. 
In addition, study 3 was conducted in collaboration with my colleague Priya Silverstein. 
To reflect the collaborative effort of the empirical work and the collective theoretical, 
methodological and stylistic contributions, I will therefore present this work in the first-
person plural voice. 
The experimental studies comprising this thesis are in preparation for 
publication or were published in the following academic journals: 
Bazhydai, M., Westermann, G., & Parise, E. (in preparation). Eleven-month-olds 
selectively refer to their social partner following epistemic violations of 
expectation.  
Bazhydai, M., Westermann, G., & Parise, E. (2020). “I don’t know but I know who to 
ask”: 12-month-olds actively seek information from knowledgeable adults. 
Developmental Science. doi:10.1111/desc.12938 
Bazhydai, M.*, Silverstein, P.*, Parise, E., & Westermann, G. (2020). Two-year old 
children preferentially transmit simple actions but not pedagogically 
demonstrated actions. Developmental Science. doi:10.1111/desc.12941 (*equal 
contributions) 
In addition, parts of the theoretical chapters are in preparation for publication: 
Gruber, T., Dukes, D., Bazhydai, M., Sievers, C., & Clément, F. (in preparation). The 
ABC model of social learning: Affect, Behavior, Cognition. 
 
Marina Bazhydai, B.A., M.A., Ed.M.  
Lancaster University, UK  
 iii 
Statement of Authorship 
Experimental Chapter 1: Eleven-month-olds selectively refer to their social 
partner following epistemic violations of expectation 
Conception and design of study: Marina Bazhydai, Gert Westermann, Eugenio Parise 
Acquisition of data: Marina Bazhydai 
Data analysis: Marina Bazhydai 
Data interpretation: Marina Bazhydai, Gert Westermann, Eugenio Parise 
Drafting the manuscript: Marina Bazhydai 
Revising the manuscript: Marina Bazhydai, Gert Westermann, Eugenio Parise  
Contribution of principal author: 85% 
 
Experimental Chapter 2: “I don’t know but I know who to ask”:  12-month-olds 
actively seek information from knowledgeable adults  
Conception and design of study: Marina Bazhydai, Gert Westermann, Eugenio Parise 
Acquisition of data: Marina Bazhydai 
Data analysis: Marina Bazhydai 
Data interpretation: Marina Bazhydai, Gert Westermann, Eugenio Parise 
Drafting the manuscript: Marina Bazhydai 
Revising the manuscript: Marina Bazhydai, Gert Westermann, Eugenio Parise  
Contribution of principal author: 85% 
 
Experimental Chapter 3: Two-year old children preferentially transmit simple 
actions but not pedagogically demonstrated actions 
Conception and design of study: Marina Bazhydai, Priya Silverstein, Gert Westermann, 
Eugenio Parise  
Acquisition of data: Marina Bazhydai and Priya Silverstein 
Data analysis: Marina Bazhydai and Priya Silverstein 
Data interpretation: Marina Bazhydai, Priya Silverstein, Gert Westermann, Eugenio 
Parise 
Drafting the manuscript: Marina Bazhydai and Priya Silverstein 
Revising the manuscript: Marina Bazhydai, Priya Silverstein, Eugenio Parise, Gert 
Westermann 
Shared contribution of principal authors (Marina Bazhydai and Priya Silverstein): 85% 
 
We the undersigned agree with the above stated “proportion of work undertaken” for 
each of the above chapter contributing to this thesis: 
 





Gert Westermann:  
 
 





To my parents, 
Alla Borisovna and Anatoli Petrovich, 
for always believing in me and encouraging me to think big, deep, and broad. 
 
 
“Man knows himself only to the extent that he knows the world; 
he becomes aware of himself only within the world, 
and aware of the world only within himself”. 




Посвящается моим родителям, 
Алле Борисовне и Анатолию Петровичу, 
в благодарность за веру в мои возможности и пробуждение силы духа и мысли. 
 
 
“Человек познает сам себя только в той мере, 
в какой он познает мир”. 




I would like to thank my academic supervisors, Professor Gert Westermann and 
Dr Eugenio Parise for the encouragement, support and thoughtful feedback on the work 
presented in this thesis. The combination of dynamic theoretical, conceptual and 
methodological discussions, experimental challenges, professional opportunities, and 
the collegial environment created in their research groups has been instrumental for my 
development as an academic and a researcher. 
I thank my colleague, Dr Priya Silverstein, for being intellectually sharp, 
motivated, resourceful and innovative, and for setting a high standard for my future 
collaborations. 
I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Professor Paul L. Harris for 
many early inspiring discussions that led directly to this PhD thesis, as well as for the 
unparalleled support and wise advice at many crucial crossroads on this journey. 
I express my appreciation to all the families who visited the Lancaster Babylab 
between 2016 and 2019 to take part in my research studies, as well as the members of 
the lab for their support and enthusiasm.  
I would like to acknowledge the generous financial support of the Leverhulme 
Trust Doctoral Scholarship Programme (DS‐2014‐14), as well as the Lancaster 
University’s Peel Studentship Trust award and the Friend's Programme Research Travel 
Conference Fund award. 
Most importantly, I am indebted to my family: my parents for motivating and 
supporting me, and my son for growing with me through this magically fascinating 
journey. Despite this long, winding and at times rather bumpy road, this path is just 





“Knowledge exists to be imparted. 
Our knowledge is an accumulated thought and  
experience of innumerable minds”. 




“Knowledge is the product of the interaction  
between an individual and the environment, 
 understanding such as something  
social and cultural, not just physical”. 




We live in an information society. It is the society where information is the most 
important commodity and true knowledge is the ultimate goal. It is also the society that 
pronounced the ‘death of truth’ and the era of ‘post-truth’ (Lewandowsky, Echer, & 
Cook, 2017). It bombards us with an abundance of mixed messages and challenges us 
to sift through multiple sources of information to make coherent sense of the world. 
Despite the postulated “cult of ignorance” (Asimov, 1980), the pursuit of knowledge, 
just as the much-celebrated pursuit of happiness, remains our cherished purpose. Our 
pursuit of truth is embedded in the social knowledge exchange process: seeking and 
conveying reliable information. To aid us in achieving this lofty goal, our social and 
cognitive toolkit helps us successfully traverse the uncertainties of the information-rich 
epistemic environment: through critically assessing available facts, seeking supporting 
evidence, evaluating expert opinions, and exerting trust in reliable sources.  
How does this process unfold in early development? This thesis was motivated 
by the desire to trace the beginnings of information seeking and information giving, by 
elucidating infants’ basic behaviours as active participants of the social knowledge 
exchange. Before being able to fully appreciate the complexities and challenges 
presented by the information age they are born into, do infants also navigate their 
epistemic environment, face uncertainty about the reliability of information and its 
sources, and exhibit sensitivity to others’ knowledge and ignorance cues? Expounding 
the ontogeny of cultural transmission of knowledge can help us better understand our 
own ability to cope with the overwhelming abundance of (mis)information and to 
proceed from experiencing epistemic uncertainty, to social knowledge acquisition, to 
transmitting ideas worth spreading.  
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Abstract 
Children are active participants in the social knowledge exchange process, but 
little is known about how this exchange manifests in the first two years of life. This 
thesis explores active social learning strategies underlying both knowledge acquisition 
and knowledge transmission in infants aged 11-24 months. Comprising three 
experimental chapters, this thesis demonstrates infants’ sensitivity to the informative 
potential of their social partners and their epistemic value, their active and selective 
information seeking in situations of epistemic uncertainty, and their preferential 
information transmission based on a combination of social and non-social factors. 
Experimental Chapter 1 shows that 11-month-olds communicatively respond to their 
social partners following epistemic violation of expectation events and do so based on 
the social partner’s epistemic status. Experimental Chapter 2 demonstrates that 12-
month-olds selectively solicit epistemic information from more knowledgeable social 
partners when facing a situation of referential uncertainty. Experimental Chapter 3 
reports that 24-month-olds’ propensity for active information transmission to less 
knowledgeable social partners is modulated by information complexity but not the 
pedagogical context of information acquisition. Overall, this thesis contributes to the 
literature on cognitive development of social learning strategies for acquisition and 
transmission of knowledge, with a special emphasis on elucidating the ontogeny of 
active interrogative communication skills. The overarching conclusion stemming from 
this work highlights that far from being passive receptacles of knowledge, infants 
actively partake in the bi-directional process of social knowledge exchange. 
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Introduction Chapter 
 Children as active participants in social knowledge 
exchange 
The following brief introductory section situates the current thesis in a vast and 
largely disconnected body of research, by providing a broad overview of the literature 
both on children’s active learning and social learning, and arguing for an integrative 
‘active social learning’, which manifests itself in a variety of selective social knowledge 
exchange strategies. This section also highlights the polar theoretical views on early 
active social learning behaviours, rooted either in domain-specific or domain-general 
cognitive mechanisms, and proposes a dialogue between these positions1. This 
overview is followed by a more detailed discussion of the literature on information 
seeking (section II) and information giving in early childhood (section III). 
I.i. Cognitive mechanisms of active social learning  
Infancy presents a unique period for quickly and efficiently accomplishing a 
large amount of learning about the physical and social world. Children’s cognitive 
development relies both on their first-hand exploration and interaction with others. Two 
metaphors have been used to explain children’s impressive rate of knowledge 
acquisition: a child as a ‘little scientist’ – an autonomous explorer guided by the 
 
1 In this regard, the use of the terms ‘origins’, ‘ontogeny’, ‘developmental precursors’, ‘proto-‘ 
and similar throughout this thesis do not imply a preference for neither an innate nor a learned mechanism 
behind the observed behaviour, as it is beyond the scope of the current work to address this fundamental 
distinction. 
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experimentation, hypothesis testing and causal learning motivations (Gopnik, 2012; 
Piaget, 1952), and a child as a ‘little anthropologist’ (Legare & Harris, 2016; Vygotsky, 
1987) – a social agent embedded in the societal structure which allows for rapid and 
effective learning of accumulated knowledge from others. Although the fields of active 
learning and social learning have been developing largely independently, recently the 
emphasis has been made on characterising the ‘active social learning’ as a unifying 
approach (Butler, 2020; Saylor & Ganea, 2019).  
The active learning approach is rooted in an autonomous engagement with 
available information and seeking new information to guide one’s own learning. It 
posits that children take a constructive approach to learning, visually and manually 
exploring their environment: tracking patterns, testing hypotheses, making inferences, 
and revising beliefs based on accumulated evidence (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012; Schulz, 
2012; Xu & Kushnir, 2013). Studies of the benefits of active rather than passive learning 
demonstrate that having control over informational input during the learning process 
enhances attention and memory and leads to a faster and more robust acquisition of 
knowledge (for reviews, see Gureckis & Markant, 2012; Markant, Ruggeri, Gureckis, 
& Xu, 2016).  
Children’s information gathering in real life, however, most often occurs in 
social contexts. The social learning approach presupposes observing and interacting 
with others to acquire information (Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Csibra & 
Gergely, 2009; Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012; Harris, 2012; 
Herrmann, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007; Heyes, 1994; Tomasello, 
Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). Knowledge exchange through a variety of social learning 
strategies enables transmission of accumulated culture, from basic tool use to complex 
community rituals, which are passed on from one generation to another, from experts 
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to novices. Despite the seeming dichotomy with active learning, social learning as such 
does not presume that children are passive receivers of knowledge. On the contrary, 
both approaches construe children as active and curious, discovery-oriented agents. 
The active social learning approach therefore incorporates both the asocial and 
social aspects as dual engines of knowledge acquisition and transmission. Here, children 
actively participate in the social knowledge exchange by integrating what they learned 
through first-hand exploration, observation, imitation, pedagogical instruction or 
seeking others’ testimony by querying them (Saylor & Ganea, 2019; Shafto, Goodman, 
& Frank, 2012) – to “gather just the information they want, on just the topic that interests 
them, at just the time they require it” (Baldwin & Moses, 1996, p. 1934) and to 
propagate such knowledge to others. The broad aim of the current thesis is therefore to 
understand how active social learning unfolds in early cognitive and social 
development. 
The cognitive mechanisms underlying active social learning are a topic of 
unresolved debate. Broadly, some proposals emphasize the top-down, conceptual and 
innate predispositions specialised by genetic evolution, such as language or ‘rich’ 
indices of mentalising and intentionality in infants’ behaviour (Csibra & Gergely, 2009, 
2011; Spelke, Bernier, & Skerry, 2013; Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, 
Behne, & Moll, 2005). For instance, the ‘core knowledge’ theory posits that infants’ 
basic social cognition evolved as an innate, domain-specific adaptation, along with 
other systems such as spatial or numerical cognition (Spelke et al., 2013). Strong 
evidence in support of this account comes from studies of infants in their first weeks of 
life (that is, prior to the ability to observe a statistically substantial number of physical 
events), nevertheless responding in surprise (indexed by longer looking) when viewing 
events which are physically impossible according to adult judgements, such as objects 
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crossing through a solid wall or violating the principle of gravity (Spelke & Kinzler, 
2007). The core knowledge domains are said to encompass, aside from object 
knowledge, motion and spatial knowledge, numerosity, geometrical forms, social 
agency and emotions. Supporting evidence from non-human species suggests that some 
of these may be indeed innate at least in part (Vallortigara, 2012). However, preventing 
fully innate claims, since infants tested in these paradigms had already had at least some 
experience in the world, they could have acquired the necessary rudimentary experience 
rather than were born with these abilities. 
Other proposals, on the other hand, highlight the bottom-up, mechanistic, ‘lean’ 
processes specialised through associative learning or via cultural inheritance (Galef, 
2013; Kendal, Boogert, Rendell, Laland, Webster, & Jones, 2018; Heyes, 1994, 2017; 
Leadbeater, 2015; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013; Whiten, 2000). At the core of these kinds of 
approaches is the premise that cognitive mechanisms evolve and are inherited through 
social learning (Heyes, 2020), underscoring the importance of dynamic interactions 
between developmental mechanisms and experience (Spencer, Blumberg, McMurray, 
Robinson, Samuelson, & Tomblin, 2009). For example, the predictive processing 
framework would explain infants’ responses to unexpected events, as described above, 
in terms of expectations that were formed through the learning experience history 
(Köster, Kayhan, Langeloh, & Hoehl, 2020). Similarly, the utility-based theories argue 
that infants acquire the ability to act rationally and optimally through statistical learning 
processes, incorporating the ability to computed the weighted combination of multiple 
epistemic (or knowledge-related) and social goals (Bridgers, Jara-Ettinger, & Gweon, 
2020; Shafto et al., 2012).  
In other words, infants might either be already cognitively equipped for effective 
social learning due to specific evolutionary adaptations, or their cognitive system is 
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quickly adapting through early learning experiences due to powerful domain-general 
mechanisms. Despite the variety of theoretical stances regarding its underlying 
mechanisms, active social learning approach proposes that rather than being passive 
recipients of knowledge from others, infants actively participate in the social knowledge 
exchange process. Using many strategies, children not only quickly acquire knowledge 
from social partners, but also themselves transmit it to others. How do they accomplish 
this? 
I.ii. Social knowledge exchange strategies  
Socially mediated transmission of knowledge is a powerful mechanism for 
adaptive learning. Such learning is less evolutionary costly than the relatively 
unconstrained, independent trial‐and‐error exploration as it allows learners to bypass 
the need for the first-hand exploration every step of the way, and instead presents 
knowledge already verified and in the ‘pre-packaged’ format through the accumulated 
experiences of others (Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Kline, 2015; Whiten, 2000). 
At the core of cultural transmission is the learner’s capacity to flexibly and effectively 
engage in a variety of social learning strategies, such as observation, imitation, 
emulation, active information solicitation, and pedagogy (Kendal et al., 2018).  
Direct observation of others is guided by the learner’s attentional mechanisms 
and allows them to acquire new information about their environment, which they could 
have possibly discovered on their own at a later time, yet social learning facilitates more 
efficient sharing of knowledge among conspecifics (Call & Carpenter, 2002; Galef & 
Whiten, 2017; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; Paradise & Rogoff, 2009). The primary social 
learning strategies are imitation – faithfully copying others’ actions – and emulation – 
applying what has been learned to different contexts by replicating the outcomes of 
actions rather than the exact behaviours observed. As excellent imitators, children can 
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copy with high fidelity a sequence of actions demonstrated by another person to achieve 
a goal (Nielsen, 2006; Over & Carpenter, 2012; Want & Harris, 2002). Imitation and 
its counterpart, the so-called overimitation or the overly faithful imitation (where the 
learner copies all of the actions of the social partner, regardless of their causal links with 
the actual action outcome), extend beyond goal-directed actions to the exclusively 
cultural domain (for a review, see Hoehl, Keupp, Schleihauf, McGuigan, Buttelmann, 
& Whiten, 2019). Emulation, on the other hand, emphasises the instrumental action 
outcome without much regard to the process of how the goal was achieved (McGuigan 
& Whiten, 2009; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2006; Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-
Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). Although observation, imitation and emulation are the 
strategies humans share with many other animals, other forms of active social learning 
may be uniquely human.  
While all social learning strategies concern transmission of knowledge from one 
social partner to another, this thesis focused specifically on infants’ active social 
learning strategies of information seeking and information giving. Intentionally posing 
requests for information to social partners allows children to direct their own acquisition 
of knowledge (Baldwin & Moses, 1996). Children are sensitive to others’ ability to 
provide useful information and take an interrogative stance towards them as sources of 
knowledge (Harris, Koenig, Corriveau, & Jaswal, 2018; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-
Liard, 2016). Even preverbal infants use information seeking gestures to solicit 
information from social partners, with their communicative strategies becoming more 
varied and complex with the mastery of language (for reviews see Lucca, 2020; 
Ronfard, Zambrana, Hermansen, & Kelemen, 2018; section II of Introduction Chapter, 
Experimental Chapters 1 and 2). 
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Children can also obtain knowledge from others who are willing and able to 
share what they know – via direct pedagogical instruction or intentional teaching. As 
compared to other social learning strategies, pedagogy facilitates acquisition of more 
complex knowledge and skills (Morgan et al., 2015; Zwirner & Thornton, 2015). A 
theory of Instructed Learning (Tomasello, 2016) argues that this social learning process 
evolved to not only enable knowledge transfer, but also establish common ground and 
social coherence. A theory of Natural Pedagogy (NP, Csibra & Gergely, 2009, 2011) 
proposes that humans are uniquely predisposed to learn from social partners who 
display ostensive communicative cues, which signal transmission of generic and 
generalizable knowledge. Infants’ early sensitivity to these cues indicates their 
readiness to learn and treat this information differently (we return to these key theories 
in more detail in section III.i of the Introduction Chapter). Other cognitive development 
theories similarly emphasise social facilitation of the learner’s input through 
apprenticeship, direct demonstration and feedback as teaching models, e.g., Zone of 
Proximal Development (Vygotsky, 1987) and Guided Participation (Rogoff, Mistry, 
Göncü, Mosier, Chavajay, & Heath, 1993). Asking children questions has been shown 
to be an effective pedagogical strategy (Yu, Landrum, Bonawitz, & Shafto, 2018), also 
helping to mitigate the detrimental effects of direct pedagogy on further exploration and 
learning (Bonawitz, Shafto, Gweon, Goodman, Spelke, & Schulz, 2011). 
Children’s own active teaching allows them to convey knowledge they acquired 
to less knowledgeable others (Butler, 2020; Kline, 2015; Strauss, Ziv, & Stein, 2002). 
Despite the paucity of empirical research on the ontogeny of teaching, studies have 
shown that infants start to engage in basic preverbal information transmission 
(Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006) and preschoolers spontaneously 
teach their younger siblings, who, in turn, spontaneously request teaching (Howe, Della 
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Porta, Recchia, & Ross, 2016). With social and cognitive development and an expanded 
teaching strategies toolkit, children gradually become more contingent and selective in 
their teaching (for reviews, see Corriveau, Ronfard, & Cui, 2018; Ronfard & Harris, 
2018; section III of Introduction Chapter, Experimental Chapter 3). 
I.iii. Selectivity in active social learning 
Children’s initiation of information seeking from others based on their ability to 
provide information and children’s propensity to transmit obtained information to 
others based on the mode of knowledge acquisition and evaluation of the information 
source is at the core of the studies comprising this thesis. As children engage in seeking 
information and transmitting acquired evidence socially, their choices are often 
selective. This selectivity primarily manifests through sensitivity to others’ cues of 
reliability, accuracy, confidence and credibility, as well as informants’ age, ingroup 
status, endorsement by others, and deference to majority, among others (Harris, 2012; 
Mills, 2013; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). Understanding the ontogeny of selective social 
learning sheds light on the later developing, more complex accounts of selective trust 
in others’ testimony (Clément, 2010; Harris et al., 2018) and knowledge clustering 
(Danovitch & Keil, 2004). 
Evidence amounts that infants are sensitive to reliability and accuracy of 
information and of people who supply it (Harris & Lane, 2014; Poulin-Dubois & 
Brosseau-Liard, 2016). A study with 8-month-olds showed that infants differently 
treated reliable information provided through social cues, such as human faces, as 
compared to other symbolic but non-social cues, such as arrows (Tummeltshammer, 
Wu, Sobel, & Kirhkam, 2014). While infants were able to track the reliability of both 
types of cues and used this information to make predictions when facing uncertainty, 
they were only willing to generalise social but not non-social reliability cues in novel 
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contexts. Reliability and accuracy cues play an important role in infants’ interaction 
with social partners in their second year of life: they selectively choose to follow their 
gaze (Chow, Poulin-Dubois, & Lewis, 2008), reference them in emotionally ambiguous 
situations (Stenberg, 2013), look longer at them upon detecting their inaccurate 
testimony (Koenig & Echols, 2003), imitate their actions (Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, & 
Polonia, 2011; Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010), and request labels for 
novel objects from them (Begus & Southgate, 2012; Kovács, Tauzin, Téglás, Gergely, 
& Csibra, 2014). In a word learning context, toddlers are more likely to retain novel 
words learned from previously reliable speakers (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013; 
Koenig & Woodward, 2010), generalise words to novel contexts (Luchkina, Sobel, & 
Morgan, 2018), and reject novel labels for familiar objects from previously inaccurate 
or ignorant informants (Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 2012).  
In addition to epistemic indices, infants exhibit selectivity to social cues, such 
as preferentially learning from adults versus peers (Kachel, Moore, & Tomasello, 2018; 
Zmyj, Daum, Prinz, Nielsen, & Aschersleben, 2012) and from ingroup rather than 
outgroup members (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013). Demonstrating the 
increasing importance of social credibility cues, 24-month-olds but not 18-month-olds 
preferentially learned from people who presented themselves as confident rather than 
actually knowledgeable (Birch, Akmal, & Frampton, 2010; Brosseau‐Liard & Poulin‐
Dubois, 2014). Despite the early emerging sensitivity to informants’ trustworthiness, 
older children sometimes gullibly accept inaccurate or unreliable information, 
prioritising group membership and social affiliation, such as consensus between 
multiple informants or familiarity over objectively credible testimony (Corriveau & 
Harris, 2009; Jaswal & Konrad, 2016), as well as making inferences about social 
partners’ ability to provide information based on their perceived personality traits 
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(Lane, Wellman, & Gelman, 2013). Nevertheless, a recent set of meta-analyses reported 
that preschoolers exhibit selective trust based on both epistemic and social 
characteristics of informants, with older children attributing higher weight to the 
knowledge dimension rather than social status (Tong, Wang, & Danovitch, 2020). 
Children’s sensitivity to an interplay between social and epistemic motivations 
in knowledge acquisition contexts can be illustrated by a set of studies contrasting 
learning from native and non-native speakers. Measuring brain’s theta oscillations as a 
neural signature of information anticipation, an electrophysiological study showed that 
11-month-old infants expected to learn new information from people who were 
previously informative as opposed to those who did not provide any information, as 
well as from native speakers as opposed to foreign speakers (Begus, Gliga, & Southgate, 
2016). However, the follow-up work showed that infants were just as likely to anticipate 
learning from the foreign speaking individuals if they were previously informative as 
from the native speakers (Begus & Gergely, 2017). Thus, infants’ information 
expectation was higher when they could plausibly expect to learn something, resolving 
the conflict between social and epistemic goals in favour of the latter. A longitudinal 
study with preschoolers came to similar conclusions: the quality of information 
becomes more important for children than the informant’s social status (Corriveau, 
Kinzler, & Harris, 2013). Furthermore, with advances in cognitive development, 
preschoolers flexibly update their epistemic representations of informants in light of 
new evidence of their credibility and are able to retrospectively revise acquired 
knowledge if needed (Clegg, Kurkul, Corriveau, 2019; Gillis, Nilsen, & Gevaux, 2019; 
Hoicka, Butcher, Malla, & Harris, 2017; Leech, Haber, Arunachalam, Kurkul, & 
Corriveau, 2019; Luchkina, Corriveau, & Sobel, 2020; Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009; 
Ronfard & Lane, 2018, 2019).  
 11 
The debate regarding the nature of underlying cognitive mechanisms broadly in 
the field of active social learning similarly applies to the reviewed selective learning 
literature (Clément, 2010; Heyes, 2017; Poulin-Dubois, 2017; Sabbagh, Koenig & 
Kuhlmeier, 2017). A variety of mechanisms has been proposed in both the domain-
general and domain-specific camps, broadly grouped. The associative learning account 
rests on the idea that simple statistical associations are responsible for the selective 
choice of informants through implicit calculations, categorisations and generalisations 
made from previous encounters with these individuals. A more complex process, the 
Bayesian learning inference, highlights that cognitive computations and inferential 
predictions are accessible not only to the human brain, but even to the ‘ideal learner’ 
computational model (Landrum, Eaves, & Shafto, 2015; Shafto, Eaves, Navarro, & 
Perfors, 2012). These domain-general accounts stand in contrast to the domain-specific 
mechanisms, which are rooted in the theory of mind (ToM) – the ability to attribute 
mental states to oneself and others, such as understanding that agents with minds have 
intentions, beliefs, desires, knowledge, etc. According to these accounts, even young 
infants possess abilities which can be deemed as proto-mentalistic and proto-
metacognitive reasoning, that is, while lacking the ability to explicitly reason about 
mental states, infants may nevertheless exhibit early, rudimentary ToM-like skills 
(Gergely et al., 1995; Király, Oláh, Csibra, & Kovács, 2018; Mascaro & Sperber, 2009; 
Setoh, Scott, & Baillargeon, 2016; Sperber et al, 2010).  
One proposal that reconciles both kinds of approaches, the ‘dual-process 
account’ (Heyes, 2016), posits that early on, it is the implicit associative learning that 
likely fully explains the observed selectivity in social learning, while with the 
development of ToM, the domain-specific, unique to humans, explicit, and experience-
dependent mechanisms take over. In a similar vein, the ‘rational evidence selection’ 
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proposal incorporates children’s abilities to track associative evidence, as well as make 
causal inferences and social judgements (Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). Research with older 
children shows that ToM and selective trust abilities are positively related (Di Yanni, 
Nini, Rheel & Livelli, 2012; Fusaro & Harris, 2008), and so are ToM and the ability to 
select relevant and useful information when teaching others (Bass, Bonawitz, Shafto, 
Ramarajan, Gopnik, & Wellman, 2017). However, direct evidence investigating this 
relationship in infants who are not yet able to pass the standard ToM tasks so far is 
inconsistent (Crivello, Phillips, & Poulin-Dubois, 2018; Kuzyk, Grossman, & Poulin‐
Dubois, 2020), highlighting the need for further research into the ontogeny and 
development of selective trust in others’ testimony.  
In sum, emerging evidence suggests that even preverbal infants are able to 
quickly process the social distribution of knowledge by taking an active epistemic 
stance. If they can identify trustworthy informants who are available and willing to 
supply evidence, can they also take an interrogative stance towards them by employing 
active and selective communication? Section II of the current chapter reviews the state 
of the literature on infants’ active communication and information seeking in the 
process of knowledge acquisition from others, highlighting epistemic curiosity 
processes in epistemic uncertainty contexts and focusing on the preverbal behaviour of 
social referencing as an interrogative signal. Section III of the current chapter provides 
a review of infants’ active information transmission behaviours in view of the main 
theoretical approaches, early behavioural manifestations and selectivity in teaching 
choices.  
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 Active communication and information seeking 
The following section reviews the literature on curiosity in social learning, with 
a focus on epistemic (or knowledge-related) curiosity, which manifests itself in the most 
pronounced way in various situations of epistemic uncertainty through the early 
developing active information seeking behaviours. Specifically, the presentation of the 
proposal and the accompanying evidence that pointing may serve an interrogative 
function is followed by the review of the emerging literature suggesting that social 
referencing may be another information seeking behaviour. 
II.i. Curiosity in social learning 
Infants are often described as naturally curious learners, keen on acquiring 
knowledge through independent exploration, as well as through their social partners. 
Curiosity can be viewed as an inherent interplay between autonomous and social 
processes, and as such, a catalyst of social learning and epistemic development broadly 
speaking. Curiosity is generally defined as active information seeking motivated by 
internal rather than external rewards. A useful classification was proposed by Berlyne 
(1960) who distinguished between perceptual and epistemic and between specific and 
diversive dimensions of curiosity. This two-dimensional taxonomy captures a range of 
behaviours, including those that pertain to infants, from the targeted search for a 
particular bit of information to the broad sampling of the environmental affordances, 
and from the tactile stimulation seeking to the pursuit of knowledge.  
Developmental roots of curiosity lie in early infancy. From the first months of 
life, infants engage in visual exploration, later mastering sustained visual examining of 
objects (Oakes & Tellinghuisen, 1994; Yu & Smith, 2016). With development of motor 
skills, exploration extends to the haptic domain, enabling multi-modal examining of 
objects’ properties and affordances (Gibson, 1988; Lockman, 2000; Rochat, 1989). 
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With onset of locomotion, infants’ exploratory activity leads to enhanced information 
acquisition in an expanded array of learning domains, such as spatial and language 
abilities (Bertenthal, Campos, & Kermoian, 1994; Iverson, 2010). In social contexts, 
infants pay special attention to people’s faces, people who look at them or speak to them 
using child-directed speech (Cooper & Aslin, 1990; Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & 
Johnson, 2002; Morton & Johnson, 1991). As infants themselves start to participate in 
communicative acts, producing non-verbal signals such as vocalizations and emotional 
facial expressions, they learn to use social interactions for information seeking. Among 
such preverbal communicative acts are babbling (Goldstein, Schwade, Briesch, & Syal, 
2010), holding out and giving objects of their interest to other people (Boundy, 
Cameron-Faulkner, & Theakston, 2016), using social referencing to seek social input 
(Striano, Vaish, & Benigno, 2006), and pointing to learn about objects of their interest 
(Begus & Southgate, 2012). Just as visual scanning and motor exploration are tools to 
gain information about the environment independently, early communicative 
behaviours are tools to obtain information from others (for reviews see Begus & 
Southgate, 2018; Butler, Ronfard, & Corriveau, 2020; Lucca, 2020; Ronfard et al., 
2018, and section II.iii. of the current chapter). 
A set of core theories have proposed several, though not mutually exclusive, 
cognitive mechanisms that underlie curiosity (for reviews see Bazhydai, Twomey, & 
Westermann, 2019; Kidd & Hayden, 2015; Loewenstein, 1994; Silvia, 2012). Earliest 
psychological theories viewed curiosity as a drive, similar to other natural biological 
drives such as hunger or thirst (Hall & Smith, 1903) – an aversive state that motivates 
reflex-like drive reduction behaviours aimed at restoring the lost balance. The later 
wave of drive theories conceptualised curiosity as a new kind of drive, an exploration 
drive (Fowler, 1965; Hebb, 1958) – an intrinsic, reward-based motivation to obtain 
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information, rather than the basic need to resolve an unpleasant experience. While 
foundational for the scientific study of curiosity, the classic drive models failed to 
accommodate the complexity and flexibility of human curiosity, as well as incorporate 
fully its social dimension. Conceptualisations of curiosity that appeared subsequently 
attempted to do that. 
Incongruency approaches to curiosity are rooted in people’s distinct responses 
to information that is novel, surprising and complex (Berlyne, 1960, 1966; Hebb, 1949). 
Detecting such information necessitates the motivation to reduce the incongruency 
between existing internal representations and incoming conflicting information, and to 
update such representations through cognitive assimilation or accommodation 
processes (Piaget, 1969). Infants’ behaviours reflecting such motivation range from 
basic orienting reflexes (Fantz, 1964; Sokolov, 1963) and preferential attentional 
deployment (Baillargeon and Graber, 1987; Wynn, 1992), to increased visual and 
manual exploration (Sim & Xu, 2017; Stahl & Feigenson, 2015) and to seeking others’ 
input upon observing novel, surprising and complex phenomena. Among examples of 
this latter, social dimension, are infants’ social referencing towards their caregivers 
upon encountering an unexpected emotional or cognitive challenge, such as facing a 
perceived visual drop-off or a novel self-propelling toy (e.g., Feinman, 1982; Sorce, 
Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985) or receiving false or incongruent information (e.g., 
Dunn & Bremner, 2017; Koenig & Echols, 2003; Mireault, Crockenberg, Sparrow, 
Pettinato, Woodard, & Malzac, 2014), pointing to novel toys (e.g., Begus & Southgate, 
2012; Kovács et al., 2014), or asking clarifying and explanation-seeking questions 
(Frazier, Gelman, & Wellman, 2009; Tizard & Hughes, 1984). Incongruency theories 
are applicable to both perceptual and epistemic curiosity, adopting the two-dimensional 
classification of curiosity (Berlyne, 1960). The other two major theories of curiosity, 
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information gap and learning progress, pertain to the epistemic dimension, which is the 
focus of the current thesis. 
While the incongruency approach to epistemic curiosity is “akin to scratching a 
mental itch”, the information gap approach is like “filling a mental hole” (Silvia, 2012; 
p. 158). According to this theory (Loewenstein, 1994), curiosity arises in order to close 
the epistemic gap between the current and desired knowledge states. Frequently used 
with adult participants, this approach presumes that an individual is aware of the 
existing information gap and strategically acts to obtain missing knowledge to fill it, 
acting with awareness of the amount of information that is needed (Gottlieb, 2018; 
Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; Kang, Hsu, Krajbich, Loewenstein, McClure, 
Wang, & Camerer, 2009). Older children also initiate information seeking to fill their 
identified information gaps by interrogating people who can provide such information 
(Jirout & Klahr, 2012; Lucca, 2020; Ronfard et al., 2018). However, the information 
gap theory as such may be inadequate to explain curiosity in preverbal infants who lack 
metacognitive skills to detect such a gap and act upon such realisation (Gottlieb & 
Oudeyer, 2018; Kidd & Hayden, 2015). 
On the contrary, learning progress theories are well suited for studying cognitive 
mechanisms of curiosity in infancy (Gottlieb & Oudeyer, 2018; Oudeyer, Gottlieb, & 
Lopes, 2016; Oudeyer & Smith, 2016). This approach is guided in part by the early 
Piagetian account of children as active learners, “little scientists”, who strategically 
interact with the environment through active exploration and play to facilitate their 
information gain. Infants’ curiosity here arises to maximise learning progress, that is, to 
most efficiently obtain knowledge and reduce prediction errors. The underlying 
processes are proposed to be intrinsic and occur outside of the learner’s awareness. Such 
optimal learning takes place through independent exploration and through seeking 
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information from social partners to achieve the learning progress goals. Studies in the 
developmental robotics field showed that a robot-initiated exploration involved its 
designated ‘caregiver’ to achieve learning goals when it was most optimal (Forestier & 
Oudeyer, 2017). Interactions with human caregivers provide infants with tools to 
enhance exploratory activities and reinforce curiosity, such as scaffolding sustained 
observation skills to extend the opportunities for knowledge acquisition (Suarez-Rivera, 
Smith, & Yu, 2019; Yu & Smith, 2016). Social partners themselves can be sources of 
knowledge that infants can tap into (Begus & Southgate, 2018; Harris, Koenig, 
Corriveau, & Jaswal, 2018). Thus, the learning progress approaches account for infants’ 
curiosity in both independent and social learning exploration. 
In sum, epistemic curiosity often takes place in social contexts and manifests in 
infants’ active social learning through interaction with suitable (familiar, friendly, or 
knowledgeable) social partners who can help fulfil infants’ information seeking goals 
and maximize their epistemic benefit. Viewed through these lenses, the very core of 
social knowledge exchange is fuelled by epistemic curiosity. Especially conducive to 
investigating the ontogeny of infants’ active communication motivated by epistemic 
goals are situations of epistemic uncertainty. 
II.ii. Epistemic uncertainty in social contexts 
A decision to seek information is more likely to arise in a situation necessitating 
the need for such information, that is, in a situation of epistemic (or informational, rather 
that affective or perceptual) uncertainty – when one’s previously formed expectations 
are violated, when no information is available to solve the problem, or when conflicting, 
unreliable, insufficient, clearly inaccurate, or ambiguous information is provided. 
Studies detected infants’ implicit, neural responses to situations when adults 
demonstrated unexpected ambiguous actions, such as bringing a spoon to one’s ear 
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rather than a mouth (Köster, Langeloh, & Hoehl, 2019; Reid, Hoehl, Grigutsch, 
Groendahl, Parise, & Striano, 2009), or deliberately mislabelled familiar objects (Parise 
& Csibra, 2012). Less is known about infants explicit behavioural and communicative 
responses to epistemic uncertainty situations. 
Infants show sensitivity to the levels of informational uncertainty before the 
development of explicit metacognitive skills (Carruthers, 2020; Goupil & Kouider, 
2016; Kim, Sodian, & Proust, 2020). Studies of epistemic uncertainty in infants and 
preschool age children demonstrate an increase in autonomous and social information 
seeking following such events. Infants approach and explore the unexpected (Stahl & 
Feigenson, 2015; Sim & Xu, 2017), turn to others to obtain situational information 
(Goupil, Romand-Monnier, & Kouider, 2016; Stenberg, 2012; Vaish, Demir, & 
Baldwin, 2011), and point to learn about novel toy labels (Begus & Southgate, 2012; 
Lucca & Wilbourn, 2018, 2019).  
 Preschoolers explore ambiguous novel toys and try to independently reason 
about the underlying causal mechanisms (Legare, Gelman, & Wellman, 2010; Schulz 
& Bonawitz, 2007), as well as pose questions to others when they themselves are unable 
to find an answer (Choinard, 2007; Harris, Bartz, & Rowe, 2017). Older children 
strategically seek information from social partners who they deem the best sources of 
relevant expertise, critically assessing when to trust and when to exert doubt on others’ 
testimony in order to acquire sufficient information to problem-solve (Mills, Legare, 
Grant, & Landrum, 2011; Mills, 2013). Despite preschoolers’ overwhelming inclination 
to endorse the testimony of trustworthy others even when it is counter-intuitive to their 
own perceptual judgement (Li & Yow, 2018; Ronfard, Chen, & Harris, 2018; Ronfard, 
Lane, Wang, & Harris, 2017), they nevertheless seek to resolve uncertainty by 
clarifying their understanding of the fact or idea (Frazier et al., 2009; Tizard & Hughes, 
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1984), obtain satisfactory, non-circular responses to causal questions (Kurkul & 
Corriveau, 2018), or obtain new evidence when lacking confidence in their own 
knowledge (Coughlin, Hembacher, Lyons, & Ghetti, 2014).  
Infants’ demonstrated ability to act, both independently and socially, in an 
epistemic environment suggests the developmental lag between their explicit 
knowledge understanding and their actual, observable behaviours, in that while lacking 
the ability to reflect on the need for information or reasoning behind seeking particular 
information, preverbal infants nevertheless exhibit such behaviours. One of the broad 
aims of the current thesis is therefore to investigate in more nuance infants’ information 
seeking from others when facing epistemic uncertainty in order to elucidate the 
ontogeny of question-asking (Butler, Ronfard, & Corriveau, 2020). What are the 
communicative skills that enable infants’ interaction with social partners to satisfy their 
epistemic goals? 
II.iii. Development of information seeking  
Social information gathering is at the core of cultural transmission of knowledge 
(Baldwin & Moses, 1996; Csibra & Gergely, 2006; Spelke et al., 2013; Tomasello, 
1999). How do infants accomplish information solicitation prior to emergence of 
language? Preverbal infants’ communicative repertoire includes social gaze, reaching, 
pointing, and vocalizing. These behaviours are among the early communicative tools 
available for seeking emotional guidance when uncertain, asking for help, and placing 
instrumental requests (Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975; Tomasello, Carpenter, & 
Liszkowski, 2007; Walden & Ogan, 1988). Recent accounts further proposed that 
through the early emerging interpersonal sensitivity, these behaviours may also enable 
curiosity-driven, active social learning, aimed at gathering information about the 
immediate environment from someone who can be regarded as familiar with it, thus 
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serving an interrogative, or information seeking function (Baldwin, 2000; Beier & 
Spelke, 2012; Grosse, Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010; Harris & Lane, 2014; 
Southgate, Van Maanen, & Csibra, 2007). As such, these preverbal behaviours may be 
the earliest precursors to fully developed, mature social information seeking through 
posing verbal questions. 
Interrogative pointing 
Among communicative tools most pronounced in their function to seek 
information is index-finger pointing – a behaviour that emerges between 11 and 18 
months. Such prelinguistic pointing has been closely linked with language development 
and therefore regarded as one of the most important milestones in early cognitive 
development (Bates, 1979; Colonnesi, Stams, Koster, & Noom, 2010). Traditionally, 
infants’ pointing has been classified into the earlier emerging imperative and later 
developing declarative (Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975). Imperative pointing – a 
request to obtain an object – assumes an immediate reward goal, whereas declarative 
pointing aims at indicating an object of interest and constitutes a more advanced form 
of behaviour produced as a tool for communication rather than an egocentric expression. 
More recently, two additional motives for infants’ pointing have been proposed – 
informative (Tomasello, Carpenter & Liszkowski, 2007) and interrogative (Southgate 
et al., 2007).  
The proposed informative pointing can be exemplified by a study reported by 
Liszkowski, Carpenter and Tomasello (2008), which showed that infants used pointing 
selectively to provide ignorant social partners with needed information. Overall, 
extensive work on pointing production and comprehension converges that in the second 
year of life, infants use pointing appropriately and selectively, with some understanding 
of social intentions. For example, when parents share their interest in an object, infants 
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point declaratively, when they request an object, infants offer it to them, and when 
parents point informatively, infants search for the information alluded to (Esteve-
Gibert, Prieto, & Liszkowski, 2017). Thus, infants understand when social partners 
provide them with information both through verbal and non-verbal means of 
communication and start to produce similar communicative signals themselves. 
Theorists have also argued that infants recognize an interrogative motive in their 
non-verbal communication, such that the emergence of index-finger pointing marks the 
transition from infants’ selective attention to information to explicitly requesting 
information, rather than an actual object as in imperative pointing, from their social 
partners (Franco & Butterworth, 1996; Lucca, 2020; Harris, 2020; Southgate et al., 
2007). In a seminal study in support of this hypothesis, Begus and Southgate (2012) 
showed that at 16 months, infants pointed to the novel objects presented in front of them 
only when the experimenter seated across from the infant has proven to be previously 
informative. If the experimenter had a history of mislabelling or appeared unsure in 
labels she provided, infants were less likely to point towards a novel object that was 
shown to them, as if hesitating to seek labelling information from the poorly informed 
social partner. Kovács et al (2014) built on this paradigm and showed that already at 12 
months, infants seek new information from knowledgeable adults. In the initial study, 
infants who interacted with an informative experimenter were more likely to point in 
their presence than infants who interacted with an experimenter providing engagement 
but no information. In the follow-up study, infants used interrogative pointing more 
when their interlocutors provided novel labels to ambiguous toys (e.g., “dax” when 
presented with an atypical member of the car category – a racing car) than when they 
provided familiar labels to the same ambiguous toys (e.g., “car”). These studies suggest 
that pointing infants are able to use this communicative tool to selectively request 
 22 
information from others, not just share their experience with others (declarative) or ask 
for the object (imperative). 
Interrogative pointing has been also shown to uniquely facilitate knowledge 
gain. Begus, Gliga, and Southgate (2014) showed that after 16-month-olds pointed 
towards an object of their interest, they were significantly more likely to learn that 
object’s function when it was presented immediately after infants pointed toward that 
object, than when this information was provided for an object not pointed to. Lucca and 
Wilbourn (2018) further demonstrated that pointing is uniquely positioned to offer such 
learning advantage as compared to other communicative cues, such as reaching or 
looking, and expect specific information in response to their points (Lucca & Wilbourn, 
2019). Infants therefore not only take an interrogative stance, but also direct their own 
learning through pointing gestures. 
Pointing emerged as a pronounced pre-linguistic means to seek information 
from others. But does this mean that interrogative communication begins only with 
emergence of pointing and is not available to pre-pointing infants? Even before 
mastering pointing themselves, infants understand its communicative function (Krehm, 
Onishi, & Vouloumanos, 2014). It has been proposed that pointing foundationally relies 
on the ability to establish joint attention (Baldwin, 1991) and best facilitates learning 
when coupled with this earlier emerging cognitive achievement (Tomasello & Farrar, 
1986). Supporting evidence comes from a longitudinal training study (Matthews, 
Behne, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2012) in which caregivers were asked to deliberately 
teach their 9-11-month-olds to point towards objects on a daily basis. However, training 
itself was not a significant predictor of pointing a month later; rather, infants’ gaze 
following ability was. Earlier development therefore might hold cues to cognitive 
mechanisms that underlie it. What are the developmental precursors to interrogative 
 23 
pointing? We argue that social referencing is one of such plausible precursors and 
review in the following sections both the classic accounts of social referencing and the 
recent studies that share the proposed interrogative perspective. 
Social referencing as information seeking 
It has been long noted that infants pay special attention to human faces, which 
may underlie their predisposition to learn about the world through a caregiver’s face 
(Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002; Frank, Amso & Johnson, 2014). With 
development, looking at others allows them to obtain crucial feedback on the situation. 
For instance, infants check in with their caregivers upon encountering a potentially 
dangerous situation, such as an obstacle on their path, a barking dog, or a spider. Social 
referencing is comprised of two behavioural elements: initiating a look at the adult and 
using adult’s emotional cues in guiding further actions (Walden, 1991). Thus, if the 
caregiver is not showing any signs of distress when the infant references them, the infant 
would cease being worried as well. A number of studies utilizing this approach 
informed the definition for a behaviour classically termed social referencing, underlying 
the importance of affective processes in the ontogeny of social learning (Campos & 
Stenberg, 1981; Clément & Dukes, 2017; Feinman, 1982; Walle, Reschke, & Knothe, 
2017). 
Several theories have been proposed to explain the development of social 
referencing behaviour. Early emergence theories (Campos & Stenberg, 1981; Vaillant-
Molina & Bahrick, 2012; Walden & Ogan, 1988) propose that social looking arises in 
response to novel or ambiguous events as early as 6 months. In contrast, Baldwin and 
Moses (1996) and Schaffer (1984, 1989) argue that intentional information seeking 
social referencing behaviour does not occur until after 12 months, only after a year of 
social learning and development of the ability to infer communicative intentions in 
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social interactions. These latter accounts propose that successful active social 
knowledge gathering is dependent on infants’ implicit understanding of communicative 
acts and meanings transmitted through them, as well as assessing their own need for 
information and using communicative cues to achieve their information-driven goals, 
which is not possible until the second year of life. To adjudicate between these 
competing accounts and between low-level, associative, and higher-level, cognitively 
rich explanations, a developmental perspective can be adopted (Bruner, 1999; Feinman, 
Roberts, Hsieh, Sawyer & Swanson, 1992; Southgate, 2019). According to such 
approach, social referencing in the first year of life may constitute information seeking 
with rudimentary understanding of intentional communication, which is nevertheless 
sufficient to solicit timely and reliable transfer of knowledge from social partners. 
Whether or not preverbal infants have a full grasp of intentionality of their 
communicative acts, they do learn a great amount of new and useful information 
through initiating a social gaze, which may be a genesis of social information exchange. 
With development, social referencing as information seeking becomes more cognitively 
sophisticated. 
Social referencing as affective information seeking 
A number of classic studies best exemplify what is typically referred to as social 
referencing. Sorce et al (1985) watched as 14-month-olds approached a visual cliff and 
manipulated mothers’ facial expressions as positive or negative. Infants were keen on 
checking in with their mothers before making the decision whether to cross the cliff or 
not, but only when the cliff was deep and not shallow. This receptivity to emotional 
expressions of other, trusted people has been viewed as a primary function of social 
looks. Zarbatany and Lamb (1985) investigated social referencing as a function of the 
information source – mothers rather than strangers. A toy spider served as an 
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uncertainty provoking stimulus for 14-month-olds. Depending on the facial expression 
of joy or fear on the mothers’ or the strangers’ face, infants selectively utilized this 
emotional information only from mothers. Further, infants used unfamiliar adults’ 
emotional reactions only when their expressions were relevant to the object, but not 
when adults’ access to relevant information was in question, e.g., an adult whose view 
of the toy was occluded by a barrier (Moses, Baldwin, Rosicky, & Tidball, 2001). It 
stems from these studies that infants are able to appreciate, deliberately seek, and 
incorporate intentional emotional expressions from their trusted adults into their 
decision making about the encountered emotionally uncertain situation. 
Social referencing propensity is also affected by stimulus ambiguity and 
situational uncertainty. For instance, upon receiving affective information in the 
paradigm similar to the visual cliff situation described above, 18-month-olds used it 
selectively only when their own perceptual uncertainty was high (Tamis-LeMonda, 
Adolph, Lobo, Karasik, Ishak, & Dimitropoulou, 2008). Infants faced a slope of 
different angles and were first given an opportunity to independently assess whether it 
was safe, risky, or borderline. If their own assessment of the risk was high but the 
emotional reaction received from the caregiver was positive, infants were less likely to 
accept her encouragement to cross. Similarly, when the caregiver projected 
discouragement for safe slopes, infants ignored her advice. Crucially, in the borderline 
uncertainty cases, infants deferred to caregivers’ advice. Building on this study, Kim 
and Kwak (2011) tested younger infants at 12 and 16 months by presenting them with 
a variety of toys chosen to elicit infants’ positive, negative, or ambiguous reactions. 
Ambiguous (but not positive or negative) toys elicited higher rates of social referencing 
and prompted infants to incorporate emotional responses to their social looks into their 
decision whether to approach or avoid the toys. Infants are therefore able to both assess 
 26 
first-hand evidence and selectively seek other’s guidance in situations of uncertainty. 
An important point of discussion has been whether social referencing in 
uncertain situations constitutes information seeking or attachment motivated behaviour 
(Ainsworth, 1992; Stenberg & Hagekull, 2007; Striano et al., 2006). First, it has been 
demonstrated that social referencing is not selectively used with caregivers, but also 
with other, familiar and unfamiliar, adults (Stenberg & Hagekull, 2007; Striano & 
Rochat, 2000; Stenberg, 2009). In contrast with the exclusive attachment-based 
proposal, Striano and Rochat (2000) found that 10-month-olds referred to the 
experimenter when she was attending to the ambiguous stimulus (remote-controlled 
barking dog toy). Similarly, Stenberg and Hagekull (2007) found that infants preferred 
to look at the experimenter rather than their caregiver when presented with ambiguous 
toys and acted in accordance with relevant information received from referencing them, 
which was explained from the perspective of the situational expertise account, since 
experimenters in the laboratory environment are more likely than infants’ caregivers to 
be knowledgeable about the ambiguous toys they presented, where they, rather than the 
caregiver, are ‘in charge’. This, however, could be explained by the lower-level, 
associative learning process, since it was the experimenter who handled the toys, rather 
than the caregiver. Furthermore, social referencing may have been driven by a novelty 
or surprise effect – a simple association with a new person and a new environment. 
Controlling for these lower-level explanations, the following set of findings 
provided stronger support for the expertise rather than attachment (or comfort seeking) 
account of social referencing. This work builds on the proposal that infants are sensitive 
to the social distribution of knowledge and make use of this in their selective social 
referencing behaviour (Feinman et al., 1992; Stenberg, 2009, 2013). Stenberg (2003, 
2009, 2012, 2013) demonstrated that infants solicit input from situational experts rather 
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than familiar people, indicative of their ability to appraise the epistemic dimension of 
environmental uncertainty. In one study, regardless of whether the caregiver or the 
experimenter presented the ambiguous toy, infants referred more to the experimenter 
(Stenberg, 2009). Here, thus, when a situational expert was an unfamiliar experimenter, 
infants were more likely to refer to them rather than their primary caregiver, who in this 
context was as uncertain about the situation as the infant herself. Experimenters’ 
familiarity and expertise was manipulated systematically in another set of studies, 
demonstrating that more familiar and more competent adults attracted more social 
referencing looks when they provided positive information about ambiguous toys 
(Stenberg, 2012), and expert adults attracted more social referencing, regardless of their 
familiarity (Stenberg, 2013).  
In sum, classic accounts of social referencing propose that children refer to 
social partners to gather their reactions to uncertainty which is affective in nature, in 
order to determine how to appropriately react to it. However, with development, the 
same behaviour can become less emotionally laden, transforming into strategic 
information seeking rather than social appraisal seeking. More recent studies open a 
possibility that social referencing serves a cognitively rich function of epistemic 
information seeking as proto-interrogative, requestive acts, which are developing before 
interrogative pointing (for reviews, see Begus & Southgate, 2018; Harris & Lane, 
2014). The following section reviews the emerging research of infants’ social 
referencing in the context of non-affective information transmission. 
Social referencing as epistemic information seeking 
Following research on pointing as an interrogative request and social 
referencing as emotional appraisal seeking, recent studies started to explore social 
referencing as a behaviour signalling a request for epistemic information. These 
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experimental reports focused on situations of cognitive-perceptual ambiguity rather 
than unpleasantness or perceived danger – situations of epistemic uncertainty described 
as being “slightly out of the ordinary”, i.e., with a lower threshold of uncertainty than 
the typical highly emotionally arousing paradigms (Nishida & Lillard, 2007). New 
reports show that infants refer to their social partners when their expectations are 
violated (Dunn & Bremner, 2017; Koenig & Echols, 2003; Walden, Kim, McCoy, & 
Karrass, 2007), upon detecting humorous situations (Mireault et al., 2014), and to obtain 
episodic or generic information (Harris et al., 2017; Goupil et al., 2016; Lucca & 
Wilbourn, 2018; Vaish et al., 2011). These studies challenge the long-standing view 
that social referencing seeks others’ socio-emotional engagement and is not fully 
intentionally communicative until the second year of infant’s life (Baldwin & Moses, 
1996; Schaffer, 1984, 1989; Walden & Ogan, 1988). We review some of these studies 
in more detail below. 
A set of studies of social looking in a word learning context reported how infants 
respond to a semantic violation of expectation (VoE) – blatant object mislabelling by 
an adult (e.g., calling a shoe a duck rather than a shoe; Koenig & Echols, 2003). These 
studies showed that 16-month-old infants regarded knowledgeable social partners (as 
opposed to adults who did not have access to information, adults who did not provide a 
label or non-social, inanimate source of information) as useful informants in situations 
of uncertainty. When a human speaker labelled an object incongruently rather than 
congruently, infants looked significantly longer to them. However, when the human 
speaker was positioned to face away from objects she was labelling, infants looked 
longer to her instead in congruent trials, as if surprised that a person with no perceptual 
experience of an object would be able to label it correctly. These findings are consistent 
with the results of Dunn and Bremner (2017), showing that 6-month-old infants 
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responded with social looks to events violating core physical properties of objects (e.g., 
when an initially presented object was covertly switched for a different object), but less 
so to events that were merely novel. These results stand in contrast to the well-
established looking time measure, which here was not sensitive enough to differentiate 
the two events. It remains unclear if 6-month-olds’ social referencing can be explained 
by the higher level of uncertainty in the VoE event as compared to the lower level of 
uncertainty novel event, thus instead eliciting socio-emotional checking in with the 
caregiver rather than actually seeking information. Nevertheless, collectively such 
studies highlight that just like affective uncertainty, epistemic uncertainty reliably 
elicits infants’ social referencing.  
Does social referencing in presence of epistemic uncertainty indicate selective 
information seeking? Vaish, Demir and Baldwin (2011) presented 13- to 18-month-old 
infants with either one or two novel objects, designed to induce referential ambiguity 
when only one label was provided by the experimenter. Indeed, infants looked at the 
experimenter more in the uncertainty situation when two objects were presented. In the 
first experiment, only the first trial of the two produced the significant result, which the 
authors associated with fatigue effects, and subsequently, the second experiment was 
limited to one trial. Further, the significant primary outcomes differed across the two 
studies: duration of looks in first experiment and the number of looks in the second 
experiment (for a broader discussion of this matter, refer to the section V.iii. Choice of 
outcome measures). Despite these methodological considerations, the study showed 
that when presented with two novel objects and only one novel label, infants as young 
as 13 months responded to this referential ambiguity with more social looking at the 
speaker. Furthermore, to eliminate the alternative explanation that infants may have 
simply oriented to the speaker uttering the label rather than sought information from 
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them, the experimental design featured a baseline phase when no novel labels were 
provided. There were no significant differences in social referencing in the presence of 
one versus two novel objects in a baseline phase, suggesting that infants indeed actively 
sought clarification before mapping a novel word onto a novel object. Overall, this 
research suggests that social looking may not be selectively used in emotional 
uncertainty, and is not only an indicator of attention to the social context or the speaker, 
but could also be a communicative tool used for epistemic (in this case, referential) 
information seeking. However, while infants’ looks here can be interpreted as if asking 
“Which one?”, the design of this study does not fully rule out the possibility that infants 
may have oriented to the speaker to establish joint attention on the situation deemed 
unusual or ambiguous, without the explicit information seeking intention. 
Building on the Vaish et al. (2011) paradigm, Hembacher and colleagues 
(Hembacher, de Mayo, & Frank, 2017; Hembacher, de Mayo, & Frank, 2020) 
investigated selective social referencing in word learning in 2-5-year-old children. In 
their task, children were asked to make an active choice of the object following the 
experimenter’s labelling which differed in the level of presented uncertainty, from the 
mutually exclusive situation when one novel object and one familiar object were 
presented, to the fully ambiguous situation when both objects were novel. Social 
referencing was coded at four experimental phases, from the time the label was provided 
to the time the child made an object choice. Children made social looks when they 
anticipated information gain, that is, only when objects presented referential ambiguity 
and they were not able to make the correct choice independently (using the principle of 
mutual exclusivity). Interestingly, infants did not gaze selectively at the experimenter 
when she was providing the labels, which is in contrast with the Vaish and colleagues’ 
(2011) study. This may be due to the differences in design flow (e.g., the direction of 
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the labeller’s gaze, the number of practice and test trials, the presence or absence of 
comprehension trials, whether infants were able to hold objects and at what stage in the 
procedure, and the level of uncertainty that was manipulated) or in the age group 
sampled (13-18 vs 2-5 year olds). But it also leaves open the possibility that infants may 
use social referencing as a communicative signal both when referential ambiguity is 
being presented to them (during the labelling; Vaish et al., 2011) and when they need 
to make an explicit behavioural decision themselves (during the object choice following 
the experimenter’s labelling; Hembacher et al., 2017). Overall, this study showed that 
social referencing increases, becomes faster and more proactive with development 
(from 2 to 5), as children continue to use social gaze interrogatively even after additional 
communicative tools (pointing and verbal) are developmentally available to them.  
Another group of studies suggests that infants use social gaze as a way to ask 
for missing information upon recognising their own ignorance. In one report, children 
aged 16-33 months were shown a mix of pictures, where some represented familiar 
items (e.g., book, bird), and other unfamiliar items that children could not name. 
Children’s looks at the speaker and their expressions of doubt and ignorance (e.g., 
“Umm…”; “I don’t know”; asking adult: “What’s that?) were positively associated 
(Harris et al., 2017). Similarly, in another study, 20-month-old infants had to remember 
which box contained the toy and choose the box they thought it was in after a delay of 
varied length (Goupil, Romand-Monnier, & Kouider, 2016). Infants in the experimental 
group were trained to ask their caregivers for help by looking at them, while the control 
group infants had to respond to the memory test without such help. Infants in the 
experimental condition used social referencing more, especially when their uncertainty 
at test was high, such as in impossible trials (when the object was hidden outside of 
infants’ awareness) or trials with longer delays before the memory retrieval phase. It 
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was interpreted as infants acting strategically to avoid making errors by declining 
difficult choices – not responding when they did not know where the toy was, but 
instead initiating a social look at their caregiver who was able to provide an answer. 
The plausibility of an alternative explanation exists, however, that social referencing 
was motivated by the adults’ contingent responsiveness in the experimental but not in 
control condition. Furthermore, despite being trained to do so, a large proportion of 
infants in the experimental condition never asked for help, and while the control group 
was not trained to ask for help, they still occasionally did so spontaneously, which may 
be indicative of a socio-emotional rather than strategically interrogative motivation for 
social referencing. Despite the limitations, these results suggest that preverbal infants 
seek help from knowledgeable others to obtain information they are lacking due to 
epistemic uncertainty.  
Notwithstanding the progress made in the literature reviewed in this section, a 
question whether social referencing looks, construed as explicit communicative 
behaviours, underlie epistemic information seeking during epistemic uncertainty 
remains controversial, warranting further systematic investigation. Experimental 
Chapters 1 and 2 directly contribute to addressing this issue. 
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 Active information transmission 
The previous section reviewed the current state of the literature on children’s 
early propensity to seek information from their social partners. In line with the bi-
directional nature of the social knowledge exchange process, the current section focuses 
on children’s ability to transmit the knowledge they acquired from social partners to 
others. We present existing evidence that infants’ remarkable ability to direct their own 
knowledge acquisition by actively seeking input from social sources is mirrored by their 
ability to convey the acquired evidence to conspecifics.  
To investigate children’s active social learning, this thesis asked how children 
who learn from different social partners, some who are more knowledgeable and others 
less so, or some who are actively teaching them while others are not, start to transmit 
acquired knowledge to others who are more ignorant. To focus on characterizing the 
manifestations of information transmission observable in early development, in this 
thesis, despite the debated differences (e.g., Kline, 2015; Skerry, Lambert, Powell, & 
McAuliffe, 2013; Strauss & Ziv, 2012), we use the term ‘teaching’ as a synonym to 
‘information giving’, ‘information sharing’, ‘information propagation’, and 
‘information transmission’, in line with the broad definition of teaching as a “behaviour 
that evolved to facilitate learning in others” (Kline, 2015, p. 2). 
III.i. Cognitive mechanisms of information transmission 
Teaching is an essential element of human cumulative culture (Kline, 2015; 
Thornton & Raihani, 2008). Not only are children efficient recipients of others’ teaching 
– their own teaching behaviours may be key to understanding the very nature of 
information transmission which enables cultural evolution (Ronfard & Harris, 2015; 
Strauss, Calero, & Sigman, 2014). However, the basic underlying cognitive and social 
mechanisms of teaching in children are poorly understood (Corriveau, Ronfard, & Cui, 
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2018; Paulus, Kim, & Sodian, 2015; Pasquinelli & Strauss, 2018). This section briefly 
describes four broad theoretical approaches addressing this problem, which we called 
behavioural, natural cognitive ability, mentalistic, and pedagogical (for relevant reviews 
and alternative taxonomies of theoretical approaches see Kline, 2015; Skerry et al., 
2013; Pasquinelli & Strauss, 2018). 
Animal and comparative research proposed that teaching, in its minimalist 
behavioural form, is an evolutionary adaptation also present in nonhuman animals (Caro 
& Hauser, 1992; Thornton & Raihani, 2008). Here, teaching is characterised by a 
modified behaviour of a teacher, who uses specific reinforcement strategies to provide 
an experience or an example to a naïve learner, as a result of which the learner masters 
a skill or obtains knowledge which would be otherwise unobtainable or obtainable only 
later in life. Importantly, teaching presents no immediate benefit and is costly to the 
teacher though beneficial to the learner. In observed animal behaviour, teaching is hard-
wired, specific to the problem (e.g., locating food sources or prey-handling) and 
contingent (requires active engagement of both the teacher and the learner). For 
example, in ants, if the learner and the teacher inadvertently lose contact during the 
teaching session, the learner begins to independently explore the surroundings to try to 
solve the food search problem on its own, and once the teacher is able to re-establish 
contact with the learner, immediately returns to the ‘teaching session’ (Franks & 
Richardson, 2006). Teaching in humans, as opposed to animals, is characterised by its 
flexibility, diversity, and domain-generality (Burdett, Dean, & Ronfard, 2017; Hoppitt, 
Brown, Kendal, Rendell, Thornton, Webster, & Laland, 2008). In accordance with this 
evolutionary behavioural approach, high skill and high value information is more likely 
to be explicitly taught rather than learned through other social learning strategies, such 
as observation or imitation.  
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The natural cognitive ability approach is specific to humans and proposes that 
teaching undergoes a developmental change, from proto-teaching in infants who have 
not yet developed a theory of mind, to emergent teaching when such capacities appear 
in ontogeny (Strauss et al., 2002; Strauss & Ziv, 2012; Strauss et al., 2014). At the core 
of this approach lie the arguments that teaching is a human universal and a 
spontaneously emerging behaviour that becomes more complex and sophisticated with 
development yet occurs without the need for explicit awareness of the underlying logic 
of one’s teaching choices. An extension of this reasoning, a constructionist approach 
has been proposed to characterise the building blocks which might be common to both 
simple and more complex forms of teaching and thus to build a bridge between the 
variety of approaches and account for rudimentary teaching behaviours in animals 
(Pasquinelli & Strauss, 2018). 
According to the mentalistic approach, teaching relies on understanding of own 
and others’ mental states, accomplished upon a teacher recognising a knowledge gap 
between themselves as knowledgeable and others as ignorant, and intending to close 
this knowledge gap (Premack, 2007). Consequently, this approach applies when 
children start to appreciate teaching as a special communicative act that leads to a 
change in beliefs (Gelman, Ware, Manczak, & Graham, 2013; Rhodes, Bonawitz, 
Shafto, Chen, & Caglar, 2015; Sobel & Letourneau, 2016). The key aspect of this 
approach is demonstrated by studies that explored the relationship between children’s 
understanding of their own teaching behaviour and their theory of mind skills (Sobel & 
Letourneau, 2016; Ziv & Frye, 2004). However, the findings that even adults are not 
always aware of the underlying logic of their teaching (Strauss, 1993), the debates about 
the early emergence of intentionality (Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995) and the 
proposed existence of the ‘implicit theory of mind’ in infants (e.g., Scott & Baillargeon, 
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2017) cast doubt on the fundamental reliance of teaching on mentalising capacity. 
Mitigating these discrepancies, it has been further proposed that rather than teaching as 
such, it is specifically the selective and high-quality contingent teaching that is 
dependent on children’s mentalising, metacognition, as well as executive function skills 
(Corriveau et al., 2018). According to this approach, advanced, selective teaching is a 
function of children’s understanding of knowledge distribution in social interactions 
(Ronfard et al., 2017; Ziv, & Frye, 2004; Ziv, Solomon, Strauss, & Frye, 2016).  
The pedagogical approach as described here broadly encompasses several 
prominent theories, united despite the important differences between them by 
converging evidence of early infants’ sensitivity to other’s pedagogical communication. 
According to the theory of Instructed Learning (Kruger & Tomasello, 1996; Tomasello, 
2016; Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007), the teacher provides information both for 
epistemic and social reasons. Pedagogical behaviour here is construed as inherently 
prosocial, such that the transfer of information occurs to facilitate cooperation and social 
coordination. Efficacy of teaching is largely reliant on children’s propensity for faithful 
imitation following enhanced sensitivity to pedagogical demonstrations. As a socially 
salient mechanism of knowledge transfer, teaching allows members of the social group 
to not only achieve epistemic unity, but also to achieve common ground. This reasoning 
explains to a large extent the human propensity to transmit normative and conforming 
information to their ingroup members. While not conceptualised as such explicitly, it 
can be inferred that according to this approach, infants are not only receptive to this 
kind of pedagogy but themselves engage in transmitting information to others driven by 
prosocial motivation, and do so as early as 12 months via informative pointing 
behaviour (e.g., Liszkowski et al., 2006; Tomasello et al., 2007; see section III.ii 
Development of information transmission, for more details of these studies). 
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Another prominent theory which fits broadly under the umbrella of the 
pedagogical approach to teaching conceptualisation, Natural Pedagogy (NP; Csibra & 
Gergely, 2009, 2011), places utmost importance on children’s receptivity to cognitively 
opaque and generalisable information explicitly communicated with the use of 
ostensive cues. This special type of communication signals that the knowledge being 
conveyed is relevant and generic, and that the communicator is knowledgeable and 
helpful. While the NP theory does not directly address children’s own teaching abilities, 
it has been proposed that pedagogy as a teaching strategy should be applicable both to 
adults and children themselves, and as such enables fast and efficient bi-directional 
transfer of culturally relevant knowledge (Ronfard & Harris, 2018; Strauss et al., 2014). 
In support, research documented children’s own spontaneous use of ostensive cues 
when teaching others, which included direct eye gaze, informing gestures, contingent 
and verbally explicit signals (Calero, Zylberberg, Ais, Semelman, & Sigman, 2015; 
Calero, Goldin, & Sigman, 2018; Whiten & Flynn, 2010).  
Overall, NP posits that infants interpret ostensive communication from adults as 
teaching them generalisable, rather than episodic, information. In this thesis, we are 
interested at what point can infants themselves take the role of the teachers of such 
information. Despite the fact that NP has not explicitly contributed to theorising about 
child-led information transmission, the theory itself warrants deeper consideration in 
light of the current thesis (see Experimental Chapter 3). What NP proposes is that 
ostensive signalling uniquely prepares infants for learning, above and beyond 
increasing salience and attracting their attention. This claim has been most strongly 
supported by studies that showed that infants follow an adult’s gaze when it is preceded 
by direct ostensive cues (e.g., direct gaze and infant-directed speech; Senju & Csibra, 
2008; Yoon, Johnson & Csibra, 2008). However, studies have also shown that other 
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salient but non-ostensive cues may lead to the same effects (e.g., shievering; Gredebäck, 
et al., 2018; Szufnarowska et al., 2014) and some of the original findings could not be 
replicated (Silverstein, Gliga, Westermann, & Parise, 2019), suggesting that attentional 
mechanisms may be responsible for the increased learning effects. In light of these 
discrepancies, the inherently innate nature of NP has been subject to criticism, with 
alternative proposals arguing for the non-specific, domain-general adaptations view of 
social learning strategies, focusing on cultural and associative learning, rather than 
innate cognitive processes (Heyes, 2016; Nakao & Andrews, 2014).  
In sum, the varied theoretical understanding of teaching has been instrumental 
to embracing the complexity and diversity of behaviours related to information 
transmission and supporting novel empirical investigations into its ontogeny. At the 
same time, the disciplinary differences have led to some discrepancies in results and 
difficulties in interpretations, which are discussed in the following section. 
III.ii. Development of information transmission 
Despite the wealth of theoretical advancements in understanding child-led 
teaching, relatively few studies have investigated the emergence of information 
transmission in infancy. This might be attributed both to theoretical and methodological 
reasons. For instance, if presuming that the cognitive prerequisites for teaching include 
a developed theory of mind and understanding of one’s own and others’ epistemic states 
(that the teacher intends to change the epistemic state of the learner), research questions 
based on such presumption might only be applicable to preschool age children, e.g., do 
children choose to teach those who expressed the need for information, those who are 
capable of learning new information, and whether they tailor their teaching to the needs 
of the learner. On the other hand, some evidence suggests that children’s information 
giving emerges spontaneously as early as 12 months, which can be explained by the 
 39 
behavioural, teaching as natural cognitive ability, and pedagogical, but not by the 
mentalising approach, as outlined in the preceding section. Here, the appropriate 
research questions could focus on the prevalence of certain information transmission 
behaviours across development and social situations. 
To account for such inconsistencies and unite several theoretical approaches, 
Strauss and Ziv (2012) proposed a developmental taxonomy of teaching strategies, 
which we adopt in the current thesis. This taxonomy advances from proto-teaching – 
transmission of the here-and-now, episodic information, such as pointing to a location 
of a hidden object – to emergent teaching of generic and generalisable information, such 
as a label or a function of an object, to adult-like systematic contingent teaching. In this 
transition, children master a range of teaching strategies, such as direct assistance, 
demonstration, explanation, and specific response to learners (e.g., checking in, 
scaffolding, providing feedback, offering praise). For example, the basic demonstration 
as a teaching strategy entails a teacher highlighting pertinent features of information 
(e.g., the rules of the game), with or without the learner’s direct or contingent 
involvement or the teachers’ consideration to the learner’s mental state. A more 
advanced form of this teaching strategy would involve a demonstration accompanied 
by verbal explanations, such as describing steps required to achieve a particular action 
outcome. Thus, the precision of the adopted operational definition of teaching and its 
developmentally appropriate strategies allows for more accurate representations of 
children’s behaviours and thoughtful interpretations of results (see also Wood, Wood, 
Ainsworth, & O’Malley, 1995, for an ontogenetic model of children as teachers).  
Furthermore, the methodological choices are also important to consider in order 
to derive a coherent understanding of the existing findings. A variety of methods has 
been developed to elucidate the phenomenon of child-led information transmission 
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from different perspectives: observation studies (Howe & Recchia, 2005; Maynard, 
2002), diffusion transmission chain studies (Flynn & Whiten, 2008, 2010; see detailed 
explanation below), tasks when children are observed as they spontaneously choose to 
teach another child (Ashley & Tomasello, 1998), tasks where the recipient of teaching 
is a puppet operated by the experimenter (Clegg & Legare, 2016; Corriveau et al., 2018; 
Ronfard, Was, & Harris, 2016), tasks where children are asked what they would teach 
if they were to (hypothetically) interact with an ignorant person (Bridgers et al., 2020), 
and tasks where adult experimenters play the role of an ignorant adult to prompt 
children’s teaching in a live interaction (Calero et al., 2015; Vredenburgh, Kushnir, & 
Casasola, 2015), as well as computational modelling (Bridgers et al., 2020). Based on 
these, for example, whereas older children’s ‘teaching’ of a puppet learner may be 
admissible evidence of their information giving, using such method with preverbal 
infants may lead to unsubstantiated conclusions, because infants may still lack a 
developed ability to engage in pretend play and ToM skills needed to construe puppets 
as agents in knowledge transmission context. Similarly, explicitly asking a preschool 
child about their knowledge transmission preferences may not be as effective a method 
as asking school-aged children, due to their developing language skills and social 
demands that imagining and elaborating on a hypothetical scenario presents. 
In light of the described theoretical and methodological considerations, several 
ground-breaking studies investigated the development of child-led information 
transmission before preschool years. Infants have been reported to engage in informing 
of others as early as 12 months (Liszkowski et al., 2006; Liszkowski, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2008). In this set of studies, infants pointed to an object to inform an 
experimenter who was looking for it while expressing uncertainty about its location, 
and did so only when the experimenter actually did not have prior knowledge about the 
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object’s location rather than when they expressed puzzlement despite actually knowing 
the location. Similarly, another study of infants’ informative pointing in their first year 
showed that they are sensitive to others’ lack of specific information (Meng & Hashiya, 
2014). Here, infants selectively informed the experimenter of a novel object which was 
introduced when the experimenter was not present in the room, despite having paid 
equal attention to both a familiar and a novel object. These cases of informative pointing 
were interpreted as infants’ developing sensitivity to others’ knowledge states and 
spontaneous information transmission to remedy the knowledge gap between 
themselves and the ignorant adult, rather than infants pointing for self-benefitting 
instrumental or declarative reasons. According to the classification proposed by Strauss 
and Ziv (2012), such transfer of episodic rather than generic and generalisable 
information would constitute proto-teaching. 
Studies with toddlers demonstrate their engagement in both episodic and generic 
information transmission. In interaction with their caregivers, two-year-olds were more 
likely to point to, as well as verbally identify the new toy and its location when the 
caregivers did not witness its appearance, as compared to when the caregivers were 
present in the room when the new toy was presented (O’Neill, 1996). Thus, like infants, 
toddlers spontaneously share information they came to exclusively possess. Ashley and 
Tomasello (1998) studied peer-to-peer transmission in the context of a social 
cooperation task. In dyads, toddlers and preschoolers learned to perform two (relatively 
complex) actions to receive a reward and were then given an opportunity to teach this 
sequence of actions to a naïve peer. Unlike older children, two-year-olds did not succeed 
at neither independently learning the task nor later teaching it, which was interpreted as 
the lack of emerging teaching ability at this age. However, it is important to note that 
the potential confounding factor here was the complexity of the action sequences which 
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may have exceeded toddlers’ cognitive and motor capacities, and the socially 
demanding peer context which may have exceeded toddlers’ social-emotional skills. 
In contrast, Vredenburgh, Kushnir and Casasola (2015) presented two-year-olds 
with relatively simple actions and tested their prompted transmission to a naïve adult 
rather than a peer. Two novel actions were demonstrated by two experimenters, one of 
which was explicitly pedagogical (using child-directed speech, direct eye-gaze, and 
verbal teaching signals), while the other intentionally demonstrated the action without 
such pedagogical cues. At transmission, toddlers selectively performed the action that 
was demonstrated to them in a pedagogical manner. This result suggests that children 
at this age are capable of transmitting generalisable information to another person who 
lacks such knowledge. In another study, Flynn (2008) also demonstrated that 2.5-year-
olds were capable of transmitting learned action to conspecifics. This study used the 
diffusion chain method, evaluating the transmission of initially ‘seeded’ (or 
intentionally taught by demonstrators) actions and any modifications made through the 
chains of transmission, from knowledgeable children to naïve ones, and further down 
the chain as children acquired information. Interestingly, here toddlers omitted the 
actions that were not causally relevant when demonstrated to them, thus showing no 
evidence of overimitation in transmission and suggesting that children at this age 
transmit information in a rather pragmatic manner. This result was in line with other 
studies of diffusion chain transmission (as well as experimental reports, e.g., Clegg & 
Legare, 2016) showing that faithful imitation of actions increases with age (Flynn & 
Whiten, 2012). 
In sum, studies with infants indicate their inclination to transmit episodic 
information, while studies with toddlers suggest that they might engage both in proto-
teaching of episodic information, such as object location, and in emerging teaching of 
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generalisable knowledge, such as functional tool use. Although child-led transmission 
of information may have its roots in infancy, the majority of studies focused on 
preschool and school age children, leaving a significant gap in our understanding of the 
developmental trajectory of information transmission. The rapidly emerging body of 
research with older children, however, shows their sensitivity to what and whom they 
are teaching. The following section highlights the most salient features of the literature 
that investigated child-led information transmission as a function of the properties of 
information selected for transmission and as a function of the social context. 
III.iii. Selective information transmission  
What are the salient properties of information that is more likely to propagate? 
Among such non-social features may be perceptual salience, novelty, causality, 
efficiency, complexity, and generalisability. At the same time, salient features of the 
social context also affect which information children will transmit, such as pedagogical 
or normative context, perceived learners’ expertise, goals and interests, and their social 
identity. A number of studies have investigated children’s selective transmission based 
on some of these features. 
Evidence from observational diffusion chain studies with preschoolers found 
that they are eager to teach their peers goal-directed tool actions, including those that 
are causally irrelevant, following their own indiscriminate copying, and often over-
imitation, of actions as they learned them from an adult model (Flynn & Whiten, 2010; 
Whiten & Flynn, 2010). Such faithfulness in both copying and propagation of acquired 
information might be related to children’s transmission of information that is perceived 
as normative or conventional. Starting in preschool age, children are keen to 
demonstrate how the game works and explain its rules, including intervening to teach 
actions that violated the rules of the game and enforce the norms specifically for the 
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non-compliant learners (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013; Strauss et al., 2002). Perceived 
normativity emerges from children’s understanding of the social context. For instance, 
children corrected a learner’s rule violations only when they explicitly set an example 
of interacting with the toy in an intentionally norm-inducing way, rather than in an 
exploratory manner (Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011), and when the learner 
explicitly expressed an intention to play a game (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 
2008). This sensitivity to information normativity was so powerful that preschool 
children were more likely to teach other people actions that were inefficient if they were 
presented in conventional manner (e.g., “This is how we do it”) (Clegg & Legare, 2016).  
Complex and cognitively opaque information is another prominent candidate 
for transmission among preschool and older children (Ronfard & Harris, 2018). 
Preschoolers spontaneously selected beneficial but complex information such as 
mathematical concepts to teach their younger siblings (Howe et al., 2016). Children 
eagerly conveyed information when it was the only evidence they received and 
preferred to transmit information obtained using a more cognitively opaque method and 
one that they could not easily discover on their own (Ronfard et al., 2016). In teaching 
the functions of the complex novel toy, preschoolers strategically conveyed relevant 
and representative information and avoided redundant demonstrations that went beyond 
the core of the taught concepts (Rhodes et al., 2015). Similarly, children considered the 
utility of information that could be either explored independently or explicitly taught 
and adjudicated between the discoverability of toys and their reward value, choosing to 
teach information that was in line with the utility calculus reasoning, by minimising the 
expected learner’s and the teacher’s costs and maximising the learner’s rewards, in line 
with the novel computational model (Bridgers et al., 2020).  
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Selectivity in information transmission is also based on the children’s perceived 
characteristics of the learner and their assessment of the presence of the knowledge gap 
between children as knowers and an ignorant but eager learner (Ronfard & Harris, 
2018). With preliminary awareness of the roles of the teacher and the learner, 
preschoolers (Ziv & Frye, 2004) adjust their selection of which rules of the game to 
teach based on the learner’s specific mistakes, thus tailoring information to fill the 
particular gap in the learner’s knowledge (Ronfard & Corriveau, 2016). A more 
sophisticated understanding of teaching as a process that causes knowledge change 
(Sobel & Letourneau, 2016; Wood et al., 1995; Ziv & Frye, 2004) enables older 
children’s contingent teaching as they tailor their demonstrations to the learner’s 
postulated goals (e.g., to learn about the toy rather than just observe) and their perceived 
competence and intelligence levels (Gweon & Schulz, 2019), select representative 
information with multiple examples to convey new knowledge (Rhodes, Gelman, & 
Brickman, 2010), and make a transmission choice based on the inferred relevance of 
supplied information for the receiver rather than personal interests (Danovitch, 2020). 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, children have also been shown to selectively provide 
information for those who have previously been more informative themselves over 
ignorant recipients (Kim, Kalish, Weisman, Johnson, & Shutts, 2016), which might, 
however, be indicative of prosocial, rather than purely epistemic motives driving 
transmission. 
In sum, studies with children of preschool age and older suggest that they are 
able to evaluate the nature of information before its transmission, e.g., whether 
information is obscure or complex, generic or specific, normative or descriptive. They 
also evaluate the social context in which information transmission occurs, such as the 
learners’ characteristics and their ability to benefit from teaching. Whether such 
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 Research questions 
The following section outlines the research questions that motivated this thesis 
and have been addressed in the three experimental chapters. What are the behavioural 
manifestations of infants’ active participation in social knowledge exchange? This 
thesis asked how social and epistemic context affects this bi-directional process and 
what communicative signals may be developmentally and functionally appropriate to 
enable it. 
While social learning theories focus on infants’ reliance on the top-down 
knowledge acquisition processes, active learning theories highlight the importance of 
infants’ bottom-up, independent information seeking as a means for learning. This 
thesis argues that infants equally and simultaneously engage both in active learning and 
in social learning. In the reported experimental work, infants were placed in various 
situations of epistemic uncertainty in an interactive social context, during which they 
could, using active social learning strategies, either obtain new information from more 
knowledgeable social partners (Experimental Chapters 1 and 2) or themselves 
propagate information to less knowledgeable social partners (Experimental Chapter 3).  
Little is known about how active social learning strategies in early development 
could help infants resolve epistemic uncertainty. This thesis therefore asked what 
developmentally available communicative and information seeking signals preverbal 
infants use, and whether they use these cues selectively in order to obtain information. 
As reviewed in the Introduction Chapter, in addition to the historically more common 
interpretation that social referencing plays a social engagement and affective 
information seeking function, recent research provided support for the idea that it may 
also serve an interrogative function in non-emotional situations, thus framing social 
referencing as a way to seek information from knowledgeable adults that is not affective 
 48 
in nature. The overarching question asked in the Experimental Chapters 1 and 2 is 
whether infants’ use of social referencing is actively communicative and interrogative 
in two different situations of epistemic uncertainty.  
Experimental Chapter 1 investigated preverbal infants’ use of social referencing 
towards their caregivers upon detecting an object-referent mismatch as the caregivers 
mislabelled familiar objects, addressing research question 1: Do preverbal infants 
actively respond to epistemic violations of expectation with social referencing 
behaviour? 
Experimental Chapter 2 investigated preverbal infants’ selective use of social 
referencing towards unfamiliar social partners as a means of seeking unavailable 
information from the best source, addressing research question 2: Do preverbal infants 
use social referencing to seek information from more knowledgeable adults in situations 
of referential uncertainty? 
Experimental Chapter 3 marks a turn from investigating active knowledge 
acquisition to focusing on infants’ active knowledge transmission, specifically how 
social and epistemic context affects their propensity to propagate information to less 
knowledgeable social partners, addressing research question 3: Do toddlers 
preferentially transmit information that was taught to them in an explicitly pedagogical 
context or information that was easier to demonstrate but not taught pedagogically? 
Contributing to the ongoing body of research on active learning and active 
teaching, this thesis therefore specifically explores the development of the information 
seeking function of social referencing as one of the earliest communicative signals and 
the earliest signs of active information transmission in infants under two years of age. 
This experimental work provides novel insights into social and cognitive mechanisms 
of cultural knowledge transmission.  
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 Methodological overview 
This thesis contains three experimental studies consisting of a total of six 
experiments which employed behavioural and eye-tracking methods. The following 
section provides a methodological overview of the rationale for the methodological 
choices. 
V.i. Interactive nature of the design 
The experimental approach adopted in this thesis utilised laboratory-based, live 
presentation interactive experimental designs. In all three studies, infants and their 
primary caregivers were invited to the established laboratory for infancy and early 
childhood studies. In study 1, infants and their primary caregivers watched a series of 
screen-based stimuli, with caregivers actively participating in the procedure and 
enabling three experimental conditions. In study 2, infants and their primary caregivers 
were introduced to two unfamiliar experimenters, each of whom played a role to enable 
an experimental manipulation, while the caregivers facilitated the procedural flow. In 
study 3, toddlers were interacting with three experimenters, two of whom were 
unfamiliar, while the caregiver was passively observing the procedure. This required 
rigorous use of randomisation and counterbalancing techniques, as well as extensive 
training to ensure standardisation of caregivers and experimenters’ behaviours. Despite 
the inherent challenges, engaging infants in such highly interactive, dynamic, rich social 
environments was instrumental to the studies’ research goals.  
Infants’ caregivers played an important role during all three experimental 
studies. In study 1, they were instrumental to enabling the key experimental 
manipulation. In study 2, they provided essential procedural support by presenting 
novel toys and removing them upon the trial completion, as well as posing key 
experimental questions to their children. Such active role of caregivers also allowed to 
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ensure infants did not develop a preference for one of the experimenters. In all three 
studies, caregivers offered assurance and support to their children, neutralising stress 
from entering an unfamiliar environment, minimising fussiness and alleviating shyness 
to engage and maintain their attention and interest.  
Infants also interacted with real objects in studies 2 and 3, while study 1 used 
screen-based visual stimuli. It is uncontested that digital stimuli presentation affords 
rigorous experimental control, such as normalizing the length, attractiveness, size, and 
other multi-sensory information, thus allowing to elucidate the socio-cognitive 
processes by minimising lower-level perceptual, potentially confounding, elements. 
However, interaction with real multi-sensory objects contributes to strengthening the 
experiment’s ecological validity and is beneficial for maintaining infants’ attention 
while minimising fussiness. In studies 2 and 3, we considered the choice of familiar and 
novel objects and their intrinsic properties such as attractiveness, colour, shape, and 
complexity, although no pilot study was performed to systematically compare these 
properties. 
V.ii. Experimental design considerations 
Careful consideration was given to the procedural flow, the length of the whole 
procedure, the total number of trials during which infants’ attention can be plausibly 
sustained, and the number of different sources of information (novel objects and 
people). We aimed at minimizing participant burden and attrition due to fussiness and 
inattention and keeping the task demands realistic for the age groups selected. This 
resulted in procedures ranging, on average, from 3.5 minutes (in study 1 experiment 1) 
to 15 minutes (in study 3 experiment 1 and 2).  
We considered utility of the between- versus within-subject experimental 
designs and single versus multiple experimenter designs. Due to the explicitly social 
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nature of the manipulations, successful designs needed to provide the conditions under 
which infants would be able to exhibit differential responses. The majority of social 
learning studies which motivated this research used between-subject paradigms (Begus 
& Southgate, 2012; Koenig & Echols, 2003; Kovacs et al., 2012; Vaish et al., 2011). 
While the within-subject design is regarded as a golden standard in cognitive 
psychology studies (by being more robust in light of inter-individual differences and 
thus affording a more rigorous choice of statistical analyses), it presents a challenge to 
the social learning and live experimental set-ups. For instance, if the same social partner 
acts inconsistently from trial to trial, infants may be confused and as a consequence 
provide indistinguishable responses.  
These considerations motivated the decision to utilize both the between- and 
within-subject designs in study 1, with reliance on the single-experimenter paradigm, 
although here we asked the caregivers to assume the role of the experimenter. As a 
result, study 1 allowed drawing important theoretical and methodological conclusions 
underlying design choices specifically in infants’ social learning studies. In studies 2 
and 3, we instead chose to recruit participants into a single condition using a two-
experimenter paradigm typical for studies of selective social learning with older 
children (e.g., Koenig et al., 2004; Harris & Corriveau, 2011). The two-experimenter 
design minimizes the risk of over-interpreting children’s responses to a single 
experimenter, such as assuming that separate conditions are equal on task demands and 
cognitive processing of the situation. Instead, each participant faces the same 
contrasting set of choices, e.g., reliable versus unreliable informant, confirming versus 
counter-intuitive testimony, simple versus complex action demonstration. In studies 2 
and 3 we therefore focused on children’s responses as they resolved such contradictions. 
In addition, as very few studies of information transmission exist in children younger 
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than 3 years of age (Flynn, 2008; Liszkowski et al., 2006, 2008; Vredenburgh et al., 
2015), in study 3, we chose to use an existing paradigm (after Vredenburgh et al., 2015), 
one that introduces children to the ignorant adult learner in a live interaction context, 
fully benefitting from the two-experimenter paradigm and allowing for rigorous 
manipulation of the main variables. 
V.iii. Choice of outcome measures 
The studies in this thesis made use of behavioural measures of social looking 
(studies 1 and 2) and action demonstration (study 3). Social cognition research has 
developed a number of distinct yet related measures such as first looks or actions, total 
frequency or proportion of looks or actions, latency to initiating a look or an action, 
duration of looks or actions, and length of visual fixations (obtained from eye-tracking 
data). Bearing in mind that the choice of the exact measure may substantially change 
the inferences that can be made from a particular set of analyses, we carefully built on 
the existing literature, considering the rationale for one measure over the other and 
adopting an approach that a measure on its own is not sufficiently meaningful unless 
interpreted within the experimental context (for reviews, see Aslin, 2007; Bergmann, 
Rabagliati, & Tsuji, 2019; Sim & Xu, 2019). For instance, social looks cannot be 
interpreted as information seeking as such, unless they are selectively generated in 
situations that afford information gathering, while infants’ points cannot be by default 
interpreted as imperative or informative without taking into account the social context 
in which they occur. Similarly, longer looking can be interpreted as a response to 
novelty only within the context of the habituation or as surprise-induced response within 
the VoE paradigm.  
With this in mind, we also explored the relationships between multiple measures 
rather than inadvertently over-interpreting a single measure (LoBue et al., 2020). With 
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regards to our study 1 and 2, this is important because previous relevant social learning 
studies (of infants’ social looking responses to referential uncertainty; e.g., Goupil et 
al., 2016; Vaish et al., 2011; and to VoE, e.g., Dunn & Bremner, 2017; Koenig & 
Echols, 2003) often used either one or the other measure of infant-generated looks, 
leaving open the question of which measure indexes which cognitive processes. With 
regards to our studies 2 and 3, we chose to investigate both the first looks or actions, 
and the overall proportion of looks or actions as a function of condition, as each is 
deemed to index a unique kind of response (for a more in-depth discussion of measures 
used in this thesis, see section IV.iii. of the Discussion Chapter). 
Finally, as our measures relied exclusively on offline behavioural coding, to 
achieve quality data collection we used multiple video cameras to capture the procedure 
from different angles. In all studies, a minimum of two research assistants were trained 
to code the data to reach substantial inter-coder reliability.  
In sum, this thesis utilized laboratory-based behavioural paradigms providing 
high ecological validity through involvement of infants’ primary caregivers, multiple 
social partners as unfamiliar and familiar experimenters, and manipulating the 
properties of information, informants, and the learning context. While cognitively 
demanding, these studies enabled social contexts which resembled real-life scenarios to 
provide a unique insight into infants’ social and cognitive development.  
 
The following three Experimental Chapters include three journal style papers, 
which experimentally addressed the three main research questions raised in the 
Introduction Chapter2.   
 
2 The references for the Introduction and Discussion Chapters can be found in the References chapter on 
page 200. Each Experimental Chapter contains references as part of the individual journal submission. 
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Experimental Chapter 1: Communication in 
Epistemic Uncertainty 
As curious learners navigating the largely unfamiliar world, infants may 
encounter situations of epistemic, or knowledge-related, uncertainty. It may take the 
form of the violation of expectation scenarios which span both physical and social 
domains, such as events that defy the natural laws of physics or false claims provided 
by previously reliable people, as well as general informational uncertainty, such as 
counterintuitive or contradicting testimony, lack of valid and timely information, or 
being asked questions one cannot answer. Encountering an unexpected or an 
incongruent event has been shown to elicit distinct neural (e.g., Kouider, Long, Le 
Stanc, Charron, Fievet, Barbosa, & Gelskov, 2015; Parise & Csibra, 2012; Reid, Hoehl, 
Grigutsch, Groendahl, Parise, & Striano, 2009) and behavioural responses in infants 
(Dunn & Bremner, 2017; Goupil et al., 2016; Koenig & Echols, 2003; Harris et al., 
2017; Stahl & Feigenson, 2017; Walden et al., 2007).  
In addition to enhanced independent exploration following such events, young 
children solicit input from their social partners (Harris & Lane, 2014; Poulin-Dubois, 
& Brosseau-Liard, 2016), showing readiness to learn from best information sources 
(Begus et al., 2016), and actively using communicative cues to obtain information 
(Begus & Southgate, 2018). As they mature, children are able to utilize a more complex 
and precise repertoire of independent and social information seeking strategies (Harris 
et al., 2018). Before showcasing more sophisticated cognition, however, preverbal 
infants’ active communicative responses to epistemic uncertainty help delineate core 
cognitive competencies underlying epistemic development. This paper focuses on one 
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of the earliest manifestations of such strategies. How and when do preverbal infants 
communicate with their social partners when facing epistemic uncertainty? 
This chapter contains the first paper which examined the first research 
question: Do preverbal infants actively respond to epistemic violations of expectation 
with social referencing behaviour?  
 
This paper is currently in preparation for publication: 
Bazhydai, M. Westermann, G., & Parise, E. (in preparation). Eleven-month-olds 







Eleven-month-olds selectively refer to their social partner 
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Research highlights 
- Caregivers’ incongruent semantic testimony violated infants’ epistemic 
expectations 
 
- Infants selectively referenced caregivers in response to incongruent labels as 
compared to congruent or no labels 
 
- Social looks increased in inconsistent epistemic environment (a mix of congruent 
and incongruent labels) 
 






Infants’ active behavioral responses to epistemic uncertainty is an understudied 
area in social cognitive development. We investigated the role of social referencing 
looks as explicit preverbal communicative responses to epistemic uncertainty in social 
contexts. In two experiments, 11-month-olds infants experienced epistemic violation of 
expectation events – caregivers providing inaccurate labels to familiar objects. Infants 
generated more social looks at their caregivers in response to incongruent labels as 
compared to when labels were accurate or no labels were provided. When caregivers 
provided a mix of incongruent and congruent labels, social referencing increased 
following both kinds of labeling testimony as compared to when no labels were 
provided. Collectively, these results suggest that preverbal infants respond with social 
looks to epistemic uncertainty induced by receiving incongruent labeling testimony, 






Infants actively navigate their non-social and social environments, often facing 
situations of informational (or epistemic, in contrast to emotionally laden) uncertainty, 
such as when insufficient or unreliable information is provided, or prior knowledge is 
not supported by new evidence. One powerful scenario that induces epistemic 
uncertainty in infants is encountering an unexpected event. Little is known about 
preverbal infants’ social behavior in such situations. The current study investigated 
infants’ social referencing as an explicit communicative response to epistemic violation 
of expectation events (VoE). 
Unexpected events provide powerful learning opportunities: violated 
predictions trigger search for information in order to resolve detected incongruency and 
improve future predictions (Köster, Kayhan, Langeloh, & Hoehl, 2020). This prediction 
and error detection process is adaptive as infants seek to update existing mental models 
of the world or to change models to accommodate new information (Reuter, Borovsky, 
& Lew-Williams, 2019). A large body of research investigated infants’ implicit 
attention allocation, visual exploration and neural correlates in response to violations of 
the physical properties of the world (Gliga & Csibra 2009; Stahl & Feigenson, 2019), 
ambiguous actions (Köster, Langeloh, & Hoehl, 2019; Reid, Hoehl, Grigutsch, 
Groendahl, Parise, & Striano, 2009) and semantic incongruency (Parise & Csibra, 
2012). Unlike infants’ implicit detection of uncertainty, less is known about infants’ 
explicit communicative responses when the unexpected event is inherently social and 
thus induces epistemic uncertainty in the interactive social context.  
Similar to selective exploration following VoE events in non-social contexts (in 
order to disambiguate the causal structure of the encountered event), social 
communicative responses may help infants probe the social environment for relevant 
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information to resolve uncertainty through the help of others. Among such early tools 
is social referencing – initiating social looks at communicative partners to seek social 
appraisal and guidance (Feinman, 1982; Walden & Ogan, 1988), most often 
investigated during infants’ emotionally laden uncertainty in situations perceived as 
potentially threatening and necessitating social appraisal input from a trusted social 
partner to guide infants’ own behavior (Campos & Stenberg, 1981; Sorce, Emde, 
Campos, & Klinnert, 1985; Walle, Reschke, & Knothe, 2017). Recently, social 
referencing has also been investigated in situations devoid of perceived danger or 
unpleasantness, such as events violating physical laws or properties of objects (Dunn & 
Bremner, 2017; Walden, Kim, McCoy, & Karrass, 2007), social pretend play (Nishida 
& Lillard, 2007), humorous events (Mireault, Crockenberg, Sparrow, Pettinato, 
Woodard, & Malzac, 2014), uncertain object location (Goupil, Romand-Monnier, & 
Kouider, 2016), and referential uncertainty (Bazhydai, Westermann, & Parise, 2020; 
Hembacher, deMayo, & Frank, 2017; Vaish, Demir, & Baldwin, 2011). In all these 
scenarios, rather than attending to the actual physical source of uncertainty, infants 
referred to an available social partner. This has been interpreted as infants actively 
seeking disambiguating cues from someone who can be regarded as a useful source of 
information (Begus & Southgate, 2018; Harris & Lane, 2014). Do infants also respond 
with social referencing when their social epistemic expectations are violated? 
Studies of infants’ responses to intentional object mislabeling by an adult have 
demonstrated that infants detect object-referent mismatches and pay selective attention 
to their social partners (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013; Koenig & Echols, 2003). 
Sixteen-month-old infants looked significantly longer to the speaker when she 
mislabeled an object in incongruent trials (as well as at the caregiver who did not 
participate in any labeling), while instead looking longer at the object rather than the 
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speaker in congruent trials (Koenig & Echols, 2003). However, when the speaker was 
facing away from the objects she was labeling, infants looked longer to her in congruent 
trials, indicating surprise that she was able to label them correctly. Such enhanced 
attention to the mislabeler was interpreted as indexing a violation of the expectation that 
social partners are, by default, reliable rather than deceptive informants (Mascaro & 
Sperber, 2009; Sperber et al., 2010). Extending this seminal finding, Brooker and 
Poulin-Dubois (2013) showed that 18-month-old infants preferred to learn words from 
a reliable labeler as opposed to a mislabeler. However, infants in this study initially paid 
equal attention to both informants, as if first establishing informants’ respective 
informative value, and only at the novel word learning stage looked longer at the 
previously unreliable informant while selectively learning from the reliable one (see 
also Crivello, Phillips, & Poulin-Dubois, 2018; Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Krogh-
Jespersen & Echols, 2012). In another study using a violation of expectation location 
change task, 24-month-olds looked longer at the speaker who provided information 
about object location which was incongruent with the speaker’s established knowledge 
or ignorance state (Galazka, Gredebäck, & Ganea, 2016).  
Collectively, these studies suggest that in epistemic uncertainty, infants in their 
second year evaluate the input from social partners and attend to them selectively based 
on their established informative value, which ultimately improves their learning 
outcomes (Nurmsoo, Robinson, & Butterfill, 2010; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 
2016). Importantly, these studies indicate that infants are able to track and respond to 
two types of epistemic cues in their social environment: object-label correspondence as 
part of their semantic representations and social partners’ epistemic status as part of 
their social representations. Thus, infants may both respond to the VoE on a local scale 
(based on situational epistemic value of information, e.g., an incorrect label) and on a 
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global scale (based on the epistemic profile of the social partner, e.g., a previously 
unreliable informant). It is unclear how these underlying cognitive processes manifest 
earlier in development and whether preverbal infants behaviorally respond to semantic 
and social VoEs in similar ways as older infants. For instance, older children critically 
evaluate informants’ prior accuracy and reliability and make ongoing behavioral 
adjustments, but evidence is limited as to when this ability for real-time weighting of 
and flexibility in response to epistemic cues emerges developmentally (Clegg, Kurkul, 
Corriveau, 2019; Hoicka, Butcher, Malla, & Harris, 2017; Koenig & Woodward, 2010; 
Leech, Haber, Arunachalam, Kurkul, & Corriveau, 2019; Nurmsoo, & Robinson, 2009; 
Ronfard & Lane, 2018, 2019).  
Whether preverbal infants can only detect epistemic uncertainty, or can also use 
explicit communicative cues to actively resolve such uncertainty through the help of 
their social partners, is an open question. Longer looking at social partners found in the 
above VoE studies can be interpreted as attention exerted to form epistemic profiles of 
the available informants (i.e., by encoding their reliability and knowledgeability), as a 
surprise-induced response to violations of epistemic expectation (i.e., false claims 
provided by previously reliable people), or as both. Such ambiguity in interpreting 
infants’ looking responses poses a challenge to understanding the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms (Aslin, 2007; Bergmann, Rabagliati, & Tsuji, 2019; Sim & Xu, 2019). The 
social context in which the epistemic uncertainty occurs adds an additional layer of 
complexity to these possible interpretations. With regards to these concerns, Dunn and 
Bremner (2017) demonstrated that infants’ responses to events defying physical laws 
were better indexed by social referencing than by looking time to the questionable 
event. In another study, Vaish et al. (2011) measured both the number of social looks 
and looking time at social partners when infants faced referential uncertainty, albeit 
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finding inconsistent evidence from these measures. Yet other reports have focused on 
discrete social looks rather than looking duration as infants’ responses to epistemic 
uncertainty (Bazhydai et al., 2020; Goupil et al., 2016; Hembacher, deMayo, & Frank, 
2017; Harris, Bartz, & Rowe, 2017). Overall, then, infants’ looking measures can be 
interpreted in multiple ways that so far have not allowed for assessment of whether 
looking serves an epistemic function in such scenarios. 
In the present study, we addressed the question whether discrete social 
referencing looks index infants’ explicit communicative response to epistemic 
uncertainty. We presented 11-month-old infants with either congruent or incongruent 
labeling by their primary caregivers, or no labeling at all, and measured infants’ social 
referencing following such events. We hypothesized that, if available to infants as a 
communicative tool to probe the social environment for relevant information, social 
referencing would be enhanced following the VoE events resulting from caregivers’ 
incongruent labeling, whereas detecting no difference in social referencing between 
uncertainty and no uncertainty conditions may suggest that such looks were not 
epistemically motivated. 
We chose to test 11-month-olds for two reasons. First, we deemed preverbal 
infants to have the cognitive capacity to initiate social looks motivated by epistemic 
goals as a developmentally available communicative tool (Bazhydai et al., 2020; Begus 
& Southgate, 2018; Harris & Lane, 2014). Second, we expected infants of this age to 
have sufficient receptive vocabulary to understand the presented object-referent stimuli 
and detect mismatches based on previous work with younger infants (Bergelson & 
Swingley, 2012, 2018; Parise & Csibra, 2012) and the expected age of acquisition of 
first nouns (Nelson, 1973). Lastly, as older infants at the age of 16 months have been 
previously shown to detect semantic incongruency and look longer towards social 
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partners who enabled it (Koenig & Echols, 2003), testing substantially younger infants 
is important to trace the origins of selective learning and trust in testimony and delineate 
cognitive competencies underlying epistemic development (Mills, 2013).  
Experiment 1 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to test whether infants would selectively generate 
communicative looks towards their social partners when facing epistemic uncertainty – 
violations of social (caregiver providing inaccurate information) and semantic (object-
referent mismatch) expectation. We employed a between-subject design3 so that infants 
consistently experienced either congruent or incongruent labeling events enabled by 
their primary caregivers, or were assigned to a control condition, where no labels were 
provided at all, which allowed us to investigate infants’ reactions to different levels of 
epistemic uncertainty (no information vs. incongruent information). We expected to see 
more social looks occurring in incongruent labeling, followed by no label, with the least 
during congruent labeling. We chose to involve caregivers rather than unfamiliar adults 
as labelers to detect the hypothesized effect to the only informant, without an option to 
look at the caregiver when both the caregiver and an unfamiliar informant are engaged 
in the experiment (as in Koenig & Echols, 2003). 
Experiment 1 methods 
Participants 
 
3 The experimental design was adapted from Parise and Csibra (2012); see also 
Supplementary Materials for an earlier within-subject version of this design (Experiment S3) which 
followed the original design more closely but proved less suitable for the social nature of the research 
question under investigation. 
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The final sample was 48 11-month-old infants (sixteen in each of three conditions; Mage 
= 331 days, SD = 11, range 315-363, 22 girls). Additional eleven infants were excluded 
for technical errors (n = 3), infants’ fussiness (n = 6), and substantial parental procedural 
errors (n = 2). Participants were recruited from a database of families in the Northwest 
of England who had agreed to participate in infant studies. 
Experimental procedure 
Caregivers received instructions during the consenting procedure upon arriving 
to the laboratory. In the testing room, infants sat in a high chair, with the caregiver 
positioned slightly behind and to the side of the infant to allow for easy head turns 
toward them. Both the infants and their caregivers faced a large screen. Caregivers wore 
an earphone to discreetly receive labeling instructions. The experiment was recorded 
using a video camera positioned directly in front of the infant’s seat. 
The experimental sequence is depicted in Figure 1. A trial began by first 
displaying an occluder together with a visual and auditory attention-grabbing animation 
(e.g., a rotating star coupled with an exciting sound), during which the caregiver 
received the labeling phrase via an earphone. The occluder was then removed to reveal 
an image of a familiar object or animal (one of ten labels and images: apple, banana, 
ball, book, bunny, car, cat, cup, dog, duck), presented in pseudorandomized order. Upon 
the image’s appearance on the screen, the caregiver said the labeling phrase and pointed 
to the object on the screen.  
Infants were assigned to three between-subject conditions: Congruent (caregiver 
providing a matching label), Incongruent (caregiver providing a mismatching label), 
and No label (caregiver not providing a label but instead saying: “Look at this!”). Each 
infant received up to 10 trials in their respective condition, with each trial lasting 10 
seconds to allow ample time for infants to first look at the presented object and then 
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initiate social looks, while accounting for the time needed for the caregiver to say their 
respective phrase upon the occluder falling. The experiment lasted, on average, 3.5 
minutes. If the infant became distracted, a rotating spiral with a jingle was presented 
between trials or an interactive break was offered. If the infant became fussy or their 
attention could no longer be attracted to the screen, the experiment ended before the 
target 10 trials could be completed. 
Measures and coding 
We calculated the overall proportion, onset, and duration of social referencing 
looks toward the caregiver as a function of condition. We chose these three social 
looking measures in order to disentangle the exact meaning of different types of 
attention signals as previous research often used discrete number of social looks, 
accumulated looking time and duration of looks interchangeably. As our hypotheses 
concerned only the proportion of social referencing measure, we did not predict the 
pattern of results for the onset and duration measures. 
Social referencing was defined as an infant initiating a direct look at a caregiver 
following the labeling phrase immediately after attending to the object on the screen, 
consisting of a head turn towards the caregiver and a direct look at their face, but not 
orienting to the caregiver’s body, hands, attempts to touch them, “pick-me-up” gestures 
or expressing the need to nurse. In instances when the infant initiated more than one 
look at the caregiver during a trial in this manner, each look was counted, and duration 
of the looks was summed up for each trial.  
In each condition, the proportion of social referencing was calculated as the 
number of social looks generated in that condition divided by the number of valid trials. 
The latency to the first social look (onset of social referencing) and total looking time 
at the caregiver (duration of social referencing) were coded manually from the video 
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recordings and averaged for each experimental condition. Coding was performed 
offline from video recordings by a researcher blind to the experimental condition, with 
a second researcher coding 20% of trials, achieving high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha 
α = .85, p < .001); all disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
Trial exclusions  
Infants who completed at least 2 trials were included in the analyses. We 
excluded trials for three reasons: technical errors (n = 6), parental procedural errors (n 
= 21), and infants’ fussiness or lack of attention, defined as looking at the screen for 
less than 1 second overall upon object presentation (n = 3). Infants contributed a total 
of 490 valid trials (M = 10, SD = 0.48, range 8-124; n congruent = 161, M = 10.06, SD = 
0.57, range 9-12; n incongruent = 161, M = 10.06, SD = 0.24, range 10-11; n no label = 158, 
M = 9.9, SD = 0.62, range 8-11). 
Experiment 1 results 
Forty-seven out of 48 infants used social referencing at least once during the 
experiment, with 51% of trials containing at least one social look. Infants generated 
social looks on average 5.6 times across all trials (range 0-14) with a total of 272 social 
looks coded in the full sample.  
A one-way ANOVA was performed with the proportion of social looks 
generated for Congruent (M = .45, SD = .35), Incongruent (M = .73, SD = .23), and No 
Label (M = .5, SD = .34) trials (Figure 2a). There was a main effect of condition, F(2, 
45) = 3.82, p = .03, ηp2 = .15, with homogeneity of variances assumed, Levene’s F = 
1.66, p = .2. To disentangle this effect, we ran pairwise independent samples t-tests 
 
4 Experimenter made exclusion decisions online, so that the immediate replacement trials could be 
administered aiming to reach 10 target trials. As a result, three infants (one in each condition) received 
more trials than targeted due to the experimenter failing by accident to stop the procedure on time, with 
all recorded valid trials included in the final analyses. 
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accompanied by a Bayes factor analysis (using a default Bayes factor with a wide 
Cauchy distribution assuming a maximum possible effect size of 0.707, with values 
below 3 interpreted as insufficient support, 3-10 as moderate support, and 10 and above 
as substantial support; Jeffreys, 1961), revealing significantly greater proportion of 
social referencing in Incongruent as compared to Congruent (t(30) = 2.73, p = .01, 95% 
CI 0.07 to 0.5, Cohen’s d = .95, BF10 = 6.6) and No Label conditions (t(30) = 2.26, p = 
.03, 95% CI 0.03 to 0.44, Cohen’s d = .79, BF10 = 3), but no differences between 
Congruent and No Label conditions (t(30) = -.45, p = .66, 95% CI 0.1 to 0.3, BF01 = 
2.1).  
Neither the onset of social referencing (F(2,45) = .32, p = .73; Levene’s F = 
0.47, p = .62) nor the duration (F(2,45) = 1.03, p = .37; Levene’s F = 1.45, p = .64) 
showed statistically significant differences in the ANOVAs (Figure 2a). 
Experiment 1 discussion 
When caregivers mislabeled familiar objects, 11-month-old infants referred to 
them more than when caregivers properly labeled objects or gave no label at all. These 
results support the account that infants expect others to provide accurate information – 
an expectation that is violated by instead receiving incongruent labels (Koenig, 
Clément, & Harris, 2004; Mills, 2013; Sperber et al., 2010). To respond to epistemic 
uncertainty, preverbal and pre-pointing infants used social referencing – a 
communicative tool to seek social input motivated by an epistemic goal, e.g., obtaining 
relevant and reliable information from a knowledgeable social partner (Bazhydai et al., 
2020; Begus & Southgate, 2018; Goupil et al., 2016; Harris, Bartz, & Rowe, 2017; 
Hembacher, deMayo, & Frank, 2017) – rather than surprise-driven longer looking time 
at the caregivers as the source of the violation of expectation in this scenario. When no 
uncertainty was present (both in congruent and no label conditions), infants were less 
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likely to reference their caregivers, although we expected some level of differentiation 
between these two varying uncertainty levels situations. Therefore, social referencing 
bids do not seem to be indicative of active information seeking, since the no label 
condition did not prompt infants to ask for the labels from their caregivers (and was not 
different from the congruent condition’s level of referencing). Rather, social referencing 
was a reactive communicative response, selective to the epistemic VoE, which is 
compatible with our main prediction. 
While we detected greater social referencing in response to caregivers’ 
consistently incongruent labeling, the between-subject design of Experiment 1 could 
not answer if infants responded to the violation of expectation on a local scale (based 
on the trial-by-trial epistemic value of provided information), or instead on a global 
scale (based on the established epistemic profile of the social partner). Exposure to a 
consistent level of epistemic uncertainty in Experiment 1 precludes us from reasoning 
about infants’ ability to flexibly respond to a changing level of uncertainty. If infants 
expect their social partners to provide accurate information, would they still selectively 
reference them following an object-referent mismatch in a dynamically changing 
epistemic environment, where the social partner is sometimes accurate and sometimes 
is not? In Experiment 2, we tested infants’ ability to track epistemic value of information 
on a trial-by-trial basis and selectivity in their social referencing as they received mixed 
congruent, incongruent and no labeling. 
Experiment 2 
We aimed to test whether incongruent labeling by the caregivers in a 
dynamically changing epistemic environment would selectively elicit infants’ greater 
social referencing as compared to congruent and no label trials. We therefore used the 
within-subject design retaining the experimental procedure as in Experiment 1, with 
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some minor adaptations. Greater social referencing in incongruent trials would suggest 
that infants are not only able to track but also differentially respond to the changing 
labeling of their caregiver based on the situational epistemic value of information. 
Alternatively, if infants do not show trial-level differentiation in their social referencing, 
it would suggest that they respond to the informant’s reliability based on their 
established epistemic profile, such that when caregivers provide mixed labeling 
testimony, infants’ expectations of their inherent reliability would be globally violated. 
Experiment 2 methods 
Participants 
The final sample was 31 11-month-old infants (Mage = 332 days, SD = 10, range 
317-353 days, 11 girls). Three additional infants were excluded due to insufficient 
number (fewer than 2) of valid trials within each experimental condition (n = 2) and due 
to general fussiness (n = 1). 
Experimental procedure 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1 (Figure 1), except that the 
trial sequence always started with three warm-up congruent trials in order to establish 
and reinforce the default expectation of the caregiver as an accurate labeler. Following 
these, the order of trials was pseudorandomized between the three experimental 
conditions (Congruent, Incongruent, and No Label), so that there were no more than 
two consecutive trials in the same condition, and no more than two of the same object-
label pairs presented consecutively. The experiment lasted 5-7 minutes, with each infant 
receiving approximately 5 trials in each of the three conditions5.  
 
5 Due to the pseudorandomized order of the trials in the sequence, the experimenter adjusted the length 
of the experiment online, so that the target 5 trials for each condition were met, while ensuring the infant 
remained attentive, which often resulted in an uneven number of trials in each condition that each infant 
eventually received. 
 71 
Measures and coding 
The main outcome variables were the proportion, onset, and duration of social 
referencing. The coding scheme was identical to Experiment 1 and the coders achieved 
high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha α = .91, p < .001). 
Trial exclusions  
Following the same criteria as in Experiment 1, a total of 446 trials were 
included in the final analyses (148 congruent, 152 incongruent, 146 no label) after 
excluding trials due to technical errors (n = 7), parental procedural errors (n = 23), and 
infants’ lack of attention or fussiness (n = 15). On average, infants completed 14.8 trials 
(SD = 3.8, range 12-26), with five trials in each condition (M congruent = 5.29, SD = 1.08, 
range 4-8; M incongruent = 5.25, SD = 1.48, range 2-9; M no label = 5.04, SD = 1.53, range 
1-8). 
Experiment 2 results 
Twenty-eight out of 31 infants used social referencing at least once during the 
experiment. Infants generated social looks on average 9.57 times across trials (SD = 
5.72; range 3-24), with a total of 233 social looks coded in the full sample, amounting 
to 53% of valid experimental trials where infants engaged in social referencing.  
A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on the proportion of social looks 
generated for Congruent (M = .58, SD = .34), Incongruent (M = .58, SD = .43), and No 
Label trials (M = .42, SD = .26). There was a main effect of Condition, F(2, 54) = 4.11, 
p = .02, ηp2 = .13; Mauchly’s test indicated no violation of sphericity, x2 (2) = 1.51, p = 
.47. The post-hoc paired t-test comparison revealed that social referencing was greater 
in the Congruent as compared to the No Label condition (t(27) = 2.78, p = .01, 95% CI 
0.04 to 0.27, Cohen’s d = .93, BF10 = 6.7), the Incongruent as compared to the No Label 
condition (t(27) = 2.48, p = .02, 95% CI 0.03 to 0.28, Cohen’s d = .48, BF10 = 3.7), but 
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not different between the Congruent and Incongruent conditions (t(27) = - 0.02, p = .98, 
95% CI -0.14 to 0.14, BF01 = 3.87) (Figure 2b).  
 Repeated-measures ANOVAs were performed to examine differences in the 
onset and duration of social looks between conditions, revealing no statistically 
significant differences (onset: F(2,54) = 1.24, p = .3, ηp2 = .04, with sphericity assumed, 
Mauchly’s test x2 (2) = 0.93, p = .37; duration: F(2,54) = 1.3, p = .28, ηp2 = .05, with 
sphericity assumed, Mauchly’s test x2 (2) = 0.91, p = .31 (Figure 2b).  
Experiment 2 discussion 
When infants experienced mixed congruent and incongruent labeling from their 
caregiver, we did not find evidence for their selective use of social referencing during 
incongruent trials. We did, however, find diminished social referencing in the no label 
trials, which suggests that infants processed labeling information on the trial-by-trial 
basis. While tracking this information locally, infants’ communicative response appears 
to be based on the global epistemic profile of the caregiver rooted in the inherent 
expectation of their reliability. These results support the account that infants expected 
their caregivers to provide reliable information, an expectation that was violated by 
instead receiving interleaved congruent and incongruent labels6, and therefore 
responded to this epistemic uncertainty with communicative social referencing looks, 
in contrast to events when no uncertainty was present (no label condition control trials). 
Some additional support for the interpretation that infants were able to track the 
congruency of labeling on a trial-by-trial basis comes from the descriptive results 
 
6 See also the converging results from the preliminary within-subject Experiment S3 reported in 
Supplementary Materials also reporting no difference in the social referencing between incongruent and 
congruent trials, when the no label trials were not introduced to the mix. 
 73 
showing that the onset of the first social look to the caregiver was substantially (almost 
a second) faster during incongruent than congruent trials (see Figure 2b). Infants emerge 
here as intolerant to inconsistency in labeling testimony provided by their caregivers 
and seeking to resolve this situation through their active communication. 
General discussion 
The present study was designed to assess whether preverbal infants selectively 
refer to their social partners when facing epistemic uncertainty. In two experiments, we 
presented 11-month-old infants with multiple trials when caregivers provided one of 
three types of information: incongruent, congruent, or no labels for familiar objects. We 
measured infants’ social referencing to test whether they would selectively use it as a 
communicative behavior upon detecting their incongruent labeling. When the caregiver 
was repeatedly delivering only one type of labeling testimony, infants preferentially 
referenced caregivers providing incongruent labels, as compared to those providing 
congruent or no labels (Experiment 1). When the caregiver was providing mixed 
labeling testimony, infants preferentially referenced them following both congruent and 
incongruent labels, as compared to no labels (Experiment 2).  
Our research suggests that preverbal infants simultaneously track two types of 
epistemic cues in their social environment: object-label correspondence as part of their 
semantic representations, and social partners’ epistemic status as part of their social 
representations. Infants demonstrated their ability to track the changing epistemic value 
of the information through behavioral adjustment to different levels of epistemic 
uncertainty (no information in trials with no labels vs. incongruent information, as 
compared to congruent labels). Despite showing such local sensitivity, infants not only 
actively referenced their caregivers when they consistently provided incongruent labels 
(Experiment 1), but also when they provided mixed congruent and incongruent labels 
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(Experiment 2). These results suggest that infants’ social referencing was a response to 
the violation of expectation stemming from their caregivers providing inaccurate 
labeling testimony (either consistently or inconsistently), in line with the account that 
infants expect their caregivers to provide reliable information. When this expectation 
was violated by caregivers instead providing, at least sometimes, incongruent labels, 
infants responded with explicit communicative looks. Relatedly, congruent labeling in 
this scenario may have elicited the same response as incongruent labeling because a 
violation of expectation of a different kind occurred – that the caregiver provides a 
congruent label after previous incongruent labeling. In this sense, congruent trials were 
no different from incongruent ones because epistemic uncertainty during those was 
primarily related to the informant’s epistemic profile rather than the object-referent 
testimony.  
Therefore, our results suggest that infants formed coherent, or global, rather than 
situational, or local, epistemic profiles of their social partners despite their demonstrated 
ability to track epistemic cues locally, and this coherent representation could not be 
easily disrupted in a changing epistemic environment, when mixed cues were provided. 
In previous studies, similarly, infants showed difficulties when evaluating inconsistent 
social-moral behavior (Steckler, Woo, & Hamlin, 2017), toddlers were sensitive to 
consistency in informants’ confidence cues (Birch, Akmal, & Frampton, 2010), and 
older children were less likely to imitate an inconsistent demonstrator who did not “stick 
to the script” (Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse, 2013). 
Alternatively, it is also possible that 11-month-olds may not yet be cognitively 
able to dynamically adapt their response as the epistemic situation changes, while such 
selectivity is present in older children who flexibly update their epistemic 
representations of informants over time, necessitating future research on the 
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developmental change in this domain (Clegg, Kurkul, Corriveau, 2019; Gillis, Nilsen, 
& Gevaux, 2019; Hoicka, Butcher, Malla, & Harris, 2017; Koenig & Woodward, 2010; 
Leech et al., 2019; Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009; Ronfard & Lane, 2018, 2019). 
However, even older children need an explicit assessment or a great amount of 
accumulating evidence of the informant’s deception or inaccuracy to overcome the 
default bias to accept their claims (Fedra & Schmidt, 2019; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 
2018), despite having the ability to detect incongruency from infancy. Relatedly, a 
recent study showed that infants, unlike adults, updated their internal model of the 
dynamically changing visual environment only when necessary, rather than every time 
a change occurred, which suggests that infants are more open to new, even if 
immediately unexpected, experience before they choose to modify their predictions 
(Kayhan, Hunnius, O'Reilly, & Bekkering, 2019). Lastly, as the social partner in our 
study was always the infant’s primary caregiver, future research should investigate 
whether their global epistemic profile representations are less stable when informants 
are unfamiliar adults, allowing infants to not only detect errors but also update their 
social and epistemic beliefs. 
Overall, these results go beyond previous reports showing that infants turn to 
caregivers when events violate their expectations about physical properties of the world 
(Dunn & Bremner, 2017; Walden et al., 2007), by focusing on social contexts when the 
source of the violation is the social partner herself. Our results are in line with the 
general conclusions of the seminal study of infants’ response to object-label mismatches 
by Koenig and Echols (2003), which reported that 16-months-old infants looked longer 
at an experimenter providing frequent and repeated inaccurate labels over the duration 
of 30-second trials (as well as the passive caregiver). However, here we focused on 
social referencing looks as a measure of explicit communication rather than looking 
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time as an implicit measure of attention towards an event that violated expectations: 
when a social partner offered unreliable testimony (consistently or at least sometimes), 
infants not only redirected their attention to them, but also selectively referred to them 
communicatively. 
The present study further underscores the role of social referencing behavior 
beyond the classical, emotionally driven uncertainty account (Stenberg & Hagekull, 
2007; Striano, Vaish, & Benigno, 2006). Recent studies that induced epistemic rather 
than affective uncertainty suggest that infants initiate social looks as a way to seek 
missing or disambiguating information (Bazhydai et al., 2020; Goupil et al., 2016; 
Harris et al., 2017; Mirreault et al., 2014; Stenberg, 2012, 2013; Vaish et al., 2011). 
Here social referencing may be interpreted as indicative of infants’ seeking input to 
resolve the epistemic conflict and reduce uncertainty through the help of their social 
partners (similar to adult social appraisal strategies to resolve uncertainty; FeldmanHall 
& Shenhav, 2019; Walle et al., 2017), possibly even seeking information gain, though 
our design is unable to directly assess this. What we do clearly show, rather, is infants’ 
selective communicative response in times of epistemic need, which is a reaction (rather 
than ‘interrogative social referencing’; e.g., Bazhydai et al., 2020) to an unexpected 
input from the social partner. This is in line with the predictive processing account 
(Köster et al., 2020) and provides insights into the nature of overt behavior rather than 
attentional or neural mechanisms (Köster et al., 2019; Reid et al., 2009, Parise & Csibra, 
2012), with social referencing emerging as one way to reduce or resolve uncertainty 
when events (caregiver’s incongruent or inconsistent labeling) did not comply with the 
existing predictive mental models. 
In sum, the current study deepens our understanding of the cognitive 
underpinnings and developmental origins of epistemic trust and selective learning 
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(Harris et al., 2018; Mills, 2013; Ronfard, Bartz, Cheng, Chen, & Harris, 2018). We 
show that preverbal infants selectively initiate social looks in situations of epistemic 
uncertainty caused by violations of expectation. Our results further suggest that despite 
being able to track the changing epistemic value of information, infants 
communicatively referenced their social partners on the basis of their perceived 
epistemic profiles: when caregivers provided unreliable (i.e., at least partially 
incongruent) labeling testimony, infants’ expectations of reliability from their trusted 
social partner were violated. We conclude that social referencing as a communicative 
response to such globally rather than locally encoded epistemic uncertainty highlights 
its epistemic function in preverbal infants’ social cognitive development.   
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Proportion, onset and duration of social referencing  
Figure 2a: Proportion, onset and duration of social referencing in Incongruent, 
Congruent and No Label conditions in Experiment 1. The dots represent the distribution 
of individual values, bold dots represent the mean values, solid lines of the box plots 
show the median with the first and the third quartiles, the upper and lower whiskers 
represent scores outside the middle 50%.  
Figure 2b: Proportion, onset and duration of social referencing in Incongruent, 
Congruent and No Label conditions in Experiment 2. The dots represent the distribution 
of individual values, bold dots represent the mean values, solid lines of the box plots 
show the median with the first and the third quartiles, the upper and lower whiskers 
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Supplementary analyses: Experiments 1 and 2 
Trial-by-trial proportion of social referencing 
Experiment 1: As the experimental procedure progressed through the initial five 
trials, infants retained high levels of social referencing in the Incongruent condition and 
lower levels in the Congruent and No Label conditions (Figure S1a).  
Experiment 2: As the experimental procedure progressed for the initial five 
trials, infants decreased their social referencing in Congruent and No Label trials, but 
not in Incongruent trials (Figure S1b). This may indicate differential alertness to 
epistemic uncertainty and enhanced processing of inaccurate information supplied in 
the incongruent trials, while infants essentially become desensitized to novelty in trials 
with correct labels or no label prompts. Note, however, that the depicted trial 
progression is not actually sequential since the order of condition was pseudo-
randomized, so this interpretation remains a cautious speculation. 
Figure S1:   
Proportion of social referencing across first 5 trials of each experimental condition 
a) Experiment 1                                                                  b) Experiment 2  
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Caregiver responsivity 
The caregivers were instructed to refrain from actively interacting with their 
child following their utterances while keeping the interaction as natural as possible. 
Naturally, parental spontaneous reaction to the infant-initiated communicative signals 
varied. We therefore coded caregivers’ contingent responsivity to their infants’ social 
referencing as a control measure for the possibility that caregivers’ response 
differentially affected infants’ social referencing. Caregivers’ contingent responsivity 
to the infant-initiated looks was coded when the caregiver returned their child’s gaze, 
smiled or vocalized in response, nodded their head, pointed to the screen while making 
eye contact with the child, touched or kissed the child, or made any other 
communicative advances towards the child after their initiated looks. When the 
caregiver remained neutral and did not engage in any interaction with her child, instead 
looking at the screen, this was coded as lack of contingent responsivity.  
Experiment 1: A one-way 3-factor ANOVA did not reveal statistically 
significant differences between caregiver responsivity across conditions: Congruent (M 
= .62, SD = .39), Incongruent (M = .72, SD = .31), No Label (M = .52, SD = .4); F(1,46) 
= 2.33, p = .13, with homogeneity of variances assumed, Levene’s F = 1.41, p = .25. 
Experiment 2: A repeated-measures ANOVA did not reveal statistically 
significant differences between caregiver responsivity across conditions (Congruent M 
= .72, Incongruent M = .59, No label M = .51, F(2,54) = 2.5, p = .09, with sphericity 
assumed, Mauchly’s test, x2 (2) = .93, p = .41).   
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Experiment S3 
This experiment was conducted prior to Experiments 1 and 2 reported in the 
current paper. We report it here to provide a rationale for methodological considerations 
which motivated the key changes to the subsequent design, and as complementary 
evidence for the role of social referencing in response to epistemic uncertainty. 
The current experimental study design was adapted from the previous work by 
Parise and Csibra (2012) which demonstrated early referential understanding of words 
and a rudimentary receptive vocabulary at 9 months by presenting infants with a series 
of object-label mismatches and measuring their neural response to semantic 
incongruency. The original study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to measure the 
neural signature of semantic mismatch detection, the N400 ERP component. To explore 
the behavioral manifestations of the labeling mismatch detection, the number of infants’ 
social looks at the person (either caregiver or experimenter) providing labels was also 
measured, finding no significant differences in response to congruent and incongruent 
stimuli during the one-second period.  
Although Experiment S3 broadly followed the design of Parise and Csibra 
(2012), we made several important changes. First, we extended the length of object 
appearance following labeling from 1 second to 7 seconds to provide infants with 
sufficient time to initiate spontaneous communicative bids, specifically measuring 
infants’ social referencing looks in response to the caregiver’s single labeling event 
(either congruent or incongruent to the object). While in infant ERP research shorter 
trial duration helps minimize the risk of motion artefacts which are often detrimental to 
collecting good quality data, behavioral social learning studies in infancy typically 
employ longer lasting trials. For instance, studies investigating infants’ looking 
response to repeated labeling events had trials lasting between 10 (Brooker & Poulin-
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Dubois, 2013) and 30 seconds (e.g., Dunn & Bremner, 2017; Koenig & Echols, 2003). 
Second, the labeling conditions were always enabled by infants’ primary caregivers 
rather than experimenters. 
The goal of the current study was therefore to test whether infants, if given an 
opportunity and sufficient time, would selectively use explicit communicative cues 
upon detecting the semantic (object-referent mismatch) and social (object mislabeling 
by caregiver) violation of expectation. We hypothesized that infants will engage in more 
social referencing in incongruent as compared to congruent trials. 
Experiment S3 methods 
Participants 
We tested thirty-two 11-month-old infants (Mage = 334 days, SD = 15, range 
274-360, 19 girls) from a database of families in the Northwest of England who had 
agreed to participate in infant studies. 
Experimental procedure 
Caregivers received instructions during the consenting procedure upon arriving 
to the laboratory. In the testing room, infants sat in a high chair, with the caregiver 
positioned slightly behind and to the side of the infant to allow for easy head turns 
toward them. Caregivers wore headphones to discreetly receive labeling instructions. 
Both the infants and their caregivers faced a large screen. The experiment was recorded 
using two video cameras positioned to capture infants’ behaviors from different angles: 
directly in front of and behind the infant’s seat. 
A trial began by first displaying an occluder together with a visual and auditory 
attention-grabbing animation (e.g., a rotating star coupled with an exciting sound). In a 
within-subjects design, a caregiver was instructed to label the anticipated object during 
the occlusion phase, either congruently (e.g., correctly saying “Look, there is a cat!” 
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before an image of a cat was revealed) or incongruently (e.g., saying “Look, there is a 
cat” while an object subsequently revealed was not a cat, but e.g., a duck). The occluder 
was then removed to reveal an image of a familiar object or animal (one of fifteen labels 
and images as in Parise & Csibra, 2012). Trial congruency, labels and images of objects 
were presented in pseudorandomized order. The experiment continued while the infant 
remained attentive, on average for 7-10 minutes. If the infant became distracted, a 
rotating spiral with a jingle was presented between trials or an interactive break was 
offered. The session ended when the infant’s attention could no longer be attracted to 
the screen.  
Measures and coding 
We calculated the overall proportion, onset, and duration of social referencing 
looks toward the caregiver as a function of condition. We chose these three social 
looking measures in order to disentangle the exact meaning of different types of 
attention signals as previous research often used discrete number of social looks, 
accumulated looking time and duration of looks interchangeably. As our hypotheses 
concerned only the proportion of social referencing measure, we did not predict the 
pattern of results for the onset and duration measures. 
Social referencing was defined as an infant initiating a direct look at the 
caregiver following the labeling phrase immediately after attending to the object on the 
screen, consisting of a head turn towards the caregiver and a direct look at their face, 
but not orienting to the caregiver’s body, hands, attempts to touch them, “pick-me-up” 
gestures or expressing the need to nurse. In instances when the infant initiated more 
than one look at the caregiver during a trial in this manner, each look was counted, and 
duration of the looks was summed up for each trial.  
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The proportion of social referencing was calculated as the number of social 
looks generated in each condition divided by the number of respective condition valid 
trials. The latency to the first social look (onset of social referencing) and total looking 
time at the caregiver (duration of social referencing) were coded manually from the 
video recordings and averaged for each experimental condition.  
Coding was performed offline from video recordings by two researchers blind 
to the experimental condition. The second coder coded 20% of trials; all disagreements 
were resolved through discussion. The coders achieved high reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha α = .82, p < .001).  
Trial exclusions. To avoid confirmation bias, we made trial-by-trial exclusion 
decisions prior to coding. Infants who completed at least 2 congruent and 2 incongruent 
trials were included in the analyses. We excluded trials for four reasons: technical errors 
(n = 13), infants’ fussiness (n = 17), parental procedural errors (n = 33), and infants’ 
lack of attention, defined as looking at the screen for less than 1 second overall upon 
object presentation (n = 50). Infants contributed a total of 575 valid trials (M =17.97, 
SD = 6.58, range 6-31): 286 in congruent (M = 9, SD = 3.28, range 3-14) and 289 in 
incongruent (M = 9.03, SD = 3.61, range 3-17) conditions. 
Experiment S3 results 
Main analyses included proportion, onset and duration of social referencing; 
exploratory analyses assessed the role of social referencing occurring prior to labeling.  
Main analyses 
Twenty-nine out of 32 infants used social referencing at least once during the 
experiment. Each infant generated social looks on average 7.28 times across trials 
(range 0-21) with a total of 221 social looks coded in the full sample, with 40% of all 
trials containing at least one social referencing event.  
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In contrast with our hypothesis, social referencing occurred equally often during 
congruent (M = .44, SD = .27) and incongruent (M = .44, SD = .27) trials, t(28) = - 0.17, 
p = .87; BF01 = 3.76. The average onset of social referencing (t(28) = - 0.61, p = .55, 
BF01 = 3.2) and duration (t(28) = -1.32, p = .20, BF01 = 1.7) did not significantly differ 
between conditions; see Figure S2.   
 
Figure S2:  
Proportion, onset and duration of social referencing across conditions 
 
Additional analyses 
We coded social referencing to the caregiver which occurred after the spoken 
label but prior to the object revealed on the screen as a measure of general orientation 
to the speaker. Twenty-two out of 32 infants looked at their caregiver before seeing the 
object (M = .19, SD = .24). On average, infants made 2.78 looks (SD = 3.08, range 1-
11), with an average length of 1.65 seconds (SD = 0.76). After using this measure to 
baseline-correct the main outcome measure, the main null result of the proportion of 
social referencing across conditions remained: congruent (M = .25, SD = .29), 
incongruent (M = .25, SD = .35), t(28) = 0.05, p = .96.  
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Experiment S3 discussion 
The results did not support our prediction that infants will look at their caregiver 
selectively following incongruent labeling, but are in line what Parise and Csibra (2012) 
reported in additional behavioural analyses. One possibility is that infants were driven 
to socially engage their social partners across both conditions, rather than selectively 
communicate their uncertainty to them and seek epistemic input from them, contrary to 
the account that preverbal infants would respond selectively in the situation of epistemic 
uncertainty. However, there are two alternative explanations. It is possible that the 
current design, due to its manipulation’s explicitly social nature, may have been not 
sensitive to detect differential social referencing. 
First, given that infants experienced both congruent and incongruent labeling 
from the same informant, it is possible that their social referencing was a response to 
their caregivers’ inconsistent epistemic reliability spanning across both types of trials 
(for similar findings of infants’ reactions to inconsistency in social interactions see 
Steckler, Woo, & Hamlin, 2017). In this sense, the within-subject design did not allow 
us to delineate whether infants’ social referencing indicated non-epistemic interaction 
seeking (i.e., initiating joint attention), active communicative response to a violation of 
expectation (e.g., seeking correct label or evidence of relevant social cues, such as that 
the caregiver is joking), or a response to a low-level uncertainty (i.e., novelty as they 
saw a new object on the screen in each trial; see Dunn & Bremner, 2017). To disentangle 
these possibilities, allowing infants to exclusively experience either congruent or 
incongruent testimony would enable direct comparison of their responses to low-level 
uncertainty (one that occurs in congruent trials) as opposed to the violation of 
expectation scenario (incongruent trials). Second, infants may have been additionally 
confused by the caregiver’s labeling when no objects were yet presented on the screen 
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in the first place, which is supported by large rates of social referencing occurring before 
the object was revealed. While controlling for the rate of social referencing prior to 
object appearance did not change the null result in the rate of social referencing after 
the object-referent mismatch was detected, it is nevertheless possible that infants were 
confused by the caregiver’s premonition-like ability to provide a label, which may have 
masked the differences in their subsequent communicative social looks. 
Both of these concerns were addressed in Experiment 1, where we implemented 
a between-subject design and changed the onset of caregiver’s labeling to occur after 
the object’s appearance rather than before. Experiment S3 therefore served as a pilot 
which allowed us to optimize the procedure for measuring social referencing behavior 
in Experiments 1 and 2 reported in the main body of the paper. 
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Experimental Chapter 2: Information Seeking in 
Epistemic Uncertainty 
The previous chapter presented an experimental investigation of the role of 
social referencing in epistemic uncertainty, demonstrating that preverbal infants use 
social referencing as an active communicative cue when they face epistemic, as distinct 
from emotional, uncertainty, therefore suggesting an epistemic function of this 
behaviour. Social referencing was selective in the epistemic violation of expectation 
situation, specifically when the infant’s caregiver provided inaccurate labels to familiar 
objects. The results suggest that infants detected the object-referent mismatch and 
expected their caregivers to provide congruent semantic information – an expectation 
violated by instead receiving incongruent labels.  
Preverbal infants emerged as active participants in the social information 
exchange process, using their developmentally available communicative tools to engage 
in social interaction. While this study design does not provide a direct insight into the 
specific meaning of social referencing looks, the results suggest that such looks, as 
opposed to passive preferential looking time measures, are active and communicative 
in nature. Infants may have been seeking disambiguating or clarifying information to 
reduce uncertainty associated with an incongruent label or to verify the communicative 
cues of the mislabelling caregiver to clarify their intentions. For instance, infants may 
have intended to verify their access to information (i.e., “Is she looking at the right 
object?”) or check their facial expressions or other pragmatic cues that may be relevant 
to the information provided (i.e., “Is she playing a game with me?”). This reasoning is 
in line with previous reports of children’s responses to a testimony from a blindfolded 
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informant (Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009) or a speaker facing away from the source of 
information (Koenig & Echols, 2003). Overall, as a communicative signal following 
uncertainty detection, the social referencing pattern in the present study lends support 
to infants’ propensity to communicate with others during uncertainty, supposedly with 
an epistemic goal of obtaining relevant and reliable information from trustworthy social 
partners (for similar reasoning, see also Goupil et al., 2016; Harris et al., 2017; 
Hembacher et al., 2017). 
The second study in this thesis aimed to further characterise the role of preverbal 
infants’ communication in epistemic uncertainty. Here, infants faced a different kind of 
uncertainty (about the novel object’s referent) and had an opportunity to seek specific 
information from available social partners. We asked whether social referencing as an 
active communicative behaviour can be used by infants to seek epistemic information, 
and to do so from the best available source of information – a previously reliable rather 
than ignorant informant.  
The epistemic uncertainty with which infants faced here also unfolded in a social 
context, but was more complicated than the previous study: in addition to their primary 
caregivers, infants also interacted with two unfamiliar adults. The caregivers were asked 
to enable epistemic uncertainty by posing a question to which neither themselves nor 
their children had or could independently obtain an answer. However, the infants had a 
choice of two potential social partners, differing in their projected epistemic status, to 
whom they could refer in search of an answer. Previous research demonstrated that 
infants are sensitive to indices of plausibility, congruency and validity in the 
information they obtain about the world and in the social partners who supply 
information (Harris, 2012; Stahl & Feigenson, 2019). Such epistemic sensitivity in 
social contexts plays an important role in infants’ interaction with unfamiliar adults; 
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while primary caregivers may be perceived as truthful and reliable by default, infants 
have to establish an appropriate epistemic status of unfamiliar informants (Harris, 2019; 
Sperber et al., 2010). We tested the role of infants’ social referencing as information 
seeking communicative signals in a more complex, but also more ecologically valid 
situation of uncertainty when multiple sources of information are available. 
This chapter contains the second paper in this journal format thesis, which 
examines the second research question: Do preverbal infants use social referencing to 
seek information from more knowledgeable adults in a situation of referential 
uncertainty? 
 
This paper has been published in the same format as presented in this thesis: 
Bazhydai, M., Westermann, G., & Parise, E. (2020). “I don’t know but I know who to 
ask”:  12-month-olds actively seek information from knowledgeable adults. 
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Research highlights 
- 12-month-olds reliably assessed the informative potential of the available social 
partners and selectively queried the best source only when information was 
needed. 
- Preverbal infants used social referencing to actively and selectively seek 
information from social partners as part of their interrogative communicative 
toolkit.  
- Social referencing served as a communicative means to seek epistemic rather 
than emotionally laden information in the situation of referential uncertainty. 
- Results indicate that infants actively participate in the cultural interpersonal 
process of knowledge transmission, using basic nonverbal communicative tools 
at their disposal.  
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Abstract 
Active social communication is an effective way for infants to learn about the 
world. Do preverbal and pre-pointing infants seek epistemic information from their 
social partners when motivated to obtain information they cannot discover 
independently? The present study investigated whether 12-month-olds (N = 30) 
selectively seek information from knowledgeable adults in situations of referential 
uncertainty. In a live experiment, infants were introduced to two unfamiliar adults, an 
Informant (reliably labeling objects) and a Non-Informant (equally socially engaging, 
but ignorant about object labels). At test, infants were asked to make an impossible 
choice - locate a novel referent among two novel objects. When facing epistemic 
uncertainty – but not at other phases of the procedure - infants selectively referred to 
the Informant rather than the Non-Informant. These results show that preverbal infants 
use social referencing to actively and selectively seek information from social partners 





Infants are notoriously curious and active learners. To enable effective 
knowledge acquisition, they actively seek information in both independent and social 
learning contexts (Begus & Southgate, 2018; Oudeyer & Smith, 2016). Recent research 
has begun to investigate infants’ ability to judge their social partners’ suitability to 
provide relevant information and selectively seek it from the most suitable informant 
(Harris, Koenig, Corriveau, & Jaswal, 2018). Nevertheless, early developmental 
manifestations of active information seeking are poorly understood. Here we investigate 
the developmental origins of intentional communication soliciting information in social 
learning by asking whether and how preverbal and pre-pointing infants actively and 
selectively refer to others in situations of epistemic uncertainty.  
Infants’ selective attention and active exploration of their environment has been 
investigated both in non-social contexts, highlighting infants’ independent discovery-
oriented behaviors that optimize their learning outcomes (Gottlieb, Oudeyer, Lopes, & 
Baranes, 2013; Kidd & Hayden, 2015), and in social learning contexts. Beginning in 
their first year of life, infants are capable to quickly and accurately form situational 
epistemic profiles of their social partners based on a variety of cues (Poulin-Dubois & 
Brosseau-Liard, 2016), such as the social partner’s competence (Begus & Southgate, 
2012; Begus, Gliga, & Southgate, 2016), reliability (Crivello, Phillips, & Poulin-
Dubois, 2017; Tummeltshammer, Wu, Sobel, & Kirkham, 2014), credibility (Birch, 
Akmal, & Frampton, 2010), and confidence (Brosseau‐Liard & Poulin‐Dubois, 2014). 
In sum, infants show vigilance towards and keen understanding of knowledge 
distribution among social partners. However, little is known about whether preverbal 
infants actively, spontaneously and strategically seek information in social contexts. Do 
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infants possess the communicative means to query others for epistemic information 
even before being able to formulate questions verbally? 
Active social communication is an effective way for infants to learn about the 
world. In addition to supporting their social and emotional needs, one early 
communicative signal – pointing - has been proposed to serve an interrogative, or 
information seeking function (Harris & Lane, 2014; Southgate, Van Maanen, & Csibra, 
2007), endorsing the idea that pointing holds a special place as a cognitive milestone 
(Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007) in that it enables infants to take an active 
interrogative stance which is not available to them earlier in development. Specifically, 
pointing has been demonstrated to be a unique communicative tool used selectively in 
the presence of an informative social partner emerging in the second year of life (Begus 
& Southgate, 2012, at 16 months; Kovács, Tauzin, Téglás, Gergely, & Csibra, 2014, at 
12 months; Lucca & Wilbourn, 2018, at 18 months).  
Several crucial insights about interrogative communication in infancy have been 
gained from this line of research: infants are capable of recognizing the informative 
potential of their social partners and, when motor development allows it, can use 
pointing gestures to interrogate them. However, to our knowledge, no studies of infants’ 
interrogative pointing have shown whether requesting information is selective from a 
specific source, such as demonstrating that infants point to a knowledgeable person 
when competing sources of information are available.  All previous studies employed a 
between-subject design in which an infant encountered a single experimenter, and they 
have focused on very specific aspects of information provision. For example, in the 
seminal interrogative pointing study (Begus & Southgate, 2012), one group of infants 
interacted with an informant providing correct object labels, and a second group with 
an informant providing false labels. In another study (Kovács et al., 2014, Experiment 
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1), infants either interacted with an adult who showed varied emotional response or 
expressed positive interest, or provided either a familiar or a novel label (Kovács et al., 
2014, Experiment 2). The general cognitive mechanism specifying if and how infants 
select an information source from a set of options remains unknown. 
While pointing has been the primary focus of attention in this line of 
investigation, other preverbal behaviors emerge prior to pointing which could serve the 
same functional mechanisms or act as a cognitive prerequisite for interrogative 
communication (Begus & Southgate, 2018; Ronfard, Zambrana, Hermansen, & 
Kelemen, 2018). One of them is social referencing, defined as initiating a look at a 
social partner in order to obtain situational information which may help guide 
behavioral choices (Walden & Ogan, 1988). Social referencing has been primarily used 
to show how infants resolve situations of emotional uncertainty by assessing the 
affective response of their caregiver or another adult to aversive, unsettling or 
potentially dangerous events, such as approaching a perceptual drop-off (Campos & 
Stenberg, 1981; Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985). Having been initially linked 
to indices of attachment and comfort seeking (Stenberg & Hagekull, 2007; Striano, 
Vaish, & Benigno, 2006), social referencing has been established as a behavior 
specifically eliciting social appraisal information - albeit only in emotional contexts. In 
utilizing this behavior, infants are sensitive to adults’ manifested expertise and 
competence cues in selectively choosing who to refer to in order to resolve their 
emotionally-laden uncertainty (Schieler, Koenig, & Buttelmann, 2018; Stenberg, 2009, 
2013).  
While adults serve as a point of reference for infants in uncertain situations, 
similar to other sources of information (both passive non-social and active social), such 
initiation of a social referencing look at an adult can be interpreted as an active 
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communicative act of asking them for information – a request for input, an 
“interrogative social referencing”, aimed at not only expecting but actively eliciting a 
response from a social partner from whom they wish to obtain information. In this sense, 
social referencing, like pointing, may be a proto-interrogative requestive act of a 
specific kind which functions to “induce the manifestation of some knowledge from the 
willing adult” (Southgate et al., 2007, p .738).  
Do preverbal infants also use social referencing to actively and selectively seek 
epistemic information? Recent research has gone beyond studying social referencing 
exclusively in emotional contexts, challenging the long-standing view that it evolved 
for socio-emotional engagement purposes only, that it is not fully social until the second 
year of an infant’s life, and that infants are not capable of intentional information 
seeking at this age (Baldwin & Moses, 1996). Several reports showed that infants also 
use social referencing in non-emotional uncertainty, such as when their expectations are 
violated (Dunn & Bremner, 2016; Walden, Kim, McCoy, & Karrass, 2007), when they 
are presented with referential ambiguity such as two novel objects and only one novel 
label (Hembacher, deMayo, Frank, 2017; Vaish, Demir, & Baldwin, 2011), and when 
they know they can obtain information from a social partner about the location of hidden 
objects (Goupil, Romand-Monnier, & Kouider, 2016). But none of the previous studies 
of social referencing demonstrated whether infants go beyond appreciation of 
informative potential of social partners, and are able to query the best available source 
when in need of specific information.  
A small number of studies suggest that social referencing is an active 
communicative behavior allowing preverbal infants to resolve epistemic uncertainty in 
social learning contexts. For example, Vaish et al (2011) demonstrated that infants at 
13 months sought disambiguating referential gaze from an adult in a labeling 
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uncertainty situation. At 16 months, infants referred to their social partner while 
signaling their ignorance when they did not know the name of the novel item (Harris, 
Bartz, & Rowe, 2017). Goupil et al (2016) showed that 20-month-olds’ increased social 
referencing to their caregiver to solicit help locating a hidden object. Here, we propose 
that social referencing enables them to not only selectively seek epistemic information 
from an appropriate source, but to do so specifically when needed. We chose to study 
this process in 12-month-olds and in a word learning context. Infants at the end of their 
first year are active word-learners with a mean receptive vocabulary of around 80 words 
(Frank, Braginsky, Yurovsky, & Marchman, 2017) and we here capitalize on their 
active interest in learning new words (Mani & Ackermann, 2018).  
We developed a novel experimental paradigm that invites 12-months-olds’ 
active and spontaneous search for epistemic information from social partners, where 
social referencing is an available communicative tool to ask for help from either a 
knowledgeable (Informant) or an ignorant adult (Non-Informant). Building on the 
findings from interrogative pointing and social referencing research, we aimed at 
eliciting infants’ spontaneous, rather than experimentally trained, social referencing 
looks in a dynamic social interaction. Infants met two new adults who contrasted in 
their ability to provide specific information (a label) while remaining equally engaging 
and sociable. We predicted that infants would show selectivity based on the established 
informative potential of their social partners, using social referencing with the intention 
to gain specific information when needed. Our goal was to understand infants’ 
developing ability and cognitive prerequisites to interrogating informants in order to 




The final sample consisted of 30 1-year-old infants (14 boys, M = 368 days, SD 
= 17, range 340 to 404 days). With a power of 0.80 and alpha of 0.05, a sample size of 
29 is sufficient to produce a large effect size (G*Power analysis software, Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Twelve additional infants were tested but not 
included due to unwillingness to participate in the procedure (N = 9) or substantial 
parental procedural interference (N = 3).  
Equipment 
Two video cameras captured the scene from two different angles. We used a 
head-mounted eye-tracker (Positive Science) to record infants’ gaze direction 
(PSLiveCapture, v1.8.3). We used Yarbus (v2.2.9) for offline calibration and GazeTag 
(v0.94) for post gaze processing. Parents and experimenters could follow timing and 
instructions of the experimental procedure on a prompts screen displaying a Power 
Point presentation. 
Stimuli 
Three familiar toys (ball, banana and book) and two novel objects were used 
during the familiarization trials, two familiar toys (duck and fish) during the warm-up 
training trials, and six pairs of novel objects during the test trials. All objects were 
brightly colored, and pairs were selected based on perceptual similarity (see Figure 1a). 
Procedure 
A researcher not involved in the experimental procedure completed parental 
consent and training on the procedure, played with the infant and brought them to the 
testing room. There, the infant was first introduced to two unfamiliar experimenters, 
and then sat in a high chair at the short end of a rectangular table. The researcher 
mounted the eye-tracker on the infant’s head, engaged the infant in warm-up play, and 
performed the calibration procedure with two familiar objects. The two experimenters 
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(Informant and Non-Informant) sat at the long ends of the table across from each other, 
with sides counterbalanced across participants. The caregiver was positioned across the 
table from the infant, facing the prompts screen, while the researcher remained behind 
the infant (Figure 1b).  
Experimental procedure  
The procedure (Figure 1c) involved a familiarization phase, followed by a warm 
up training trial and a test phase. 
Familiarization 
There were four familiarization trials, each lasting 25 seconds, two with familiar 
objects and two with novel objects. A reinforcement trial, identical to familiarization 
trials with familiar objects, was presented later on, following the first test trial. This trial 
was introduced after piloting in order to ensure infants’ sustained attention on the 
procedure for the remaining five test trials and it is not used for main statistical analyses 
(but see Supplementary Materials for these data).  
On each familiarization trial the caregiver retrieved one of the 3 familiar objects 
(Trials 1 and 2, later labeled by the Informant as ball, banana, and book) or one of the 
2 novel objects (Trials 3 and 4, labeled by the Informant as dani and fifa) from a tray 
below the table (Figure 1a) and placed it on the table out of the infant’s reach. Upon 
placing the object, the caregiver asked “What is this?”. Following the caregiver’s 
question, both the Informant and the Non-Informant established joint attention with the 
infant, making direct eye-contact, smiling, and speaking in child-directed intonation. 
Either the Informant or the Non-Informant spoke first, counterbalanced across trials. 
The Non-Informant said: "I don't know!”, whereas the Informant provided the label as 
she pointed to the object: “This is a [label]!”. The caregiver then pushed the toy closer 
to the infant for a 20-second object exploration, during which the Informant and the 
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Non-Informant continued with their respective utterances as described below. The 
Informant labeled the object 4-6 times, using utterances such as “Look, this is a ball!”; 
“Wow, a ball!”; “What a nice ball!”; “I like this ball!”, “Where is the ball?”, “A ball!”. 
The Non-Informant provided a positive, engaging social interaction, using 4-6 
utterances such as “Look at this!”; “Oh Wow!”; “What is this?”; “Hmm...”; “This is 
nice!”; “I like this!” Both experimenters naturally took turns speaking to the infant, 
taking care to not interrupt each other.  
Warm-up training 
The single warm-up training commenced a substantial change in the procedure 
and was designed specifically to introduce and ease infants to the change in the object 
presentation routine after the familiarization trials: here, infants were not provided an 
opportunity to explore presented toys immediately. This trial (and the subsequent test 
trials) consisted of the following episodes: object presentation, information seeking, 
information provision, object exploration, and object choice (Figure 1d).  
During the warm-up training trial, two familiar objects, a duck and a fish, were 
placed by the caregiver out of the infant’s reach, with the caregiver asking: “Which one 
is the duck?”. After a period of 15 seconds, during which all adults remained silent and 
looked at the infant, the caregiver repeated the question. During this period the infant 
could seek information by looking at the experimenters. In the next, “information 
provision” episode, the Informant responded with the correct label (“This one is the 
duck!”), simultaneously pointing to the duck toy, while the Non-Informant expressed 
ignorance about the label (“Oh wow! Is it?” or “I don’t know!”), just as she did during 
the familiarization phase, with the order of who spoke first counterbalanced as during 
familiarization. Following the experimenters’ respective utterances, the caregiver 
placed both objects in front of the child for a 20-second exploration.  
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Test  
The test trials’ procedure was identical to the warm-up training trial except that 
the infant now was presented with two novel objects and inducing high referential 
uncertainty (“Which one is the [pseudoword]?”) (Figure 1d). The caregiver did not 
know the novel objects’ labels. Following the infant’s opportunity to seek information, 
the Informant (either speaking first or after the Non-Informant’s utterance) pointed to 
and labeled one of the objects with the pseudoword in question, consistently labeling 
the same pre-selected object in each of the pairs. There were six test trials; the first test 
trial followed the warm-up training trial, and the remaining five test trials followed the 
reinforcement familiarization trial which was identical to the familiarization trials 
(Figure 1c). 
Trial exclusion criteria 
For behavioral data analyses, 99% (N = 119) of familiarization, 73% (N = 22) 
of training, and 87% (N = 143) of test trials were included. Infants completed on average 
5.4 test trials, with 4.8 valid trials retained for analyses. Trials were excluded due to 
infant fussiness or refusal to take part in the procedure (N = 10), experimenter error (N 
= 8), caregiver procedural interference (N = 4), and technical problems (N = 4). As 
expected by design, the warm-up training trials were excluded most often due to infant 
fussiness resulting from not having access to the toys immediately and due to caregiver 
mistakes following a change in the procedure. As a result, only 22 (out of 30) warm-up 
training trials were available for analyses. 
For the head-mounted eye-tracking based data analyses of the length of visual 
fixations, we obtained a limited dataset comprised of 20 infants for familiarization, 10 
for training, and 15 for test trials. This was due to low tolerance of wearing the 
equipment, as well as pulling the eye-tracker off in the middle of the experimental 
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procedure, e.g., after the familiarization trials when they were facing silent periods 
during the warm-up training or test trials’ “opportunity to seek information” episodes. 
We therefore had a restricted sample available for analyses of the length of infants’ 
visual fixations and consider such analyses supplementary to the main behavioral social 
looks analyses. Nevertheless, these analyses were instrumental for comparison of the 
number of looks and the total looking durations as two distinct measures. 
Coding 
We were interested in determining how much attention infants directed at each 
experimenter in all phases of the procedure, measured by first looks, total looks, and 
the duration of the looks. We distinguish these measures from a functional standpoint. 
For the familiarization trials, we used the video recordings to code the number of looks 
at each experimenter and the eye-tracker to code the length of visual fixations on each 
experimenter. We calculated a proportion of looks at the Informant and the Non-
Informant out of the total looks infants made at the two experimenters during the 
familiarization phase, averaging across four trials. This measure indexes infants’ 
attention as they encoded the experimenters’ epistemic profiles. We also coded infants’ 
first looks at this phase. However, as infants’ initial attention was expected by design 
to be directed at whoever spoke first on each trial, the function of infants’ first looks is 
inevitably different from the function of the first looks during the warm up and test trials 
when infants were facing uncertainty and nobody was speaking for 15 seconds (Figure 
1d).  
For both the warm-up training and the test trials, we coded first looks, total 
number of looks averaged across six trials (from the video recordings), and length of 
infants’ visual fixations (from the eye-tracker) at each experimenter during the 15-
second-long “opportunity to seek information” episode. Here, the hypothesized 
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function of looks is to solicit information from the experimenters as opposed to attend 
to their information provision as during familiarization.  
Of note, further, are the functional differences between the measures of duration 
of looks and the discrete social looks. It has been debated what looking time preferences 
mean (Aslin, 2007; Sim & Xu, 2019) and whether looking time and social looks index 
the same cognitive mechanisms (Dunn & Bremner, 2017; Haith, 1998; Walden et al., 
2007). The exact measure of social looking as epistemic information seeking is a topic 
of ongoing investigation as both the number of social looks and the duration of social 
looks have been previously used as a primary outcome measure (e.g., Koenig & Echols, 
2003; Vaish et al., 2011). Here we focused on the number of discrete social looks as an 
index of information seeking and the looking duration as an index of information 
encoding. 
Two independently trained research assistants coded 100% of the behavioral 
data, achieving substantial agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977) for the first looks 
(Cohen's kappa κ =.78, p < .001) and excellent agreement for the total looks coding 
(Cronbach’s alpha α = .92, p < .001); all disagreements were resolved through 
discussion. The main coders were not blind to the identity of the experimenters. A 
subset (20%) of test trials was also coded by a coder blind both to the hypotheses and 
the identity of the experimenters, achieving excellent reliability both for first looks (κ = 
.90, p < .001) and for total looks (α = .94, p < .001). 
Results 
The results of infants’ social looks at the Informant and the Non-Informant are 
presented separately for the familiarization, warm-up training and test trials, followed 
by the cross-phase comparisons and regression analyses. Exploratory analyses and 
additional figures are available in the Supplementary Materials. A Bayes Factor analysis 
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was performed to determine the probability of the null or the alternative hypothesis 
being true (i.e., that there is no difference between looks at the Informant and the Non-
Informant or that there is a difference) given the data (Jeffreys, 1961). For all analyses, 
we used a default Bayes factor (Rouder et al., 2012) with a half normal distribution 
(assuming a maximum possible effect size of 0.707). 
Familiarization  
Averaged across four trials, infants’ looks at the Informant were at chance for 
first looks (M = .56, SD = .24, t(29) = 1.35, p = .1, one-sample t-test; BF01 = 1.7; Figure 
S1) and total looks (M = .51, SD = .12, t(29) = .64, p = .53, BF01 = 3.28; Figure 2a), and 
there were no differences between length of visual fixations on the Informant (M = 284, 
SD = 230 ms) and the Non-Informant (M = 264, SD = 385 ms), t(19) = .23, p = .82, 
paired t-test; BF01 = 3.2. 
Warm-up training 
The proportion of looks at the Informant was at chance for first looks (M = .50, 
SD = .51, t(21) = 0, p = 1, BF01 = 4.48), total looks (M = .42, SD = .42, t(21) = -.91, p = 
.37; BF01 = 4) and length of visual fixations (Informant M = 303, SD = 548 ms, Non-
Informant M = 171, SD =  224 ms; t(9) = .67, p = .52; BF01 = 2), Figure S2.  
Test 
Infants were significantly more likely, on average during six trials, to first 
reference the Informant rather than the Non-Informant, M = .69, SD = .30; t(29) = 3.34, 
p = .002, 95% CI (.07, .30), Cohen’s d = .63, one-sample t-test; 21 out of 30 infants 
looked at the Informant first, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test z = -2.8, p = .005. Bayes 
Factor Analysis yielded a BF10 = 23, strongly supporting the alternative hypothesis and 
thus corroborating the result obtained with the frequentist statistics. The proportion of 
total looks at the Informant was significantly higher than the proportion of total looks 
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at the Non-Informant, M = .65, SD = .24; t(29) = 3.43, p = .002, 95% CI (.12, .48), 
Cohen’s d = .63, BF10 = 28, with 22 out of 30 infants showing the effect, Wilcoxon 
Signed test z = -3.14, p = .002 (Figure 2a). Infants’ visual fixations were significantly 
longer for looks at the Informant (M = 253, SD = 160 ms) than at the Non-Informant 
(M = 134, SD = 83 ms), t(14) = 2.41, p = .03, 95% CI (12.98, 224.49), Cohen’s d = .62; 
z = -2.05, p = .04; BF10 = 3.2.  
Cross-phase comparisons  
To clarify whether infants preferentially looked at the Informant only when a 
situation of epistemic uncertainty warranted further information seeking (as during the 
test phase’s opportunity to seek information episode), instead of preferentially looking 
in appreciation of the Informant’s knowledge overall (as during the familiarization 
phase), we conducted the following cross-phase comparisons. We compared total looks 
and length of fixations between familiarization and test phases. The cross-phase 
comparison of first looks is reported in Supplementary Materials, Figure S1, due to the 
distinctions in functional meaning between first looks at different phases 
(familiarization: first look at whoever speaks first; test: first look at whoever can help 
resolve epistemic uncertainty). 
Total looks. The proportion of infants’ total looks at the Informant was 
significantly higher during the test phase as compared to the familiarization phase, t(29) 
= - 2.91, p = .007, 95% CI (-.23, -.04), Cohen’s d = .55, BF10 = 8.9 (Figure 2b). To 
follow up on this comparison more specifically, we selected two familiarization and 
two test trials, which differed on whether or not the infant was facing referential 
uncertainty when presented with equally novel toys. The average proportion of infants’ 
total looks to the Informant during the last two familiarization trials (where the caregiver 
presented novel toys without asking the infant for the objects’ names) was significantly 
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lower than the proportion of total looks to the Informant during the first two test trials 
(where the caregiver also presented novel toys but now asked the infant to identify a 
label in a pair of two novel toys), t(29) = 3.39, p = .002, 95% CI (.09, .37), Cohen’s d = 
.53, BF10 = 26 (Figure 2b). 
Length of fixations. Infants did not spend significantly longer fixating on the 
Informant during the test phase as compared to the familiarization phase, t(14) = .94, p 
= .36, BF01 = 1.95. 
Regression analyses. To test whether infants’ looks at test were influenced by 
their looks at familiarization, we fitted two linear regression models. The proportion of 
infants’ first looks towards the Informant generated at familiarization was not predictive 
of their preferential first looks at the Informant at test ( = .03, t(28) = .16, p = .88), and 
there was no effect of the total looks in the familiarization phase on total looks at test 
( = .25, t(28) = .68, p = .50).  
Discussion 
To understand preverbal infants’ active role in social transmission of 
knowledge, we introduced 12-months-olds to two unfamiliar adults, an Informant and 
a Non-Informant. At test, in a situation of referential uncertainty, it was impossible for 
infants to independently discover the missing information (a novel label’s actual 
referent), but they could seek it from available social partners. Infants selectively 
referred to the previously knowledgeable rather than an equally socially engaging but 
ignorant adult. Infants showed no such preference at other phases where they did not 
require information, providing strong evidence that their social referencing was 
selective and served an information seeking function (see Supplementary Materials for 
additional control analyses). We conclude that infants were able to reliably assess the 
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informative potential of the available social partners and selectively queried the best 
source when information was needed. 
In line with our hypothesis, these results demonstrate that social referencing 
serves as a communicative means to solicit epistemic knowledge from others. While 
there is convincing evidence that interrogative pointing (where infants request 
information about an object by pointing at it, e.g., Begus & Southgate, 2012; Kovács et 
al., 2014; Lucca & Wilbourn, 2016; 2018) indexes infants’ ability to pose epistemic 
requests (Southgate et al., 2007; Tomasello et al., 2007), we find that infants are 
cognitively ready to do so by use of social referencing, which overall emerges earlier in 
development and is available to pre-pointing infants. In our new paradigm we actively 
elicited a different behavior, where information was sought by specifying the informant 
rather than the referent. While our results do not speak to whether interrogative social 
referencing is a developmental precursor to interrogative pointing or emerges 
independently, the current study highlights the early emerging cognitive mechanisms 
enabling epistemic interrogation. One way to interpret these social looks is as 
intentional communicative acts triggering epistemic help from cooperative and 
interactive social partners, in contrast to merely gathering information from a passive 
source such as a book. However, to further delineate whether infants actually posed 
epistemic requests (as in interrogative pointing) with their social looks, we would 
require clear evidence that they would persist in their communicative attempts 
triggering information elicitation, such as repeated pointing or vocalizations when their 
initial requests are not responded to (Southgate et al., 2007; Tomasello et al., 2007). 
Some data from our study supports such an interpretation: as experimenters remained 
unresponsive during the “opportunity to seek information” episode, infants continued 
to generate repeated social looks as if they were not satisfied with a lack of answers and 
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thus continued to demonstrate their interest in obtaining a response. Designing an 
experimental situation to specifically answer this question is an important future step in 
this line of research. 
Previously, selectivity in social referencing in ambiguous situations has been 
most commonly attributed to gathering emotional rather than epistemic information 
(e.g., Stenberg & Hagekull, 2007; Schieler, Koenig, & Buttelmann, 2018; Striano, 
Vaish, & Benigno, 2006). While social referencing has been shown to index infants’ 
response to the violation of expectation in cognitive and perceptual scenarios (Dunn & 
Bremner, 2016; Koenig & Echols, 2003; Walden, Kim, McCoy, & Karrass, 2007), here 
we demonstrate that infants are capable of strategically seeking pertinent epistemic 
information about the immediate environment from someone who can be regarded as 
knowledgeable about it. This finding is in line with the expertise rather than the comfort-
seeking hypothesis of social referencing (Feinman, Roberts, Hsieh, Sawyer, & 
Swanson, 1992; Stenberg, 2009, 2013), but also extends it for the first time, to the best 
of our knowledge, specifically to referential ambiguity in word learning situations. Only 
a small number of recent studies investigated social referencing during epistemic 
uncertainty, and all did so with older children (Harris, Bartz, & Rowe, 2017, 16-33 
months; Goupil et al., 2016, 20 months; Hembacher et al., 2017, 24 months; Vaish et 
al., 2011, 13 months). Unlike previous studies, our experimental manipulation placed 
infants in a more naturalistic situation where they had a mutually exclusive choice of 
who to look at - rather than whether or not to look at the social partners at all when 
facing high epistemic uncertainty (e.g., Kovács et al., 2014; Vaish et al., 2011), or doing 
so only after being experimentally trained rather than spontaneously (e.g., Goupil et al., 
2016).  
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The current study shows that social referencing serves the function to actively 
seek relevant information when such information is actually needed. In spite of the 
Informant being knowledgeable throughout all experimental phases, infants 
preferentially looked at them only at test when asked a question they themselves could 
not answer, ruling out the possibility that the Informant was overall more engaging than 
the Non-Informant just because they were always providing specific and relevant 
information, including exclusively pointing to the object  
as part of the information provision. Crucially, the same result emerged when 
directly comparing a subset of the familiarization trials with novel objects (last two 
familiarization trials) with an equal subset of the test trials with novel objects (first two 
test trials). Additionally, infants’ hold-outs and gives as an early developing active 
communicative behavior (Boundy, Cameron-Faulkner, & Theakston, 2016) were not 
preferentially directed at the Informant at any stage (see Supplementary Materials), 
supporting our interpretation of interrogative selectivity of social looks at the 
opportunity to seek information episode only. These results suggest that infants 
generated social looks to the Informant not because they realized that they have specific 
and relevant information overall, but because they were the best source of such 
information when it was needed. This may also be explained by infants’ general, rather 
than specific to situational knowledgeability, preference for seeking epistemic help 
from competent social partners (for a discussion see Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). Future 
studies should investigate whether infants pay attention to general competence cues as 
opposed to epistemic competence per se, as well as whether competence in one domain 
is generalized to other knowledge domains. 
An alternative interpretation to our results, following a reinforcement learning 
process, could be that infants’ looking was not driven by information seeking but 
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instead by anticipation of the correct response from the Informant. We believe this to 
be the less favorable explanation: infants’ looks to the Informant did not increase as the 
trials progressed (in contrast to Kovács et al., 2014) and were selective to test trials only, 
but not familiarization, warm-up training, and reinforcement familiarization trials, some 
of which were interspersed with the test trials (Figure 1d, see Supplementary Materials 
for these results). Furthermore, our results suggest that social looks and duration of 
looks index different cognitive mechanisms at different phases of the procedure, such 
as attention to the adults as infants formed their respective epistemic profiles at 
familiarization, and intentional communication soliciting information-gathering at test. 
The meaning of infants’ looks and looking time is generally debated (Aslin, 2007; Dunn 
& Bremner, 2016; Sim & Xu, 2019). These underlying differences may explain why 
our results were evident in the proportion of total looks, but not first looks, which were 
directed at the experimenter speaking first at each familiarization trial, or the length of 
visual fixations, which indexed encoding of experimenters’ identity at familiarization, 
but underlined the lack of attention at the Non-Informant at test when seeking 
information selectively from the Informant. 
We believe that the field is ripe for future investigations of information seeking 
through social referencing in preverbal infants. Our new paradigm would be easily 
applicable down to 6-month-old infants, and would enable a better understanding of 
how early this cognitive capacity emerges. Additionally, our paradigm could be 
improved by interleaving at test the trials with familiar objects (no uncertainty) with the 
trials with unfamiliar objects (epistemic uncertainty), further ruling out the possibility 
that infants look more at the knowledgeable informant because they anticipate the 
knowledge transmission to occur rather than actively soliciting it.  
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In sum, we have shown that infants reliably identify knowledgeable social 
partners and actively use social referencing to selectively seek information from them 
over others when required. Our results show that this capacity, at the heart of human 
cultural transmission, is available at least from 12 months of age. Infants know who to 
ask when information that is impossible to acquire otherwise, such as a label, is 
specifically relevant to them: they refer to a benevolent, knowledgeable and informative 
conspecific who can promptly satisfy their epistemic needs. Far from being passive 
recipients of top-down information from others’ testimony, infants actively participate 
in the cultural interpersonal process of knowledge transmission, and they do so with all 
the basic communicative tools at their disposal.  
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Figure 1:  
Example of the stimuli (1a), experimental set up (1b), procedure (1c), and structure of 
the test trials (1d). 
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Figure 2:  
Proportion of total looks at Informant (versus Non-Informant) at familiarization (2a) 
and test (2b) phases of the experiment. The dots represent the distribution of individual 
participants’ proportion of total looks at the Informant during the Familiarization and 
Test phases (2a), and a subset of two novel toy trials during the Familiarization and Test 
phases (2b). Bold dashed lines represent the Mean values, chance level at .5 is 
represented by frequent dashed line; solid lines of the box plots show the median with 
the first and the third quartiles, the upper and lower whiskers represent scores outside 
the middle 50%. 
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Cross-phase comparison of first looks at familiarization and test  
The proportion of infants’ first looks at the Informant during the four 
familiarization phase trials did not differ significantly from the proportion of first looks 
during the six test trials, t(29) = -1.69, p = .1, BF01 = 1.08. 
 
Figure S1:  
Proportion of first looks at Informant (versus Non-Informant) at familiarization and test 
phases of the experiment. The dots represent the distribution of individual participants’ 
proportions of first looks, dashed lines represent the chance level, red dot represents the 
Mean values, solid lines of the box plots show the median with the first and the third 
quartiles, the upper and lower whiskers represent scores outside the middle 50%. * 




Warm-up training trial 
The proportion of first looks directed at the Informant rather than the Non-
Informant (t(21) = 0, p = 1, BF01 = 4.48) and the proportion of total looks (t(21) = -.91, 
p = .37; BF01 = 4) were both at chance. 
 
Figure S2:  
Proportion of first looks and total looks at Informant (versus Non-Informant) at the 





The proportion of first looks directed at the Informant rather than the Non-
Informant (t(29) = .73, p = .23, BF01 = 3.1) and the proportion of total looks (t(29) = 
.77, p = .22; BF01 = 3) were both at chance. 
 
Figure S3:  
Proportion of first looks and total looks at Informant (versus Non-Informant) at the 




Trial-by-trial analyses at test: first and total looks 
We analyzed the trial-by-trial proportions of first and total looks generated to 
either the Informant or the Non-Informant at each of 6 test trials. Due to exclusion, 87% 
of infants completed trial 1, 83% finished trials 2 and 3, 77% progressed to trial 4, with 
substantially reduced percentage of valid trials 5 (57%) and 6 (53%). One-sample t-tests 
results are presented in Table 1.  
 
Figure S4:  
Distribution of the proportion of the first and total looks at the Informant across test 
trials. Large points indicate statistically significant one-sample t-test results at an alpha 




Table S1:  
Results of the one-sample t-test analyses for each test trial 
Trial/Looks Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 
First Looks t(25) = 1.62, 
p = .05 
t(24) = 3.7,  
p = .001 
t(24) = 1.89,  
p = .04 
t(22) = 1.5,  
p = .07 
t(16) = 0.7,  
p = .24 
t(15) = 2.24,  
p = .02 
Total Looks t(24) = 2.5,  
p = .01 
t(24) = 2.97, 
p = .003 
t(24) = 1.76,  
p = .05 
t(22) = 1.5,  
p = .07 
t(16) = 0.22,  
p = .41 
t(15) = 3.73,  
p = .001 
 
Caregiver looks at experimenters 
A relatively small subsample of trials contained unsolicited caregivers’ looks at 
the experimenters: this occurred on 23% of total valid trials, specifically: with 43% of 
total familiarization trials, 10% of total warm up training trails, 30% of total 
reinforcement trials, and only 6% of total test trials.  
We coded caregivers’ first and total looks at the Informant and the Non-
Informant throughout the phases of the procedure. At familiarization, we coded all looks 
that occurred during the whole 20-second trial; at test, we coded all looks during the 15-
second silent period of opportunity to seek information. 
At Familiarization, caregivers directed 59% of first looks (out of total 33 first 
looks made by caregivers) and 55% of total looks at the Informant (out of total 49 
looks). At Test, caregivers directed 75% of first looks (out of total 6 first looks) and 
43% of total looks at the Informant (out of total 7 looks).  
One-sample t-tests revealed no significant looks preferences at the Informant 
over the Non-Informant at both Familiarization (first looks: t(19)= .13, p = .45; total 
looks: t(19) = .13, p = .45) and at Test (first looks: t(4) = 1.5, p = .1; total looks: t(4) = 
.40, p = .35).  
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To test whether caregivers’ looks had an effect on infants’ looks, we conducted 
a series of simple linear regression analyses, with the aim to delineate the effect of 
caregivers’ first looks on infants’ first looks at familiarization and at test and caregivers’ 
total looks on infants’ total looks at each phase. 
The proportion of caregivers’ first looks towards the Informant generated at 
familiarization was not predictive of infants’ preferential first looks at the Informant at 
familiarization ( = -.18, t(18) = - .89, p = .39) and at test ( = .12, t(18) = .92, p = .37). 
The proportion of caregivers’ first looks towards the Informant generated at test was 
not predictive of infants’ preferential first looks at the Informant at test ( = -.29, t(3) = 
-1.02, p = .39). 
The proportion of caregivers’ total looks towards the Informant generated at 
familiarization was not predictive of infants’ preferential total looks at the Informant at 
familiarization ( = .07, t(18) = .88, p = .4) and at test ( = .1, t(18) = .86, p = .4). The 
proportion of caregivers’ total looks towards the Informant generated at test was not 
predictive of infants’ preferential total looks at the Informant at test ( = -.15, t(3) = .92, 
p = .13). 
 
Other communicative behaviors 
A range of other non-verbal communicative behaviors were manually coded 
from the video data: pointing, reaching, vocalizing, and producing declarative and 
imperative communicative bids – all during the 15-second “opportunity to seek 
information” episode of the test phase.   
We reasoned that pointing and reaching present a contrast corresponding to the 
contrast between declarative versus imperative motives (e.g., Southgate, Maanen, & 
Csibra, 2007). In our experimental setup, pointing towards the toys was operationalized 
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as a manifestation of declarative motives (“Look at this!”), while reaching was 
essentially imperative (i.e., “I want this; give it to me!”). Infants’ vocalizations were 
operationalized as a proxy measure of frustration given the situational demands (i.e., 
not having access to the toy and lack of contingent communication from the adults). 
Additionally, to further characterize these communicative behaviors, two 
separate unifying coding categories were created. Declarative bids were coded when at 
least one of the following conditions were met (adapted from Camaioni, Perucchini, 
Bellagamba, & Colonnesi, 2004): maintaining eye-contact with an adult whilst pointing 
at or reaching for the toys; generating eye-contact with an adult 2 seconds before 
pointing at or reaching for the toys or after pointing at or reaching for the toys; making 
eye-contact with an adult and smiling, babbling, waving or whimpering at them, but 
then becoming visibly upset when no response was received (i.e., when an attempt to 
engage an adult was unsuccessful); eye-contact with an adult while making gestures 
signifying uncertainty, such as tilting the head to one side, shaking the head ‘no’, 
shrugging shoulders, or making a hand flip gesture (e.g., Kim, Paulus, Sodian, Proust, 
2016; Harris, Bartz, & Rowe, 2017). Imperative bids were instances of attempts to 
obtain the objects characterized by intent looking at the objects combined with reaching, 
pointing or vocalizing frustration at the same time, but not making simultaneous or 
occurring within 2 seconds eye-contact with adults. We also coded which adult such 
declarative and imperative communicative bids were directed at. 
Six infants produced a pointing gesture which occurred on average in 9% of the 
test trials; 20 infants reached towards the objects in 56% of the trials; vocalizations from 
22 infants accompanied 46% of the trials; declarative communication was evident in 
48% of the trials generated by 21 infants, while imperative in 18% of the trials by 15 
infants. 
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Declarative communicative attempts were significantly more frequent than the 
imperative communicative attempts (t(28) = 2.37, p = .02, paired-samples t-test) and 
the two were negatively correlated, r = -.44, p = .02. There was a moderate positive 
correlation of vocalizations with imperative communicative requests, r = .46, p = 
.01; and a negative correlation with pointing r = - .40, p = .03.  
We further coded whether imperative and declarative communicative bids were 
directed at Informant, Non-Informant or at both at each trial. There were a total of 11 
trials (9% generated by 9 infants) with imperative and 53 trials (41% by 21 infants) with 
declarative bids directed at the experimenters rather than the caregiver; see Figure S5. 
On average, across all infants the proportion of infants’ imperative bids directed at the 
Informant was M = .53 (SD = .51) and of declarative bids M = .72 (SD = .25), however, 
no statistical analyses were performed on these data due to the limited number of infants 
featuring both types of communicative behaviors. 
 
Figure S5: 
The number of individual test trials with imperative and declarative communicative bids 
at the experimenters. 
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To evaluate whether these additional communicative behaviors had an effect on 
the primary outcome measures - first and total looks at test - we conducted exploratory 
regression analyses. We regressed the proportion of the first looks at test on pointing, 
reaching, vocalizations, imperative communication, and declarative communication, 
and the proportion of total looks on the same variables. In both models, none of the 
variables were statistically significant predictors (first looks: F(5, 23) = .44, p = .82; 
total looks: F(5, 23) = .34, p = .89). 
 
Hold outs and gives 
We coded whether infants were more prone to holding out an object or giving it 
to the Informant versus the Non-Informant, based on the previous work indexing these 
as active communicative behaviors (Boundy, Cameron-Faulkner, & Theakston, 2016). 
We analyzed these behaviors during the familiarization and test trials while infants had 
access to the toy (at test, during the object exploration episode, see Figure 1d). 17 infants 
generated hold-out and give behaviors during familiarization, and 10 did so during the 
test trials. One-sample t-tests revealed that infants had no preference for the Informant, 
neither at familiarization (M = .51; t(16) = .09, p = .47), nor at test (M = .43, t(9) = -.57, 
p = .71), and the paired-samples t-test showed no cross-phase differences (t(6) = -.85, p 
= .43). Further, we conducted exploratory regression analyses to evaluate whether hold 
outs and gives had an effect on our primary outcome measures: first and total looks at 
test. We regressed the proportion of the first looks at test on infants’ average proportion 
of hold outs and gives at familiarization and test and the proportion of the total looks at 
test on the same variable, resulting in no statistically significant effects (first looks:  = 
.15, t(17) = 1, p = .33; total looks:  = .04, t(17) = .29, p = .77). 
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Object choice episode at test   
Infants’ choice of an object at test was coded following the caregivers’ prompt 
(“Where is the [pseudoword], can I have it?”) as initial preferential looking at, pointing 
at, reaching for or touching one of the objects in the pair. Averaged across test trials, 
responses from 21 children were coded as indicating a preference, but there was no 
evidence of a preference for the previously labeled object (M = .27, t(29) = -5.73, p = 
1, one-sample t-test). 
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Experimental Chapter 3: Active Information 
Transmission 
Research presented in the previous chapter demonstrated that preverbal infants 
were keen to solicit knowledge from social partners who they regarded as possessing 
such knowledge, specifically when they could not obtain the needed information in any 
other way. They used one of the early available explicit communicative tools – social 
referencing – to initiate such information-gathering.  
Together, studies 1 and 2 present novel evidence that infants take an active 
interrogative stance before developing a more sophisticated and complex information 
seeking tools, such as pointing and formulating questions verbally. These studies 
support the proposition that infants in their first year of life show sensitivity to epistemic 
uncertainty and knowledge distribution among social partners, exhibit epistemic 
vigilance in social contexts, and actively communicate with social partners to seek their 
epistemic input.  
The social knowledge exchange process is inherently bi-directional and children 
are therefore active players at its both ends. While the body of literature on active social 
learning in early childhood is growing fast, less is known about children-initiated active 
information transmission. When do children teach others, who do they choose to share 
information with, and what kind of information do they tend to transmit? These are the 
overarching questions driving research into the developmental origins of child-led 
teaching.  
Contributing to the nascent literature on early developmental precursors to 
information transmission, this chapter contains a study which investigated two-year-old 
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children’s propensity to demonstrate novel toys’ functions to an ignorant adult after 
learning them from other social partners. Specifically, in this study, we asked how 
different social and non-social cues which are present when children acquire new 
information affect the likelihood of its preferential transmission. We reasoned that if 
children’s active learning can be affected by both the properties of information (e.g., 
object’s functions) and the properties of the informant (e.g., being explicitly 
pedagogical), so might be their own active teaching. The present research therefore 
investigated the interaction of non-social (i.e., action complexity) and social (i.e., 
informant’s pedagogical cues such as direct eye contact, child-directed speech, and 
explicit verbal teaching prompts) factors in shaping children’s transmission choices.  
Here, just as in a study presented in the previous chapter, toddlers were exposed 
to two competing sources of information – two interactive social partners, each 
demonstrating a separate piece of information: novel object’s functions, which differed 
on the levels of action complexity and the mode of action demonstration (pedagogical 
and intentional but non-pedagogical). Upon encoding the epistemic value of 
information presented, toddlers were faced with a choice: which type of information to 
propagate further in the social knowledge exchange process. In this study, we 
demonstrated that toddlers were willing to actively teach a naïve adult what they knew, 
adding to the growing literature on of the factors affecting information transmission in 
early childhood. 
This chapter contains the third paper in this journal format thesis, which 
examines the third research question: Do toddlers preferentially transmit information 
that was taught in an explicitly pedagogical context or information that was easier to 
demonstrate but not taught pedagogically? 
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This paper has been published in the same format as presented in this thesis: 
Bazhydai, M., Silverstein, P., Parise, E., & Westermann, G. (2020). Two-year old 
children preferentially transmit simple actions but not pedagogically 
demonstrated actions. Developmental Science. doi:10.1111/desc.12941  
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Two-year old children preferentially transmit simple actions  
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Research highlights 
- We directly contrasted pedagogical demonstration with complexity of novel 
actions in a knowledge transmission paradigm with 2-year-old children. 
- Children preferentially transmitted simple non-pedagogically demonstrated 
actions over pedagogically demonstrated complex actions.  
- We found no evidence of preferential transmission of pedagogically 




Children are sensitive to both social and non-social aspects of the learning 
environment. Among social cues, pedagogical communication has been shown to not 
only play a role in children’s learning, but also in their own active transmission of 
knowledge. Vredenburgh, Kushnir and Casasola (2015) showed that 2-year-olds are 
more likely to demonstrate an action to a naive adult after learning it in a pedagogical 
than in a non-pedagogical context. This finding was interpreted as evidence that 
pedagogically transmitted information has a special status as culturally relevant. Here 
we test the limits of this claim by setting it in contrast with an explanation in which the 
relevance of information is the outcome of multiple interacting social (e.g., pedagogical 
demonstration) and non-social properties (e.g., action complexity). To test these 
competing hypotheses, we varied both pedagogical cues and action complexity in an 
information transmission paradigm with 2-year-old children. In Experiment 1, children 
preferentially transmitted simple non-pedagogically demonstrated actions over 
pedagogically demonstrated more complex actions. In Experiment 2, when both actions 
were matched for complexity, we found no evidence of preferential transmission of 
pedagogically demonstrated actions. We discuss possible reasons for the discrepancy 
between our results and previous literature showing an effect of pedagogical cues on 
cultural transmission, and conclude that our results are compatible with the view that 
pedagogical and other cues interact, but incompatible with the theory of a privileged 
role for pedagogical cues.  
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Introduction 
Social transmission of information is achieved through observation, imitation, 
and explicit teaching. The human capacity to flexibly engage learners in pedagogical 
contexts is at the core of transmission of complex cumulative human culture (Burdett, 
Dean, & Ronfard, 2017; Caldwell, Renner, & Atkinson, 2017; Kline, 2015). Although 
socially-mediated learning in early childhood has been studied extensively, little is 
known about child-initiated teaching (Nakao & Andrews, 2014; Sobel & Letourneau, 
2016; Ziv & Frye, 2004) and its cognitive mechanisms (Corriveau, Ronfard & Cui, 
2017; Paulus, Kim & Sodian, 2015). Active transmission of information from children 
to others starts in infancy (Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008), but the majority 
of studies on child-initiated teaching focus on preschool to primary school age children 
(Flynn, Turner, & Giraldeau, 2016; Flynn & Whiten, 2012; Whiten & Flynn, 2010), 
leaving a gap in understanding the developmental trajectory of information 
transmission. This emerging body of research shows children’s sensitivity to what and 
whom they are teaching (Gweon & Schulz, 2019; Kim, Kalish, Weisman, Johnson, & 
Shutts, 2016; Rhodes, Bonawitz, Shafto, Chen, & Caglar, 2015; Ronfard, Was, & 
Harris, 2016).  
While research on information transmission in early childhood is limited, as they 
acquire knowledge, children are sensitive to both non-social and social aspects of the 
learning environment. Non-social factors include, among others, perceptual salience 
(Pruden, Hirsh‐Pasek, Golinkoff, Hennon, 2006), novelty (Mather & Plunkett, 2012), 
perceived causality (Burdett et al., 2018; Ronfard, Was, & Harris, 2016), efficiency 
(Pinkham & Jaswal, 2011), and complexity or difficulty (Bannard, Rosner & Matthews, 
2017; Flynn, Turner & Giraldeau, 2016; Kidd, Piantadosi & Aslin, 2012). Such salient 
factors guide integration of knowledge about objects, causal relations, statistical 
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patterns, and updating and rejecting of hypotheses in light of acquired evidence 
(Bonawitz, van Schijndel, Friel, & Schulz, 2012; Gopnik et al., 2017; Waismeyer & 
Meltzoff, 2017).  
Social factors affecting learning include perceived intentions, competence, past 
accuracy, and social status of the informant or teacher (for reviews see Harris, 2012; 
Over & Carpenter, 2012; Tomasello, 1999). Furthermore, pedagogical cues, such as 
infant-directed speech (Eaves, Feldman, Griffiths, & Shafto, 2016), mutual gaze and 
joint attention (Striano, Chen, Cleveland, & Bradshaw, 2006), and explicit linguistic 
cues (Butler & Tomasello, 2016; Gelman, Ware, Manczak, & Graham, 2013), have 
been shown to selectively affect children’s learning (Sage & Baldwin, 2011) in a way 
that is argued to not be able to be explained by heightened attention (but see Gredebäck, 
Astor, & Fawcett, 2018; Szufnarowska, Rohlfing, Fawcett, & Gredebäck, 2014). 
Pedagogical cues have been shown to not only play a role in children’s learning, 
but also in children’s own active transmission of knowledge. Vredenburgh, Kushnir and 
Casasola (2015) showed that 2-year-olds were more likely to demonstrate an action to 
a naïve experimenter not present during the demonstrations after learning it in a 
pedagogical than in a non-pedagogical context. In their study, children were taught two 
possible actions on one toy. One action was shown in an explicitly pedagogical manner 
(involving infant-directed-speech and direct eye contact), whereas the other action was 
shown in an intentional but non-pedagogical way. Children were equally likely to learn 
both of these actions immediately following the demonstrations, but preferentially 
demonstrated the action that had been shown in a pedagogical context.  
A variety of social learning theories propose that a human predisposition for 
learning from others, mediated by pedagogical cues, enables effective cultural 
transmission, thereby reducing the costs of unconstrained trial-and-error exploration. 
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These theories predict that knowledge is most likely to be effectively transmitted when 
it was learnt as a cultural convention (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Harris, 2012; Tomasello, 
1999, 2016; Vygotsky, 1978). For instance, Tomasello (2016) argues for pedagogical 
instruction being one of the pillars of cultural learning, with evidence accumulating that 
pedagogical contexts selectively enable children to generalize such information (e.g., 
Butler & Markman, 2012; Gelman et al., 2013).   
While most pedagogical learning theories merely highlight the importance of 
pedagogical cues and are not specific about the relationship between these cues and 
other, non-pedagogical cues, the arguably most prominent such theory, Natural 
Pedagogy (NP, Gergely & Csibra, 2009; 2011), argues for a qualitative distinction 
between pedagogical and non-pedagogical cues. According to NP, humans have 
evolved to be sensitive to a circumscribed set of pedagogical cues (direct eye gaze, child 
directed speech, contingent reactivity), which directly create the expectation of 
communicative intention in the learner, circumventing the need to infer such an 
intention from other behaviors (Csibra, 2010). In this way pedagogical cues are thought 
to be a potent driver of infants’ learning especially of culturally relevant knowledge that 
would be hard to acquire relying on observation alone, and their presence leads to the 
infant’s effective encoding of such information. Nevertheless, as a privileged status for 
pedagogical cues in knowledge transmission is common to all described theories we 
refer to them here collectively as Privileged Pedagogy (PP) views.  
An interpretation of pedagogical cues that is in contrast to views ascribing a 
qualitatively distinct role to them is that, through their salience, they merely enhance 
attention to the learning situation without assuming infants’ understanding of 
communicative and referential intentions behind them (Heyes, 2016, 2017). In this way, 
pedagogical cues interact with other situational factors to affect the likelihood of 
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successful learning. In such a Cue Combination (CC) framework, each cue, weighted 
by its saliency, has an effect on the likelihood of some information being learned or 
transmitted, and combined weights of the cues favor learning of one piece of 
information over another. Such an approach resembles, for instance, the emergentist 
coalition model of word learning (Hirsh-Pasek, Golinkoff, & Hollich, 2000), which 
suggests that children attend to, weigh, and integrate a variety (coalition) of 
developmentally accessible cues (social, perceptual, cognitive, and purely linguistic) in 
learning new words. A combination of social and non-social cues has been shown to 
guide infants’ attention, leading to effective learning outcomes in different settings 
(Barry, Graf Estes, & Rivera, 2015; Smith, Colunga, & Yoshida, 2010; Wu & Kirkham, 
2010; Wu, Tummeltshammer, Gliga, & Kirkham, 2014). Extending this account beyond 
gradual weighted cue combination and presenting the social and non-social cue 
combination as a complex framework (Yurovsky & Frank, 2017), it has been proposed 
that domain general cognitive processes such as attention and speed of information 
processing explain developmental change in infants’ use of social cues during word 
learning. Relately, rational constructivist approaches to social learning also argue for an 
integrative view, namely accounting for children’s existing knowledge (Sobel & 
Kushnir, 2013) and statistical inference (Xu & Kushnir, 2013). Together, these 
approaches argue for embracing the complexity arising from real life learning 
situations, and for designing experiments which manipulate several competing cues 
while taking into account the different weightings of these cues. 
Critically, while both PP and CC accounts assume a strong role for pedagogical 
cues in learning and transmission, they differ in how they explain the mechanisms 
underlying the effect of pedagogical cues. Whereas, for example, NP assumes that 
pedagogical cues have an evolved privileged and specific status in learning that is not 
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based on their salience (Csibra & Gergely, 2006, 2009, 2011; Senju & Csibra, 2008; 
Yoon, Johnson & Csibra, 2008), others have argued that indeed the role of pedagogical 
cues is salience-based and have shown that non-pedagogical salient cues may lead to 
the same effects (Gredebäck, et al., 2018; Szufnarowska et al., 2014). Other work found 
that previous evidence for a privileged status of pedagogical cues may be difficult to 
replicate (Silverstein, Gliga, Westermann, & Parise, 2019), and that both independently 
accumulated statistical evidence and an explicit pedagogical stance that highlights the 
importance of information affect the likelihood of successful learning (Buchsbaum, 
Gopnik, Griffiths, & Shafto, 2011). 
Studies that are aimed at specifically evaluating the function of pedagogical cues 
typically contrast a pedagogical and a non-pedagogical condition with other cues held 
constant (e.g., Senju & Csibra, 2008; Vredenburgh et al., 2015), and can therefore be 
accounted for both within the PP and CC frameworks. In order to disentangle these two 
accounts, it is necessary to manipulate both pedagogical and non-pedagogical aspects 
of the learning situation, but few studies have taken this approach. Previous findings 
from studies pitting pedagogical against other cues have focused on the efficiency of an 
action for achieving a specific goal, and have been inconclusive: different studies found 
selective preference for pedagogical cues (Marno & Csibra, 2015), equal rates of 
imitation of pedagogically cued and efficient actions (Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme, & 
Bushnell, 2007), imitation of inefficient actions only after pedagogical demonstration 
but not after independent exploration (Pinkham & Jaswal, 2011), or effects of 
pedagogical cues in overriding children’s propensity to over-imitate inefficient actions 
(Hoehl, Zettersten, Schleihauf, Grätz, & Pauen, 2014).  
Building on Vredenburgh et al.’s (2015) finding that 2-year-olds are more likely 
to demonstrate an action to an adult after learning it in a pedagogical rather than non-
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pedagogical context, in the present study we set to investigate which of two potentially 
competing cues - action complexity as a non-social cue and pedagogical demonstration 
as a social cue - selectively affects the likelihood of an action being shown to an ignorant 
adult. Although Vredenburgh et al. interpreted their results within a PP framework, we 
here aimed to directly evaluate PP vs. CC accounts by pitting an experimenter’s 
pedagogically demonstrated complex action against another’s non-pedagogically 
demonstrated simple action and observing which action was then preferentially 
transmitted by the child to a third, naïve experimenter. We focused on 2-year-old 
children to enable direct comparison between our results and those found by 
Vredenburgh at al.  
While largely adopting Vredenburgh at al.’s (2015) experimental paradigm, we 
made several crucial changes to the procedure and some of the phrasing to provide a 
more stringent test of the pedagogical manipulation, by stressing the experimenter’s 
direct, explicit teaching intention. Specifically, we changed the verbal prompt used by 
the experimenter performing the pedagogical demonstration from “Look! Do you see 
this?” to “Look at this! This is how you do it!”, and the prompt used in the non-
pedagogical demonstration from “I like this! Nice!” to the accidental discovery prompt: 
“What’s this? Oh, that’s how you do it”. Both phrases could (and should) lead to social 
learning, but the difference lies in demonstrators taking the intentional and norm 
inducing pedagogical as opposed to intentional but non-directive non-pedagogical 
stances. We ensured that both demonstrators did not interact with children prior to the 
experiment to control for potential preferences for one over the other, while the third 
experimenter acting as an ignorant person, on the contrary, was familiar to them and 
strongly evoked the conventional, normative context by expecting action transmission 
from children (saying “Can you show me how to play with it?”, which is a change from 
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“What does this do? Can you show me?”). Collectively, these modifications were made 
to provide a more controlled manipulation and a more specific test of the effect of 
pedagogy above and beyond normativity inferences made by children from observing 
demonstrations (e.g., Casler, Terziyan, & Greene, 2009; Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & 
Tomasello, 2016), while maintaining interactive engagement in the aim of ecological 
validity. 
For the non-social cue, we manipulated action complexity, or difficulty of 
execution. Simple actions are faster to perform, require less effort, and have a higher 
probability of achieving the desirable outcome, and thereby, if we assume CC, action 
simplicity may outweigh the enhanced attention to more complex actions afforded by 
pedagogical cues. This reasoning is also in line with recent findings that older children 
transmit information to others in accordance with principle of the utility calculus, 
making rational and efficient decisions based on the complexity of information and the 
perceived needs of the naive learner (Bridgers, Jara-Ettinger, & Gweon, 2019; Gweon 
& Schulz, 2019). Note that this approach is in contrast to studies manipulating the 
efficiency cue, where different manners of executing an action result in the same 
outcome (Marno & Csibra, 2015; Pinkham & Jaswal, 2011). We chose to instead 
manipulate complexity in order to ensure there were qualitatively different ‘pieces’ of 
information (i.e. actions with different outcomes) to learn and transmit.  
In Experiment 1, we directly contrasted PP and CC explanations for children’s 
choice of action transmission by manipulating pedagogical cues and action complexity 
simultaneously. PP would argue that pedagogically transmitted actions should be 
transmitted preferentially as pedagogical cues hold a privileged status over other cues 
(Csibra, 2010; Csibra & Gergely, 2006). In contrast, from a CC perspective, 
pedagogical cues and action complexity should interact to lead to children’s preferred 
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choice of action based on the relative weighting of the cues, so that pedagogical cues 
can be outweighed by information complexity. Then, in order to clarify the results of 
Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 we conducted a replication of Vredenburgh et al.’s 
(2015) manipulation of pedagogical cues while matching action complexity, retaining 
other methodological changes outlined in Experiment 1. Data, example videos, and 
supplementary results can be found on the Open Science Framework (OSF; 
https://osf.io/e2hvj/).  
Experiment 1 method 
Participants 
Thirty-one 24-month-old children from a local community in a small city in 
Northwestern England participated in the experiment (15 females, Mage = 24 months 2 
days, SD = .49, range 23.28-25.25 months). Two more children were tested but not 
included in the final sample due to failure to perform any actions.  
Stimuli 
Two unfamiliar toys served as stimuli in two trials (see Figure 1a). Each toy had 
two target functions, each producing a unique attractive sound. The first toy included 
two different buttons. One of the buttons was visibly located on the surface of the toy 
and could be pressed with a finger (simple action). The second button was hidden inside 
the toy but could be pressed with a hammer-like tool slotted into the toy (complex 
action). The second toy included a spiral feature, which made a sound when squished 
down (simple action), and a shaker feature that needed to be removed from the object 
before shaking to produce the sound (complex action). Toys were designed specifically 
so that the actions were not obvious, with many distracting non-functional elements. 
All action outcomes produced comparable sounds that differed in the complexity 
required to elicit them. 
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Procedure 
The experiment was divided into two phases: a Demonstration (including a 
Pedagogical and a Non-pedagogical demonstration and a post-demonstration) and a 
Transmission phase.  Experimenter 1 (E1) briefly interacted with the child during a 
warm up before the Demonstration started.  The child was seated in a high chair at a 
rectangular table, with the caregiver sitting slightly behind and to the side of the child 
(see Figure 1b). The caregiver was instructed not to interfere in any way. Following the 
warm up phase, E1 told the child that she would now leave the room and that her friends 
would like to come in with a new toy that she herself had never seen. She then left the 
room and closed the door. There were two consecutive trials, one for each toy. Each 
trial included all phases. The entire procedure was filmed using two video cameras. 
Demonstration phase. Experimenters 2 and 3 (E2 and E3), previously unseen 
by the child, were assigned to either the pedagogical or non-pedagogical demonstration, 
with order and condition counterbalanced across trials and participants. Upon E1 
leaving the room, E2 and E3 entered, bringing in the first toy. They sat side by side 
across the table, facing the child. E2 and E3 each demonstrated one action on the toy 
three times, either pedagogically (always the complex action) or non-pedagogically 
(always the simple action). Then (Post-demonstration) the experimenter who had just 
performed the action placed the toy in front of the child and asked: “Can you do it?” If 
the child performed the demonstrated action within 15 seconds, the phase was finished, 
the toy returned to the other end of the table, the other experimenter demonstrated the 
other action and asked the child to perform it. If the child did not act after 15 seconds, 
the experimenter asked: “Can you show me?”. Throughout the demonstration, the other 
experimenter gazed downwards. Upon completing the demonstrations, both 
experimenters left the table and sat in the far corner of the room behind the child.  
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Pedagogical demonstration. The experimenter made frequent eye contact with 
the child throughout the demonstration and spoke in child-directed speech. After taking 
a look at the toy, the demonstrator looked at the child, establishing joint attention, and 
said excitedly: “Look at this! This is how you do it!”. She then demonstrated the 
complex function in a slow, deliberate manner, repeating it 3 times, alternating her gaze 
between the child and the object.  
Non-pedagogical demonstration. The experimenter maintained attention on 
the toy, making no eye contact with the child. She looked at the toy and uttered in a 
self-addressed manner in an adult-directed speech: “What’s this? Oh, that’s how you do 
it”.  The demonstrator performed the simple function in a slow, deliberate manner and 
repeated it 3 times. 
Transmission phase. E1 knocked at the door and re-entered the testing room, 
greeted the child and showed excitement upon noticing the toy on the table, saying: 
“Wow! Is that your new toy? That’s an interesting toy! I’ve never seen that before! Can 
you show me how to play with it?” If the child did not perform any actions after 15 
seconds, the experimenter asked: “Can you show me what this toy does?” After 30 
seconds, the experimenter thanked the child and took the toy away, leaving the testing 
room. 
Coding 
In order to be included in the final sample, children had to contribute at least 
one of the two experimental trials. Twenty-five children contributed both trials, and 6 
children contributed one. 
Trial exclusion. Six individual trials were excluded from final analyses due to 
children’s failure to perform any actions (N = 4), experimenter error (N = 1), and 
parental interference (N = 1). 
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Post-demonstration. For each of the four post-demonstrations (two actions by 
two objects), we coded whether children performed the target action (hereafter called 
‘manipulation check’) and whether this resulted in achieving the outcome, i.e. sound 
(‘achieving the action outcome’). Note, we have used the terminology “performed” for 
actions that were attempted by the children regardless of whether they achieved the 
desired outcome, in contrast to “achieving the action outcome”. We created an 
additional dichotomous variable (‘exploratory behaviors’): accidentally discovering the 
non-target action during the first action’s post-demonstration.  
Transmission phase. The exact sequence of actions performed in each 
transmission phase (one per toy/trial) was coded, resulting in two measures: which 
action was shown first to the experimenter (‘first action’) and number of switches to 
each action type (‘number of actions’).  
Inter-rater reliability. An independent blind coder performed the offline 
coding. Another researcher double-coded 20% of the data. We used Cronbach's α (for 
continuous variables) and Cohen's κ (for dichotomous variables) to assess coders’ 
agreement, who were found to be highly reliable, α = .89 and κ = .84. All disagreements 
were resolved in a joint discussion. Where the two coders differed in their coding of 
continuous variables by over 50%, the video was jointly recoded and a final code 
produced. When the two coders’ responses differed by less than 50%, an average was 
used. 
Experiment 1 results 
Statistical tests used were consistent with those by Vredenburgh et al. (2015).  
Post-demonstration  
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Trial order (and toy) did not have an effect on manipulation check (Pearson’s 
chi2 = 2.8, p = .09) and on achieving the outcome of the action (chi2 = .85, p = .36), we 
therefore combined across these factors for further analyses. 
Manipulation check. Children passed the manipulation check on 86% of trials 
(i.e. performed the action after demonstration), and this did not differ between simple 
non-pedagogically taught actions and pedagogically taught complex actions 
(McNemar’s p = .69).  
Achieving the action outcome. Children achieved the action outcome on 57% 
of trials, and were significantly more likely to achieve the outcome of simple action 
(this happened in 98% of the trials) than complex action (only 15% of trials), Pearson’s 
chi2 = 46.56, p < .001, despite successfully passing the manipulation check in both types 
of actions.  
Exploratory behaviors. In 48% of post-demonstration trials, children 
accidentally discovered the non-target action, both simple (N = 31) and complex (N = 
22), Pearson’s chi2 = 3.9, p = .05. 
Transmission  
To test which action the children preferentially selected during this phase we 
examined two main variables: the choice of the first action and the number of actions. 
First action. First actions from both trials were converted into scores: +1 (only 
demonstrated complex action first), 0 (one demonstration of each action first), and -1 
(only demonstrated simple action first). These scores were compared to chance (0).  
Children performed the simple non-pedagogically demonstrated action first 
significantly more than they performed the complex pedagogically demonstrated action 
first (t(30) = 2.68, p = .01, 95% CI [-.68, -.09], Cohen’s d = .49, one sample t-test), see 
Figure 2a.  
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Number of actions. The majority of children (79%) performed both actions in 
both trials. Children performed a higher number of simple (M = 1.61, SD = .84) than 
complex (M = 1.23, SD = .5) actions, t(30) = - 2.47, p = .02, 95% CI [-.71, -.07], Cohen‘s 
d = .55, paired t-test, see Figure 3.  
Exploratory behavior analyses. The choice of the action transmitted first was 
not affected by accidental discovery of the non-target action not shown in the 
demonstration phase (trial 1: Pearson’s chi2 = 1.81, p = .18; trial 2: Pearson’s chi2 = 
1.54, p = .21), nor by whether the child performed both actions at the transmission phase 
(trial 1: Pearson’s chi2 = .05, p = .82; trial 2: Pearson’s chi2 = 1.17, p = .28).  
Experiment 1 discussion 
We found support for children’s preferential transmission of the simple non-
pedagogically demonstrated actions over the pedagogically demonstrated complex 
actions with two converging measures. Children transmitted the simple non-
pedagogically demonstrated action first more often, and they performed more of these 
actions. Our complexity manipulation was successful, in that children found it difficult 
to achieve the outcome of the complex actions, which is considered a good manipulation 
of complexity in other studies of information transmission (e.g., Whiten & Flynn, 2010). 
This does, however, make it possible that the actions were so complex that children did 
not preferentially transmit them due to developmental motor skill deficiencies; it has 
been previously found that toddlers will not imitate an action that they cannot 
motorically achieve (Paulus, Hinnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, 2011, but see Nielsen, 
2006). Crucially, however, in our study, overwhelmingly children transmitted both 
actions despite preferentially (i.e., first) transmitting the simple action. Likewise, there 
was no relationship between infants’ achieving the action at post-demonstration and 
later transmitting it: children’s preferential transmission of the complex action was not 
 161 
predicted by their successfully achieving the outcome: of the 16 children who 
transmitted the complex action first, 4 had achieved its outcome at post-demonstration 
but 12 had not.  
These results (in combination with those by Vredenburgh et al., 2015) are best 
understood within a CC account. When pedagogical cues were manipulated alone, 
actions demonstrated pedagogically rather than non-pedagogically ‘won’ (Vredenburgh 
et al., 2015). However, as shown here, when pedagogically demonstrated complex 
actions were pitted against non-pedagogically demonstrated simple actions, simple 
actions ‘won’, suggesting that enhanced salience resulting from pedagogical cues is 
weighted against action simplicity in children’s choice of which action to transmit 
preferentially. This is not to say that it is impossible that even under a CC framework, 
pedagogical cues could not outweigh simplicity. 
However, with our design we could not tell whether our results showed that the 
properties of the simple action overrode the effect of pedagogical demonstration, or 
instead whether we, in contrast to Vredenburgh et al. (2015), might find that in our set-
up pedagogical teaching does not lead to preferential transmission in the first place. To 
this end, we decided to conduct a replication of the study by Vredenburgh et al. (2015). 
We used the same procedure as in Experiment 1, except that action complexity was now 
matched for both pedagogically and non-pedagogically demonstrated actions in each 
trial. We thus had one trial with two simple actions (as in Vredenburgh et al., 2015) and 
the second trial with two complex actions, allowing us to compare how children perform 
on both pairs at the transmission phase (note that the trial with the simple actions always 
occurred first in order to ease children into the procedure).  
Experiment 2 method 
Participants 
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Thirty-one 24-month-old children participated in this experiment (14 females, 
Mage = 24 months 4 days, SD = 0.36, range 23.28-24.69 months). Three more children 
were tested but not included in the final sample due to failure to perform any action at 
post-demonstration or transmission phases (N = 1) and parental interference (N = 2).  
Stimuli 
Stimuli were the modified toys from the Experiment 1, where the two functions 
of each toy were now matched for complexity, with the toy used in the first trial always 
operated with two simple actions, and the second toy (second trial) operated with a pair 
of complex actions (see Figure 1a).  
Procedure and coding  
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, bar the difference in manipulation 
(i.e. now actions were matched for complexity rather than contrasted by complexity in 
each trial). We intentionally did not counterbalance the order of the simple and complex 
trials so that children would be eased into the procedure with the simple trial. For this 
reason, we did not compare simple and complex trials statistically, as this manipulation 
was confounded with trial order. Twenty-two children contributed both trials, and 9 
children contributed one of the trials. 
Trial exclusions. Nine individual trials were excluded from final analyses due 
to failure to perform any actions (N = 5) and experimenter error (N = 4).  
Coding. The experimental procedure and coding were identical to Experiment 
1, except for the addition of action duration as an outcome measure previously shown 
to be sensitive to this manipulation (Vredenburgh et al., 2015). Thus, the duration of 
actions performed by the children was manually coded offline frame by frame, from the 
first frame of the child touching the functional part of the toy. This measure was not 
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reported in Experiment 1 due to the inherent difference in time needed to complete 
complex and simple actions (these results can be found in Supplementary Materials). 
Inter-rater reliability. The coders achieved high reliability, with continuous 
variables producing Cronbach’s α = .87 and dichotomous variables resulting in Cohen’s 
κ = .90.  
Experiment 2 results 
Post-demonstration 
Manipulation check. Children passed the manipulation check on 97% of trials, 
and the pass rate did not differ between the two actions (McNemar’s p = .69; trial 
1/simple: 93% of children passed the manipulation check; trial 2/complex: 86% of 
children).  
Achieving the action outcome. Children were equally able to achieve the 
outcome of the pedagogically and the non-pedagogically demonstrated actions 
(McNemar’s p = 1; trial 1/simple: 96% of children achieved the simple actions 
outcomes; trial 2/complex: 31% achieved the complex action outcomes).  
Duration. There were no significant differences in how long children spent 
executing the target actions in both conditions (t(51) = .33, p = .74, paired t-test). 
Exploratory behaviors. In 40% of post-demonstration trials, children 
accidentally discovered the non-target action, but this did not differ between 
pedagogically demonstrated actions and non-pedagogically demonstrated actions in 
terms of both prevalence (McNemar’s p = .52), and duration of time spent on these 
actions (t(50) = .78, p = .44, paired t-test).  
Transmission 
First action. Children did not perform the pedagogically demonstrated action 
first significantly more than the non-pedagogically demonstrated action (t(30) = .00, p 
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= 1.0, one-sample t-test; Figure 2b) or separately for either trial (trial 1/simple: t(30) = 
.00, p = 1.0; trial 2/complex: t(30) = .00, p = 1.0). No statistical inference can be derived 
from this non-significant result (Lakens, McLatchie, Isager, Scheel & Dienes, 2018). 
Collapsed across trials, a default Bayes factor (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 
2012) with a wide Cauchy distribution (scale of effect = 0.707) yielded BF01 = 3.86. 
We can conclude that the data constitute moderate evidence for the null hypothesis 
(Jeffreys, 1961).  
Number of actions. The majority of children (81%) performed both actions in 
both trials. The number of pedagogically and non-pedagogically demonstrated actions 
did not significantly differ overall (t(30) = .40, p = .69, paired t-test), or separately for 
either trial (trial 1/simple: t(27) = -.25, p = .80; trial 2/complex: t(27) = .24, p = .81), 
see Figure 3. Collapsed across trials, a default Bayes factor with a wide Cauchy 
distribution (scale of effect = 0.707) yielded BF01 = 3.69, establishing moderate 
evidence for the null hypothesis. Overall, children performed more actions during trial 
1 (simple) than during trial 2 (complex): t(21) = 3.91, p < .001; 95% CI (.81, 2.65). 
Duration of actions. Children did not spend significantly longer performing 
either of the actions overall (t(30) = .19, p = .85, paired t-test), or separately for either 
trial (trial 1/simple: t(27) = -.50, p = .62; trial 2/complex: t(24) = .22, p = .83). Collapsed 
across trials, a default Bayes factor with a wide Cauchy distribution (scale of effect = 
0.707) yielded moderate support for the null hypothesis, BF01 = 3.79. 
Exploratory behavior analyses. Whether or not a child accidentally discovered 
the action that was not shown to them in the demonstration phase (trial 1: Pearson’s chi2 
= 0.70, p = .40; trial 2: Pearson’s chi2 = 0.71, p = .79), and whether or not a child 
performed both actions at the transmission phase did not affect which action they chose 
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to transmit first (trial 1: Pearson’s chi2 = 0.00, p = 1.00; trial 2: Pearson’s chi2 = .52, p 
= .47). 
Experiment 2 discussion 
Contrary to the results by Vredenburgh et al. (2015), we found no evidence of 
preferential transmission of pedagogically demonstrated actions even when both actions 
were matched for complexity, indexed through first action, duration of actions, or 
number of actions. This overall result was also found separately for trials with two 
matched simple actions and two complex actions. This finding is supported by Bayes 
Factor Analysis, which shows moderate support for the null hypothesis.  
Critically, even in the second trial, where both actions were complex, children 
still transmitted both actions, despite the outcomes only being achieved by 31% of 
children at post-demonstration and 40% of children at transmission phase. Importantly, 
ignoring all possible effects of our complexity manipulation, even in the simple trial 
(which is comparable to the actions used in Vredenburgh et al.), we saw no preferential 
transmission of the pedagogically demonstrated action.  
There are several possibilities for why we did not replicate Vredenburgh et al.’s 
(2015) finding. First, it is possible that our finding is a Type 2 error. However, this is 
unlikely given Bayes Factor Analysis showing moderate support for the null hypothesis 
across the range of measures used, and very similar results across the simple and 
complex action trials. We stress that the changes to the pedagogy manipulation that we 
made in our design, as compared to Vredenburgh et al., aimed for an even stronger and 
more stringent comparison of pedagogical versus non-pedagogical demonstration, 
making us more likely to detect the differences between the manipulations. It is also 
possible that the original finding was a Type 1 error. As no other studies to date have 
replicated this finding, this remains a possibility. Future research could investigate the 
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subtleties required for reproducing this effect, and whether the underlying theory should 
be modified accordingly to include these specific constraints. 
Another possibility is that there are key differences between Vredenburgh et 
al.’s (2015) and our experiment. For example, it is possible that our verbal prompts in 
effect meant that both conditions were considered normative by the children, in that 
both prompts contained “this/that is how you do it”. In our attempt to create a more 
controlled manipulation of pedagogical cues, whereby the only difference between 
prompts was the pedagogical nature, we may have inadvertently created a more 
normative context for both conditions. Nevertheless, normativity is not the defining 
feature of pedagogical context, and in PP a pedagogical transmission of normative 
information would still be preferred over non-pedagogical transmission of equally 
normative information (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Csibra, 2010). The defining features 
of pedagogical context (which we did manipulate) are the presence of ostensive cues 
and explicit teaching. Future research can disentangle the effect of pedagogical context 
and normativity in information transmission. 
Within the proposed CC framework, it is also possible that differences in the 
specific pedagogical cues and specific actions used in the two studies alter the specific 
weighting of cues. In our Experiment 2, the inherent interest of the actions may have 
outweighed the salience difference introduced by manipulating pedagogical cues, 
whereas in the study by Vredenburgh et al.’ this was not the case. An analogy to 
illustrate this possibility is a child receiving two presents for their birthday, one 
accompanied by ‘pedagogical’ cues (’Wow, look at this, a present for you!’), and the 
other just placed in front of the child. The child might be so excited about the presents 
per se that the manner (social context) in which they were delivered makes no 
discernible difference to their interest in them.  
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Finally, it is possible that, in contrast to Vredenburgh et al.’s (2015) finding, 
pedagogical cues do not modulate preferential transmission of actions. In light of strong 
evidence that explicit pedagogical cues are of special importance to children in a variety 
of learning situations (Butler & Markman, 2012, 2014, 2016; Csibra & Gergely, 2009; 
Marno & Csibra, 2015) this would be surprising. Nevertheless, Vredenburgh et al’s 
study was the first to extend the notion of the importance of pedagogical cues from 
learning to a child’s active transmission of information, and it is possible that factors 
that are important in learning do not necessarily translate to information transmission, 
or do so at a later age than currently investigated. Future research should therefore focus 
on examining the contexts under which different cues combine to affect transmission.  
General discussion 
In this study we investigated how two types of cues (pedagogical demonstration 
and action complexity) affect children’s transmission of recently demonstrated actions 
to a naïve adult, testing the prediction of a Privileged Pedagogy (PP) account that 
pedagogical cues would ensure preferential encoding of the action even despite its 
higher complexity, against a Cue Combination (CC) view that both pedagogical and 
complexity cues would be weighted to determine which action was preferentially 
transmitted. We report evidence that children preferentially transmitted simple non-
pedagogically taught actions over pedagogically taught complex actions (Experiment 
1), and no evidence of preferential transmission of pedagogically demonstrated actions 
when both actions were matched for complexity (Experiment 2), with moderate support 
for the hypothesis that pedagogical cues have no effect on preferential transmission. 
Our results are compatible with the CC view, and incompatible with the PP 
view. The CC framework can explain this pattern of results, and the difference of our 
results compared to those of Vredenburgh et al. (2015), if as well as the cues that we 
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purposefully manipulated (action complexity and pedagogical demonstration) we also 
take into account the intrinsic properties of the toy. It is possible that compared to 
Vredenburgh et al. (2015), the inherent salience of our toys and our actions was higher. 
In this way, even if pedagogical demonstration did have some weighting, this did not 
incur a big enough difference to affect children’s preference for action transmission. 
This is in contrast to Experiment 1, where there are intrinsic action properties that 
enhance the likelihood of transmission of the simple action. However, we note that 
although our results are compatible with the CC view in this way, future research should 
quantify and examine in more detail the relative weightings of different cues in 
determining outcomes for learning and transmission. 
 Several features of our study and that by Vredenburgh and colleagues 
warrant discussion and further research. First, it is possible that children were not 
sensitive to the pedagogy manipulation and instead considered the whole demonstration 
phase as a uniform learning episode, where one demonstrator is ostensibly more 
communicative than the other. Although we manipulated pedagogy explicitly, using 
various established cues, a more extreme manipulation of pedagogical and non-
pedagogical cues may help resolve this consideration (e.g., Marno & Csibra, 2015). 
However, this may be at the expense of ecological validity, and would add further 
confounds that could be responsible for any differences found (as opposed to the 
presence of pedagogical cues themselves).  
As we chose to manipulate the complexity of the actions by varying their ease 
and transparency of execution, this resulted in the complex actions being harder to 
achieve for some of the participants. Although this raises the possibility that it 
discouraged some children from choosing to transmit complex actions regardless of the 
manner in which they were demonstrated, three main points speak against this 
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interpretation. In Experiment 1, in trials where children transmitted the complex action 
preferentially (16), they were no more likely to have been able to achieve the outcome 
at post-demonstration than not (4 achieved, 12 did not). In Experiment 2, the results for 
the trial in which both actions were complex showed that even with low achievability, 
infants still transmitted both actions. In the trial where both actions were simple 
(comparable to Vredenburgh et al., 2015), children showed the same pattern: there was 
no difference in their transmission of pedagogically and non-pedagogically 
demonstrated actions. Hence, there is no evidence that being unable to achieve the 
outcome of the complex action affected children’s transmission choice. Future research 
should investigate the relationship between the ability to achieve the outcome of an 
action and its transmission, with a large enough sample to statistically examine these 
individual differences.  
Another promising avenue for future research is cultural transmission of 
different types of information (Corriveau, Ronfard, & Cui, 2017; Flynn & Smith, 2012; 
Paulus, Kim, & Sodian, 2015; Ronfard & Harris, 2018). In the present study, we 
investigated easy to acquire, developmentally appropriate, rewarding, causally 
unambiguous, accurate, and easily verifiable information. It is an open question whether 
the mechanisms for transmission of this type of information would be the same as for 
information that is causally opaque, inefficient or irrelevant (e.g., Burdett, McGuigan 
& Harrison, 2018; Corriveau, DiYanni, Clegg, Min, Chin, & Nasrini, 2017; Lyons, 
Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011; Ronfard, Was, & Harris, 2016), socially 
conforming and more frequently endorsed (e.g., Morgan, Laland, & Harris, 2015), or 
tabooed (e.g., Seehagen, Schneider, Miebach, Frigge, & Zmyj, 2017). It would also be 
important to further investigate what is meant by transmission in this paradigm, i.e. 
whether the children are demonstrating what they can do, or that they know the rules, 
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to show what they themselves have learnt, or to explicitly teach someone else. These 
are among the exciting questions open for investigation. 
 Like Vredenburgh at al. (2015), we focused on 2-year-olds as the 
youngest group previously shown to engage in active cultural information transmission, 
yet a rarely studied population compared to a large body of research with preschool and 
elementary school children. We still know very little about the developmental trajectory 
of cultural information transmission in children as they navigate the social world, as 
well as the extent of the claims made by the PP accounts in toddlers, rather than infants 
or preschoolers, which should be addressed in further research. As we set out to 
investigate children’s selectivity in social learning, we would like to bear in mind that 
within a complex, dynamic, self-organizing developmental system (Smith & Thelen, 
2003), mechanisms are constantly changing. It is plausible that while we showed the 
parsimonious outcome of the present study’s manipulation with two-year-olds, later in 
development this may change. Understanding when and why such a change occurs is 
an avenue open for further research. 
Overall, our study provided an ecologically valid manipulation of pedagogical 
cues and evaluated two competing accounts of their role in the learning and transmission 
of information in toddlers. In our paradigm, children were not influenced by the context 
of the demonstration, but instead by the properties of the actions themselves, favoring 
actions that are easy to perform, require less effort, have a higher probability of 
achieving the desirable outcome, and result in a rewarding sound most readily. What 
we can conclude is that we do not have support for PP, as this view would assume that 
pedagogical cues should not only have a positive effect on transmission when 
manipulated alone, but that they should also override other cues, neither of which we 
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were able to show in our two experiments. This study contributes to our understanding 
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Figure 1:  
Experimental stimuli, setup and procedure 





Toy1: two simple actions (button press on yellow button at the bottom (1) and the green 
button on the top (2) to elicit the sound); Toy 2: two complex actions (wooden toy (1) 
is pushed through the opning at the top of the toy to press the button to elicit the sound; 
plastic toy (2) is pulled out and shaken to elicit the sound) 






Distribution of first responses at the transmission phase 
2a: Experiment 1: distribution of first responses at the transmission phase across the 
two trials  
 





Note: The distribution of first responses to the ignorant adult’s request across both 
transmission trials. From left to right, the responses are ordered by frequency and 
exclusivity; the number of children whose first response was only the non-
pedagogically demonstrated action (both times or once only), to those whose first 
response was mixed (one of each type), to those whose first response was the only 






Average count of types of actions shown at transmission 
Average count of different types of actions shown at transmission phase during both 
experiments, including pedagogically demonstrated actions and non-pedagogically 
demonstrated actions. 
 






We measured duration of actions in both experiments as this was a key variable 
in Vredenburgh et al. (2015), however, we did not report duration of actions in 
Experiment 1 as it was confounded by our manipulation of complexity (see below).  
Experiment 1 
Post-demonstration  
Duration of actions. Children spent significantly longer executing the complex 
pedagogically demonstrated actions than the simple non-pedagogically demonstrated 
actions (t(52) = 4.84, p < .001).  
Transmission 
Duration. Children spent an equal amount of time attempting either action 
(t(30) = 0.53, p = .60, paired t-test).  
Discussion. We found no differences in how long children spent on showing the 
actions at transmission, while at post-demonstration children spent significantly more 
time executing the more complex pedagogically demonstrated actions than the simpler 
non-pedagogically demonstrated actions. We are cautious in interpreting any difference 
in durations for this manipulation due to the differing lengths of time it takes to perform 
the two actions, and the difference in achievability of the actions.  
Children attempting both actions 
It is worth noting that in our study the majority of children performed both 
actions at transmission episode (81% of children), whereas Vredenburgh and colleagues 
found that fewer children performed both actions (27% of children). This suggests a 
difference at the transmission stage, with the children in our study interpreting the 
request of the adult as ‘show me everything you can do with this toy’, and the children 
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in the study by Vredenburgh and colleagues interpreting this as ‘show me the right thing 
to do with this toy’. Notice that there were differences in the exact prompts given by 
the experimenters in the two studies (current study: ‘Can you show me how to play with 
it?’; Vredenburgh et al: ‘What is this? What does this do?’). However, there is nothing 
in the content of these questions that suggests more or fewer possible actions on the toy. 
It is therefore unlikely that these differences might account for the observed differences 
in action performance. Furthermore, one of the main outcomes of interest was the first 
transmitted action, and that should be unaffected by how many actions the child chose 






 Main findings 
The present thesis addressed three research questions centred on an overarching 
theme – the active role of young children in acquiring and transmitting information in 
social contexts. Three experimental chapters comprising six experiments explored 
infants’ (11-24-month-olds’) sensitivity to the informative potential of their social 
partners, active and selective information seeking in situations of epistemic uncertainty, 
and their preferential information transmission choices. While the first two studies 
investigated infants’ active role in social knowledge exchange processes by exhibiting 
epistemic vigilance to the information they receive and actively seeking information 
from social partners, the focus of study 3 turned from the child as a solicitor of 
information to the child as a source of information. 
Experimental Chapter 1 presented a study designed to answer the first research 
question: Do preverbal infants actively respond to epistemic violations of expectation 
with social referencing behaviour? 11-month-olds and their primary caregivers saw 
images of familiar objects presented on the screen. Caregivers provided either 
congruent, incongruent, or no labels to these objects. Experiment 1 of this study found 
that infants referenced their caregivers more when the caregiver provided incongruent 
labels to familiar objects repeatedly and in a consistent manner. When caregivers were 
sometimes accurate and sometime inaccurate in their labelling testimony, in experiment 
2, infants referred to them equally often across these mixed trials, but not during the no 
label trials. Such indistinguishable responding to both congruent and incongruent 
labelling was also the case in the preliminary experiment (reported in the supplementary 
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materials). These results suggest that preverbal infants differentially responded to 
epistemic violations of expectation upon receiving unreliable labelling testimony from 
their caregiver. Importantly, they responded with an active communicative signal that 
was developmentally available to them – social referencing – thus supporting its 
epistemic function.  
Experimental Chapter 2 presented a study designed to answer the second 
research question: Do preverbal infants use social referencing to seek information from 
more knowledgeable adults in a situation of referential uncertainty? In study 2 
(Bazhydai, Westermann, & Parise, 2020), 12-month-old infants were placed in a 
situation of referential uncertainty: not knowing the answer to the posed question about 
a novel object-referent relationship. Infants were familiarised with two informants, one 
who was knowledgeable about object labels and the other who was not. At the test 
phase, when they faced epistemic uncertainty, infants actively and selectively used 
social referencing as a communicative tool in presence of potentially helpful social 
partners, proving themselves capable of identifying the best sources of information by 
selectively seeking epistemic input from previously knowledgeable informants. Social 
referencing emerged here as an information seeking communicative signal, actively 
used by preverbal infants before pointing which was previously considered to be the 
earliest onset of interrogative communication. 
Experimental Chapter 3 presented a study designed to answer the third research 
question: Do toddlers preferentially transmit information that was taught to them in an 
explicitly pedagogical context or information that was easier to demonstrate but not 
taught pedagogically? In study 3 (Bazhydai, Silverstein, Parise, & Westermann, 2020), 
24-month-olds were taught two novel actions by two experimenters. In experiment 1, 
one action was more complex but demonstrated in an explicitly pedagogical manner, 
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while the other action was less complex but demonstrated non-pedagogically. We 
investigated whether and how social (pedagogical communication) and non-social 
(action complexity) cues, or factors, affect child-led information transmission. Upon 
learning both actions from live demonstrations, children were presented with a choice 
which action to teach to an ignorant adult. Children preferentially transmitted simple 
non-pedagogically demonstrated actions over pedagogically demonstrated complex 
actions. When both actions were matched for complexity, in experiment 2, there was no 
evidence of preferential transmission of pedagogically demonstrated actions. We 
interpret the results from the perspective of the cue combination process, such that 
active and selective weighting of non-social and social cues guides children’s 
knowledge transmission process. Having considered both types of salient cues during 
the learning phase, two-year-olds shared less complex information with an ignorant 
learner, while pedagogical cues, despite their proposed privileged status in learning, 
here had no effect on transmission choice. Overall, this study highlights that children at 
this age engage in emergent teaching using demonstration as a strategy to transmit 
pertinent and weighted information to less knowledgeable others. 
Across all three studies, children were exposed to unexpected or competing 
sources of information during their interaction with social partners, and thus faced 
dilemmas which they had to resolve. The broader aim of this thesis was to investigate 
infants’ active role in the knowledge exchange process through measuring behavioural 
responses to these various epistemic dilemmas. Three different situations of uncertainty 
were explored, ranging from the state of not knowing to having to choose between 
different possibilities. In study 1, when 11-month-old infants’ social and epistemic 
predictions were violated, they attempted to resolve incongruency by referencing their 
trusted social partner. In study 2, when 12-month-olds lacked information they were 
 191 
unable to obtain independently, they referenced social partners who proved best 
equipped to help resolve referential uncertainty. In Study 3, when 24-month-olds had 
to adjudicate between competing cues present when they learned new information in 
deciding what information to transmit to an ignorant social partner, they chose to 
preferentially transmit less complex information. Thus, in all three studies, various 
situations of epistemic uncertainty prompted infants to exhibit their active role in 
knowledge acquisition and transfer.  
In sum, this thesis demonstrated young children’s use of communicative skills 
to obtain knowledge and propagate it further. Embedded in complex social 
environments where knowledge can be not only passively observed, but also solicited 
and shared in deliberate ways, infants emerged as active agents making decisions as to 
what information to seek from others and what information to give to others. The next 
section discusses major theoretical implications of this research.  
 192 
 Theoretical contributions: Active information seeking 
Broadly, this thesis contributes to the conceptualisation of social learning as an 
integral part of active learning by showing that from early in development, children can 
guide their own knowledge acquisition in social contexts. Active social engagement is 
an effective way for children to self-direct their learning about the world. Effective 
knowledge transfer via social communication necessitates that both the ‘knower’ and 
the ‘learner’ are actively involved in the process, and thus the ‘learner’ can select when 
to learn from others, who to learn from and what to learn (Baldwin & Moses, 1996; 
Strauss et al., 2014). Contrary to the influential proposals that before their second year 
of life, infants are merely good passive consumers of information but not seekers of 
information (Baldwin & Moses, 1996; Schaffer, 1984, 1989), this thesis demonstrates 
that as participants in social knowledge exchange, infants use social referencing as an 
active communicative and information seeking signal, show sensitivity to the epistemic 
social environment, and exhibit curiosity in social learning. The following sections 
reflect on the theoretical contributions that studies 1 and 2 make in these domains. 
II.i. Social referencing as communication and information 
seeking 
Research reported in studies 1 and 2 features the emergence of infants’ 
interrogative stance – active communication and information seeking in knowledge 
acquisition – as a prominent strategy for social knowledge transfer, providing a crucial 
insight into the ontogeny of this cognitive process (Butler, 2020; Begus & Southgate, 
2018; Harris et al., 2017; Lucca, 2020; Ronfard et al., 2017). Prior to the emergence of 
language, non-verbal communicative cues serve an information seeking function and 
enable active social learning, such as requesting pertinent information about the 
immediate environment from someone who can be regarded as knowledgeable about it. 
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Among social strategies to obtain information from others in response to epistemic 
uncertainty, this thesis focused on the early developing social referencing behaviour. 
Social referencing has been classically defined as infants initiating looks at others to 
seek their situational appraisal to help the infant determine their own behaviour towards 
it. This thesis proposes that social referencing is also a communicative and information 
seeking behaviour that preverbal infants use when facing epistemic uncertainty. 
Previously, the development of pointing has been regarded as the onset of 
interrogative communication (Begus & Southgate, 2012; Kovács et al., 2012; Southgate 
et al., 2007) and a preverbal behaviour of supreme importance to language development 
(Bates, 1979; Colonnesi et al., 2010; Werner & Kaplan, 1963). To understand its 
underlying cognitive process, it has been previously asked whether infants’ 
understanding of active communication during social knowledge exchange might be 
already present before they are able to produce pointing gestures. For example, a study 
of pre-pointing 9- and 11-month-olds showed that infants are sensitive to the 
communicative function of pointing (Krehm et al., 2014). When infants start using this 
gesture, it may reflect their attempt to transfer information rather than, as previously 
suggested, merely initiate joint attention (Liszkowski et al., 2006, 2008) or initiate 
pointing without proper consideration of a social partner’s attention (D’Entremont & 
Seamans, 2007). While pointing is an important milestone in infants’ communicative 
and information seeking behaviour, social referencing has been theoretically proposed 
to serve the same function earlier in development (Begus & Southgate, 2018; Harris & 
Lane, 2014). The results presented in this thesis provide evidence for this proposal. 
Before producing more complex and unambiguous communicative signals, preverbal 
and pre-pointing infants nevertheless showed active information seeking though the 
means already developmentally available to them, even if such signals may not yet be 
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readily interpretable by their social partners as a request for information in the same 
manner that a point or a question would be later in development. This ‘interrogative 
social referencing’ exists in parallel with affective social referencing which developed 
to seek social and emotion cues from social partners in situations of affective 
uncertainty (Clément & Dukes, 2017; Feinman, 1982; Walden & Ogan, 1988). 
Furthermore, the results are in support of the expertise rather than the comfort-seeking 
account of social referencing (Feinman et al., 1992; Stenberg, 2009, 2013) and crucially 
expand our understanding of social referencing behaviour as part of epistemic (rather 
than the more thoroughly explored in infancy emotional) development (Campos & 
Stenberg, 1981; Sorce et al., 1985; Stenberg & Hagekull, 2007; Striano et al., 2006). 
While uncertain situations have been previously shown to increase infants’ 
attention to social partners who provide incorrect or incongruent testimony (Brooker et 
al., 2013; Galazka, Gredebäck, & Ganea, 2016; Koenig & Echols, 2003), studies 1 and 
2 demonstrate that such situations uniquely prompt infants to generate communicative 
social looks (see also Dunn & Bremner, 2017; Mireault et al., 2014; Walden et al., 
2007). In this thesis, we manipulated epistemic uncertainty in two different ways to 
measure social referencing in response: semantic and social VoE (study 1) and 
referential uncertainty (study 2). While we measured the same behaviour, we argue that 
two different situations warrant slightly differing interpretations of the meaning of 
social looks.  
Our VoE scenario combined two sources: object-referent mismatch (semantic 
incongruency) and the unexpected behaviour of the caregiver who provided incorrect 
labels. This presented an interesting challenge for interpreting infants’ looking since in 
classic, non-social (e.g., core knowledge) VoE paradigms, longer looking at objects 
would be typically interpreted as surprise (for reviews see Sim & Xu, 2019; Stahl & 
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Feigenson, 2019), and looking at people while witnessing VoE event as sharing that 
surprise with others by establishing joint attention (Dunn & Bremner, 2017; Koenig & 
Echols, 2003). In our case, however, the person (caregiver) is both the source of 
epistemic uncertainty and the social partner with whom joint attention on the surprising 
event can be established, and, importantly, also the only available person who could 
potentially provide disambiguating evidence (unlike, for example, in Koenig and Echols 
(2003) study where the experimenter provides labels while the caregiver is also present, 
affording infant looks at either of the social partners). In this unique instance, we 
cautiously interpret infants’ looks in study 1 as an active response to uncertainty with a 
communicative intent, rather than claiming that they engage in information seeking (our 
study 2 is better suited to make this claim). However, based on our results in both study 
1 and 2, we argue that social looks and looking duration are inherently different, in that 
social looks are communicative in nature, while duration of looks, even when applied 
to a social situation, such as looking longer at a social partner, likely underlies lower-
level attentional processes. 
As the nature of surprise response, especially when evoked by other people, 
remains an important and open question, these looks can be caused by confusion, 
interest, attention sharing, or information seeking. Addressing this question, Sim and 
Xu (2019) present a well-articulated argument that when confronted with VoE events, 
infants engage in sophisticated statistical inference process, considering both the 
probability of an observed event and alternative hypotheses that could account for it, 
thus providing themselves with potentially new learning opportunities for belief 
revision. In this sense, an unexpected event leads to infants engaging in curiosity-driven 
learning to explore and accumulate new evidence (e.g., Stahl & Feigenson, 2015, 2017). 
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To provide crucial evidence in support of this claim, future studies of social referencing 
in response to VoE should also test infants’ subsequent learning.  
Additional evidence that social referencing may not be indexing merely passive 
surprise expression comes from a study of humour perception in preverbal infants 
(Mireault et al., 2014). In a similar to our study 1 situation of epistemic uncertainty, 
when infants witnessed absurd humorous events such as an experimenter wearing a red 
ball on her nose, 6- and 12-month-olds perceived these events as humorous (judged by 
their smiling and laughing at the events) without first seeking parental affective 
guidance. Thus, infants of similar age to those in our study 1 did not spontaneously seek 
caregiver’s cues during epistemic uncertainty, nor were they more likely to share with 
their caregivers their own appraisal of the situation when it was ambiguous than when 
it was ordinary. This is in contrast to our study 1, where a potentially humorous, absurd 
event (calling a dog a cat) prompted increase in social referencing.  However, after 
referring to a smiling parent (whose affective signalling was not contingent on infant 
generating a look at them), both 6- and 12-month-olds were more likely to smile at the 
event, suggesting that they were nevertheless influenced by affective cues even though 
they did not seek them in the first place. Since we did not measure infants’ use of 
caregiver’s cues in response to their social looks, to address this limitation, future 
research, as noted above, would need to design a paradigm to test infants’ learning 
outcomes. 
The discussion above focused on trying to derive the meaning of social looks in 
response to epistemic uncertainty, which may range from lower level attentional to 
higher level conceptual processes. The associative learning mechanisms are hard to 
completely rule out in any given study, especially when the participants had a full year 
of the learning experience, both in conceptual and epistemic domains. In our study 1, 
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some of the lower-level explanations can be ruled out since the caregiver followed 
precisely controlled instructions for their utterances in respective conditions, and the 
exploratory coding of caregiver responsivity did not reveal systematic differences in 
their response to infants’ social looks. Still, more subtle cues have not been controlled 
for, such as pitch, bodily language, or proximity between caregiver and infant as a 
function of condition. Similarly, our study 2 was able to directly address several 
alternative ‘lean’ explanations, such as infants’ potential preference for the 
experimenter versus the caregiver due to the associated relationship between an 
unfamiliar adult in a new environment – since infants met two unfamiliar adults whose 
identity, order and number of utterances and sides at which they were seated were 
controlled for. Still, the preference for Informant may have been formed due to other 
associated features which we were not able to control for given the live social 
interaction nature of the manipulation, e.g., presence of gestures, subtle bodily 
movements, confidence or pitch of their respective utterances. The studies in this thesis 
are therefore unable to make a strong claim in favour of either domain-general or 
domain-specific mechanisms. 
In sum, we show that before their first birthday, preverbal infants spontaneously 
direct their looks at people who are best suited to resolve the epistemic uncertainty, 
substantially extending previous findings of selective information seeking in preverbal 
infants (Goupil et al., 2016; Kovács et al., 2014; Vaish et al., 2011). This thesis therefore 
contributes to characterising the repertoire of infants’ looking responses and their 
underlying cognitive mechanisms in epistemic uncertainty (Aslin, 2007; Bergmann et 




II.ii. Development of selective active social learning 
This thesis contributes to understanding the ontogeny of selective active social 
learning by elucidating preverbal infants’ sensitivity to their social partners’ ability to 
provide reliable information. While an extensive body of research on selective trust 
focused on three-to-five-year-old children, less research has been dedicated to its earlier 
development (Koenig & Harris, 2005; Koenig & Harris, 2007; Nurmsoo et al., 2010; 
Poulin-Dubois, & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). As active information solicitors, infants in 
studies 1 and 2 exhibited early signs of epistemic vigilance in social learning by 
discriminating between social partners’ accurate, consistent and competent information 
provision.  
Studies of selective trust in children under the age of three report inconclusive 
results. In most studies, infants (typically 18-24-month-olds) are introduced to a single 
experimenter playing a role of either a reliable or an unreliable informant. Upon an 
opportunity to encode the experimenter’s epistemic status, infants learn new labels 
selectively from a previously reliable experimenter (Crivello et al., 2018; Koenig & 
Woodward, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 2012). However, other reports showed 
that two-year-olds did not selectively endorse testimony provided by a more accurate 
social partner (Ganea, Koenig, & Millet, 2011; Hermes, Rakoczy, & Behne, 2019), or 
were unable to make person-specific attributions of reliability and therefore did not 
subsequently show selectivity in learning from a reliable informant (Schmid, Mani, & 
Behne, 2019), which may be related to toddlers’ lack of advanced cognitive and theory 
of mind skills. 
Do preverbal infants have the ability to encode a speaker’s epistemic status 
(Harris, 2019)? Research employing different paradigms with infants demonstrated that 
even 8-month-olds show sensitivity to informative reliability cues in a social context 
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(Tummeltshammer et al., 2014), and that 11-month-olds selectively expect to learn from 
informative rather than non-informative speakers (Begus et al., 2016). In live interaction 
studies, when presented with a single experimenter testimony, one-year-olds pointed 
more to a novel toy when the experimenter was previously reliable rather than unreliable 
or simply uninformative (Begus & Southgate, 2012; Kovács et al., 2014; Lucca & 
Wilbourn, 2018). Rather than testing infants’ selective label learning from either a 
reliable or an unreliable informant, the question in these studies with preverbal infants 
(as well as in our study 2; Bazhydai et al., 2020), asks in the first place whether infants 
exhibit the ability to encode the informative potential of the speakers. We show that 12-
month-olds are indeed able to distinguish the knowledgeability cues of social partners, 
determine who is a better source of knowledge, and selectively refer to them when 
information is lacking. The methodological differences may be responsible for the 
inconsistencies across various studies in this line of research, some of which are 
discussed in the Methodological Considerations section of this chapter. To reconcile 
these findings with the previous body of research with preschoolers, future research 
should investigate if infants at this age will also subsequently learn better from more 
knowledgeable or reliable informants.  
In our study 2, we show that infants at 12 months evaluate and encode the 
respective informativeness of the social partners and use these evaluations in guiding 
their information seeking behaviours. Thus, infants showed sensitivity to knowledge 
distribution among the experimenters: one as a reliable and informative social partner, 
and the other as a non-informative and unreliable source of knowledge about objects’ 
labels, albeit an engaging social partner. In our study 1, we further probe the ontogeny 
of selective trust in demonstrating that 11-month-olds recognise when social partners 
are unreliable or inconsistently reliable. Upon detecting a mismatch in semantic 
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testimony from their primary caregivers, infants experienced a violation of expectation. 
We interpret these findings in the sense that they attributed default expectations of 
trustworthiness to their social partners and therefore selectively responded both when 
social partners were consistently unreliable and inconsistently reliable. Thus, in study 
1, we show that infants’ violation of expectation is driven by both detecting an object-
label mismatch and by a previously accurate informant becoming inaccurate in their 
testimony. While previous reports in similar paradigms showed infants’ surprise 
response (longer looking time) to social partners as they provided consistently 
unreliable or incorrect information (Brooker et al., 2013; Galazka et al., 2016; Koenig 
& Echols, 2003), we extend these findings by showing that younger infants attribute 
default trustworthiness to their social partners and are not willing to tolerate 
inconsistency in their testimony, despite being able to properly attend to the changes in 
epistemic cues. This finding sets preverbal infants apart from older children who are 
able to track social reliability cues and make dynamic adjustments to epistemic 
situations (Clegg et al., 2019; Gillis et al., 2019; Hoicka et al., 2017; Koenig & 
Woodward, 2010; Leech et al., 2019; Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009; Ronfard & Lane, 
2018, 2019). 
While this was not the main focus of our study, we additionally explored 
whether infants in our study 2 also looked at the caregiver when facing epistemic 
uncertainty7. It is important to clarify that substantial looking at the caregiver was 
expected in the very set up of the experiment: aside from being, naturally, a caregiver 
 
7 We report these exploratory analyses here because study 2 is presented in this thesis in its final 
published form, which did not include these. We refrained from running any statistical analyses and only 
present descriptive results. 
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rather than an unfamiliar adult, she/he was the only person sitting directly across the 
infant rather than to the side, and the only person handling the objects and asking 
questions. When facing referential uncertainty (at test), the caregiver asked the key 
question and remained silent and gazing directly at the infant for the duration of the test 
trial. While the study was not designed to investigate the differences in looking at 
caregiver vs experimenters, construed in this way, each of the three present adults 
(Caregiver, Informant or Non-Informant) had a 33% chance of attracting infants’ looks. 
This exploratory coding revealed that while infants’ first looks were directed at 
Caregiver (M = .48) more so than at Informant (M = .32) and Non-Informant (M = .20), 
their total looks nevertheless favoured Informant (M = .42), rather than Caregiver (M = 
.34) and Non-Informant (M = .25). Thus, even after accounting for the initial looks at 
the caregiver, which could be expected by design as initial attention to the person who 
put the toys on the table,  as well as who of all uttered the question and sat directly 
across the table, infants looked more often at the Informant as the person who could 
ultimately provide an answer to the question posed by the caregiver. This supports the 
general conclusion of the study 3 and the theoretical account that expertise rather than 
familiarity guides social referencing in epistemic uncertainty. 
 
II.iii. Active social learning as curiosity 
Curiosity conceptualised as self-motivated learning has recently come into focus 
in developmental research, emphasising its cognitive, perceptual, and computational 
aspects (see Bazhydai, Twomey, & Westermann, 2020; Kidd & Hayden, 2015, for 
reviews). This thesis broadly contributes to the literature on curiosity in the currently 
underexplored social learning domain, expanding this field to include infants’ social 
interactions, and highlighting the premise that active communicative information 
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seeking during social interaction is one of the manifestations of curiosity (see Begus & 
Southgate, 2018, for a review). As a multi-sensory experience, curiosity-driven 
exploration encompasses visual, haptic, proprioceptive, communicative and social 
skills, expressed through visual and manual exploration, approaching objects or people 
that are of interest, as well as using social partners to solicit interesting information. 
With social referencing as the target infant behaviour in this thesis, it can be argued that 
curiosity presents itself as analogous to visual scanning in the social domain: using 
social gaze to obtain information from available social partners. 
Several prominent theories argue for a range of cognitive mechanisms 
underlying curiosity. While according to the early approach rooted in behaviourism, 
curiosity is a natural drive akin to similar biological drives such as hunger and explained 
through the interplay between reflexes and external stimulus responses, the data 
stemming from studies 1 and 2 are better explained by a combination of incongruency, 
information gap, and learning progress approaches (for reviews of these approaches, 
see Bazhydai et al., 2019; Kidd & Hayden, 2015; Loewenstein, 1994, and the 
Introduction Chapter of the current thesis).  
Curiosity is proposed to be triggered to process detected incongruency, such as 
novel, surprising or complex incoming information, in order to update existing internal 
representations through cognitive assimilation or accommodation processes (Berlyne, 
1960; Kagan, 1972; Piaget, 1969). For instance, previous research demonstrated infants 
increased independent exploration of the source of unexpected events (Stahl & 
Feigenson, 2015; Sim & Xu, 2017). Studies 1 and 2 contribute to our understanding of 
infants’ response specifically to epistemic uncertainty in social context, by suggesting 
that to resolve such uncertainty, preverbal infants tend to ask others for help through 
explicit information seeking communication. Results from study 1 go beyond previous 
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reports showing that infants turn to others when events violate their expectations about 
physical properties of the world (Dunn & Bremner, 2017; Walden et al., 2007), and 
extend findings from studies with older infants showing longer looking at social 
partners following unreliable testimony (Brooker et al., 2013; Koenig & Echols, 2003): 
when a social partner offered inaccurate information, infants not only redirected their 
attention to them from the incongruent stimulus, but also selectively referred to them 
communicatively, suggesting early signs of explanation or clarification seeking. In 
study 2, in line with previous reports (Goupil et al., 2016; Vaish et al., 2011), when 
asked surprising questions to which they were unable to obtain an answer 
independently, infants generated social looks at the best source of information to obtain 
such an answer. 
According to the information gap approach (Loewenstein, 1994), curiosity is a 
process allowing to overcome one’s lack of knowledge on a particular topic, by closing 
the gap between the current knowledge and desired knowledge state. Studies with adults 
have shown that curiosity is the lowest when individuals have either too little or too 
much baseline knowledge about the topic (Gruber et al., 2014; Kang et al., 2009). This 
thesis’s study 2 could also be explained by the information gap approach, if an 
assumption is made that deliberate, conscious understanding of the existing information 
gap is not necessary. If infants detected a gap in their existing knowledge and the 
question posed to them during the test phase of the procedure (that they do not have an 
answer about the referent-object relationship, “Which one is the [pseudoword]?”), their 
curiosity may have driven them to seek such answer from the knowledgeable social 
partner. It remains unclear, however, if the classically defined information gap 
approach, which is likely to involve metacognitive abilities, is applicable to preverbal 
infants’ cognition. In addition, there is a lot of overlap between the information gap and 
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the learning progress approach, which, on the contrary, has been actively investigated 
in infancy. 
Learning progress theories propose that curiosity arises to maximise knowledge 
acquisition and reduce epistemic uncertainty through seeking out learning experiences 
that lead to a systematic reduction in prediction error. Studies showed infants’ reduction 
in curiosity-driven visual exploration when presented information was either too 
predictable or too complex for them to grasp (Kidd, Piantadosi, & Aslin, 2012), 
interpreted as infants attending to events that have the best chance to facilitate the most 
efficient and optimal learning progress. Computational and developmental robotics 
research (e.g., Oudeyer et al, 2016; Twomey & Westermann, 2018) operationalise this 
approach by leaving out completely the need for subject’s metacognitive awareness of 
the underlying processes. While the majority of learning progress investigations 
focused on independent curiosity-driven exploration, social learning also plays a role in 
efficient knowledge acquisition. For example, Forestier and Oudeyer (2017) reported 
that a robot learning to use novel tools and produce novel sounds used both autonomous 
exploration and sought out the “caregiver’s” involvement to aid its learning process. In 
studies 1 and 2 of the current thesis, infants’ motivation to turn to social partners can 
therefore be explained by the underlying learning progress motivation: as useful sources 
of pertinent knowledge, social partners may be both the objects of infants’ curiosity and 
the social tools used to obtain information to satisfy curiosity. In this thesis, we 
demonstrate how this process may work in preverbal infants, contributing to general 
understanding of the early pre-cursors that lead to more sophisticated question-asking 
in later development (for reviews, see Butler, Ronfard, & Corriveau, 2020; Lucca, 2020; 
Ronfard et al., 2018). 
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 Theoretical contributions: Active information 
transmission 
Broadly, this thesis contributes to the literature demonstrating that active social 
learning is a bi-directional process, where infants are more than mere recipients of 
information, but rather its active solicitors and propagators. If infants take an active 
information seeking stance as they process changes in epistemic situations when they 
learn, do they also take an active information transmission stance? If the heuristics used 
by infants to seek information from social partners require no need for mentalizing 
capacity, are infants’ heuristics for information propagation also present before 
reaching cognitive maturity? This section highlights this thesis’s theoretical 
contributions to elucidating cognitive mechanisms and early behavioural manifestations 
of child-led information transmission as a function of the properties of information and 
the social context. 
III.i. Development of information transmission 
Little is known about the developmental trajectory of information transmission 
and its cognitive mechanisms (Corriveau et al., 2018; Kline, 2015; Paulus et al., 2015). 
The overarching aim of our investigation therefore was to advance the understanding of 
teaching by identifying its basic functions and building blocks which would be common 
to both simple and more complex forms of teaching, in line with the proposed 
constructionist approach (Pasquinelli & Strauss, 2018). Whereas infants aged 12 
months have been shown to engage in proto-teaching by informing others when they 
possessed episodic information their social partners did not (Liszkowski et al., 2006, 
2008; Meng & Hashiya, 2014), children aged 3 and above confidently engage in 
transmitting generalisable information, such as demonstrating how to play a game or 
how an object works. Gradually enriching their toolkit with development and language 
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acquisition, verbal explanations and systematic teaching adapting to the learner’s needs 
and response become more prevalent (Strauss & Ziv, 2012; Pasquinelli & Strauss, 
2018).  
Only a handful of studies investigated information transmission in children 
under the age of three, leaving a gap in our understanding of teaching ontogeny (Ashley 
& Tomasello, 1998; O’Neill, 1996; Vredenburgh et al., 2015). Contributing to this body 
of research, we broadly conclude that using a minimalist experimental paradigm to 
model naturalistic social engagement, our study 3 (Bazhydai, Silverstein et al., 2020) 
suggests that toddlers were able to engage in solicited information giving and used 
action demonstration as their strategy to transmit information when queried by an 
ignorant social partner. Through their active demonstrations, children shared functions 
of a novel toy (though, overall, they preferred to transmit the simpler rather than more 
complex information). Therefore, according to the adopted in this thesis classification 
(Strauss & Ziv, 2012), two-year-olds engaged in emergent teaching, typically 
characteristic of three-year-olds, rather than in the proto-teaching, as observed in 
preverbal infants. This is further supported by the fact that infants eagerly responded to 
the generic prompt for information from a naïve adult (“Can you show me how to play 
with this toy?”) and ultimately demonstrated all actions they learned how to perform on 
a novel toy. It could be argued, however, that according to the operationalisation of 
generalisability in NP (Csibra, 2010), both actions in this study were specific (e.g., this 
particular button press makes a particular sound), rather than kind-generalisable (e.g., 
this kind of object is used to serve this kind of function). At the same time, from another 
perspective, if demonstrating the rules of a particular game can be viewed as 
generalisable knowledge that preschoolers often engage in teaching to others, it would 
also apply to demonstrating the functions on a particular cultural artefact – a toy 
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affording a range of functions. To expand on this reasoning, if we teach someone that 
Minsk is the capital of Belarus, is this specific or generic knowledge? The information 
is specific (but not episodic; that is, unless the existing political unrest does not lead to 
a change of the country’s name or its capital name, of course). Nevertheless, for 
someone to relay this information would be considered a teaching episode. Similarly, 
preschoolers teaching the game rules are conveying information specific to this game, 
yet, the normative nature of such episode makes it a teaching episode. To lend stronger 
support for the conclusion that we observed emerging teaching in two-year-olds, future 
research would need to investigate toddlers’ preferential transmission of specific versus 
generic information, as well as their response to differently phrased prompts from a 
naïve learner (distinguishing between requests evoking normative behaviour by asking 
for generalisable vs specific information), as well as spontaneous teaching propensity. 
III.ii. Information complexity as a non-social factor for 
transmission 
The interpretation that two-year-olds transmit generalisable, non-episodic 
information is in line with the results reported by Vrebenburgh et al (2015), but contrary 
to the report by Ashley and Tomasello (1998) that studied the same age group. This 
may be due to important methodological differences between the studies. First, Ashley 
and Tomasello studied peer-to-peer teaching, rather than toddlers’ propensity to inform 
an ignorant adult. In the context of their social cooperation task, toddlers may have 
behaved differently than when a friendly adult experimenter asked them to demonstrate 
the actions of the toy they learned (as in Bazhydai, Silverstein et al., 2020, and 
Vredenburgh et al., 2015). Second, the task used in our study was relatively 
unsophisticated (and similar to Vredenburgh et al., 2015), in stark contrast to the 
difficult, multi-step task used by Ashley and Tomasello (1998), where children may 
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simply not have had the cognitive and motor capacities to succeed in the first place. 
Indeed, it has been previously found that toddlers fail to imitate an action that they 
cannot motorically achieve (Paulus, Hinnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, 2011). Thus, it is 
likely that developmental motor and cognitive deficiencies precluded children in the 
Ashley and Tomasello’s study to transmit complicated sequences of actions to teach 
another child, in turn precluding the authors to conclude that toddlers, like preschoolers, 
can teach generalisable rather than merely episodic information. Although the more 
complex actions presented toddlers with a relative challenge in execution, in our study, 
there is no evidence that struggling to achieve the outcome of the relatively more 
complex action affected children’s transmission choice: while simple actions were 
taught by children preferentially, both simple and complex actions were eventually 
transmitted. This is in line with the research reported by Nielsen (2006) where 24-
month-olds often failed to imitate an action (to achieve its outcome) but actively 
persisted nevertheless, which was interpreted as evidence for toddler’s habitual, 
successful and deliberate imitation (after Call & Carpenter, 2002).  
Our study was rooted in the premise that according to NP, complex action, 
despite being cognitively and motorically more taxing than the more simply executed 
and thus more salient action, would be more likely transmitted since it was paired with 
pedagogical cues in Experiment 1. We, however, chose to manipulate information 
complexity using a dichotomous approach (complex-simple), which was admittedly a 
substantial simplification of the complexity dimension. Similarly, though, the 
pedagogical demonstration manipulation was also schematised. It remains possible that 
a different, more nuanced manipulation of both complexity and pedagogy variables may 
yield a different result, especially if future studies could operationalise these as graded 
dimensions rather than dichotomies. On the other hand, we could have made both 
 209 
manipulations even more extremely polarised in order to isolate the effects, e.g., by 
having the non-pedagogical demonstration occur without any interaction with children, 
or by making complex actions even more pronounced, similar to the multi-step 
apparatus operation (e.g., Ashley & Tomasello, 1998). Future research should focus on 
systematic exploration of the interaction between social and non-social salient cues.  
With the chosen complexity manipulation, nevertheless, the preferential 
transmission of simple actions lends support to the principle of utility calculus 
demonstrated in older children’s information transmission studies (Bridgers et al., 2020; 
Gweon & Schulz, 2019). According to this approach, simplicity as a rational and 
efficient choice outweighs the unnecessary complexity, such as when an equally 
rewarding outcome can be achieved without having to perform a more complex, albeit 
enhanced through the explicitly pedagogical demonstration, action. It may be concluded 
that two-year-olds preferred simple actions because they were more confident in 
performing them for an ignorant adult. In this sense, when having to adjudicate between 
multiple sources of information in choosing what information to propagate, two-year-
olds rely on simpler heuristics. While complex and cognitively opaque information is 
more likely to be transmitted in older children and adults (Caldwell, Renner, & 
Atkinson, 2018; Ronfard & Harris, 2018), this does not appear to be the case in younger 
children. In our study, toddlers chose to preferentially transmit an action that was easier 
to accomplish (hence, they were able to confidently demonstrate it to an ignorant 
partner) rather than the harder-to-demonstrate action that bore the weight of social 
normativity and cultural significance. It is also possible that two-year-olds are simply 
not sensitive to cultural saliency cues, with such sensitivity emerging in preschool years 
along with the theory of mind skills.  
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III.iii. Mentalising and normativity as social factors for 
transmission 
Contributing to the operationalization of teaching in early development, our 
results suggest that two-year-olds engage in proto-mentalistic and proto-metacognitive 
transmission, rather than support the theory of mind (ToM) or normative 
conceptualisation of teaching. As such, we show support for the behavioural and 
cognitive rather than the mentalistic approach to teaching conceptualisation (see section 
III.i of the Introduction Chapter for a review). 
It is uncontested that children’s understanding of teaching and of themselves as 
teachers is not available until the ToM milestone is reached in later development 
(Corriveau et al., 2018; Pasquinelli & Strauss, 2018), when children start to appreciate 
teaching as a special communicative act that leads to a change in beliefs (Gelman et al., 
2013; Rhodes et al., 2015; Sobel & Letourneau, 2016). Less is known about infants’ 
understanding of knowledge distribution in teaching interactions (Ronfard et al., 2018; 
Ziv, & Frye, 2004; Ziv et al., 2016) and the notions of intentionality and rudimentary, 
proto-mentalising capacities in infancy are a subject of debates (Gergely et al., 1995; 
Király et al., 2018; Setoh et al., 2016). Our study suggests that teaching in two-year-
olds may happen without setting intentions and prior to their ability to demonstrate the 
ToM competence through the false belief tasks. We have no evidence to suggest that 
children in our sample realised that they possessed unique transferable knowledge 
which the ignorant adult did not have, or that the children’s choice of actions was a 
function of their deliberate reasoning about the nature of their own communicative 
behaviours or about others’ minds.  
However, the minimalist paradigm we employed nevertheless allowed 
elucidating early emergent teaching in this age group – one that does not presuppose 
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complex social cognition but rather requires “only a certain degree of acceptance of the 
learner’s attention, with no specific modification of their own behaviour needed” 
(Pasquinelli & Strauss, 2018, p. 737). This observed behaviour fits well with the 
definition adopted in the fields of cultural evolution and animal cognition (Caro & 
Hauser, 1992), which leaves out completely the ability to make inferences about the 
mental state of others as a prerequisite for teaching. Instead, teaching is defined as a 
teacher’s behavioural adjustment in the presence of a naïve learner, without immediate 
benefit for the teacher, in order to provide, through behavioural reinforcement 
strategies, an experience or an example to the learner, as a result of which the learner is 
able to master a skill or obtain such knowledge which would be otherwise unobtainable 
or obtainable only later in life. The performance of toddlers in the current study provides 
an example of such teaching. In this way, while preschoolers use demonstrations and 
verbal explanations (such as teaching and reinforcing game rules), two-year-olds teach 
primarily through demonstration of how something works, and works reliably well, but 
without any metacognitive insight into their teaching.  
In addition to reliance on ToM capacity, teaching has been dubbed a highly 
normative enterprise (Pasquinelli & Strauss, 2018), with generalisable, opaque, obscure 
and culturally normative information more likely to be transmitted (Ronfard & Harris, 
2018). For example, preschool age children spontaneously correct and teach actions that 
violated the rules of the game, use normative language, and enforce social norms 
(Köymen, Lieven, Engemann, Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2014; Rakoczy et al., 
2008; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013, Schmidt et al., 2011). Furthermore, children often 
regard social learning context as generally norm inducing, indiscriminately to the 
presence or absence of explicit pedagogical or other normative cues 
(Casler, Terziyan, & Greene, 2009; Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016). 
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However, such normative conceptualisation of teaching in children under the age of 3 
has not been explored. 
In our study 3, normative motivations do not seem to be the driving force in two-
year-olds’ information transmission. Despite one action demonstrated in an explicitly 
pedagogical manner and the other not, two-year-olds were eager to transmit all 
knowledge they gained from both demonstrators, with 81% of children performing both 
actions. Thus, rather than interpreting the solicitation of information as ‘show me the 
right way of playing with this toy’, children seem to have interpreted the ignorant adult’s 
request as ‘show me everything you can do to play with this toy’. Similar observations 
have been made of 3-year-olds engaging in undifferentiated, rather than selective, 
teaching, when children spontaneously chose to teach both ignorant and knowledgeable 
social partners, despite being able to encode their respective epistemic status (Ronfard 
et al., 2015).  
Two-year-olds’ eagerness to transmit all and every piece of information they 
possessed to an ignorant social partner in itself warrants further investigation. It is 
possible that such broad provision of information was triggered by a presence of a 
knowledge gap between themselves as knowers and an ignorant adult as an eager learner 
(Ronfard & Harris, 2018). Alternatively, it is possible that children failed to properly 
monitor information sources in presence of other saliency cues, such that interesting 
functions of the novel toys overshadowed the salience of the pedagogical cues, all while 
children were excited to actively and confidently demonstrate what they learned to their 
social partner. In this vein, research shows that children easily forget the details of how, 
when and where knowledge came from (Principe, Kanaya, Ceci, Singh, 2006; Taylor, 
Esbensen, & Bennett, 1994).  
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We therefore conclude that for two-year-old children, teaching may not be a 
special, costly, intentional, normative and metacognitive communicative act. Instead, 
they engage in pre-normative teaching better characterised by an urge to propagate 
learned information. The question of which social and epistemic factors are taken into 
consideration by these young teachers is open for further systematic investigation. 
III.iv. Pedagogical cues in active information transmission 
Broadly, pedagogical transmission has been proposed to allow for efficient 
transfer of generalisable, cognitively opaque cultural knowledge. Infants’ sensitivity to 
pedagogical cues has been the focus of the Natural Pedagogy (NP) approach (Gergely 
& Csibra, 2009, 2011). According to NP, explicit ostensive cues signal to the naïve 
learner that knowledge being intentionally communicated by the teacher is important 
for their acquisition. Such reasoning is broadly rooted in the cultural evolutionary 
theories that information that is difficult to discover independently would benefit from 
being transmitted through explicit teaching from a knowledgeable to an ignorant 
conspecific (see also Thornton & Raihani, 2008). While the effect of ostensive cues on 
learning has been primarily investigated in preverbal infants, preschool-aged children 
have also been shown to infer normativity following pedagogical cues (Butler, Schmidt, 
Bürgel, & Tomasello, 2015).  
Though NP theory has only addressed learners’ passive receptivity to 
pedagogical cues, other proposals extended the key tenets of this theory to children’s 
active teaching (Ronfard & Harris, 2018; Strauss et al., 2014). According to these 
proposals, children’s sensitivity to pedagogical cues facilitate encoding of information 
as generalizable knowledge suitable for transmission to conspecifics. While our results 
showed that two-year-olds engage in propagation of generalisable knowledge that is 
valid beyond the current situation and specific content (i.e., novel toy’s inherent 
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functions), the study exposed the limits of NP theory in the active child-initiated 
teaching domain. First, we did not obtain any evidence that the demonstrator’s 
pedagogical cues made children encode the information they taught as preferential for 
transmission. Our results instead went beyond the theory showing children as pragmatic 
transmitters. Second, our findings are not in line with the proposal that pedagogical cues 
hold a privileged status in this situation. Instead, they are in line with the proposed in 
our paper competing cue combination account suggesting that both pedagogical cues 
and ease of execution may enhance the saliency of information and increase the 
likelihood of its learning and subsequent transmission. Nevertheless, it remains possible 
that two-year-olds present a special case as the developmental stage between infancy 
and preschool age which may display differential sensitivity to pedagogy and action 
complexity cues. Importantly for settling the existing theoretical debates, since only a 
handful of studies looked at this question, our results warrant replication and further 
investigation. 
In support of the pedagogical approach to teaching, previous reports suggested 
that children themselves spontaneously use ostensive cues when teaching others, such 
as initiating and maintaining direct eye contact and using gestures to aid explanations 
(Calero et al., 2015; Calero et al., 2018; Whiten & Flynn, 2010). This has been reported 
as evidence in support of NP theory that ostensive cues communicate pedagogical, 
generalisable relevance during cultural transmission. Hence, if younger children also 
naturally emit such cues, this would suggest that they indeed engage in emergent 
teaching rather than episodic information sharing. To explore this, using data from study 
3, we analysed two-year-olds’ ostensive and other explicit teaching-related non-verbal 
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and verbal cues8. Specifically, we coded the number of looks children initiated at the 
demonstrator as they were being taught, at the post-demonstration phase when they had 
a chance to copy the action and explore the toy, and at the transmission phase as they 
taught the ignorant experimenter. In addition, we coded whether the child established 
joint attention to the toy with the experimenter before beginning the transmission action 
demonstration, and whether the child provided explicit verbal instructions or teaching 
cues to experimenter (e.g., labelling the object's parts (car, toy), explaining: "This is 
how you do it", "You put it here - then you press this button", “See?”, “Here, like that!” 
etc.). 
Results demonstrate that children generated more social looks during the 
transmission (M = 3.04, SD = 1.8) than during the demonstration (i.e., learning) (M = 
2.53, SD = 0.87) and the post-demonstration (i.e., toy exploration or manipulation 
check) phases (M = 2.35, SD = 1.23); F(1, 59) = 7.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .11; repeated-
measures ANOVA. At the onset of the transmission phase, 73% of children established 
joint attention to the toy with the ignorant experimenter, and 33% of children used direct 
instructive cues when teaching the functions of the novel toys. Those ranged from 
saying just one word, e.g., “This” or “There”, to more elaborate interaction combining 
instruction and demonstration, such as this one: Experimenter: “Can you show me how 
to play with this toy?”; Child: “Yeah! [takes the hammer-like tool; establishes joint 
attention]; put it there [puts it in the toy’s opening and presses the button inside, looks 
at experimenter]; take it down [puts toy in second opening; looks at experimenter]”. 
Children’s ostensive and explicit instructive cues were not related to the outcomes of 
the pedagogical or complexity manipulations in the two experiments (i.e., first actions 
 
8 We report these exploratory analyses here because study 3 is presented in this thesis in its final published 
form, which did not include these results. 
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chosen and number of each type of actions shown). While the study’s procedure 
precludes us from making conclusive inferences about the exact function of these 
behaviours, and despite the inherent limitations of this unplanned exploratory coding, 
it nevertheless lends additional support to the account that two-year-olds engaged in 
emergent teaching which, presumably without their consicous awareness, closed the 
knowledge gap between themselves and their social partner.  
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 Methodological considerations 
The studies comprising this thesis made use of the existing replicable 
methodologies, as well as extended and consolidated previously reported findings from 
separate lines of research. As such, study 2 built on the main principles of the existing 
two-experimenter paradigms, which are extensively used with children over three years 
of age in studying selective trust. We adopted these paradigms for use with preverbal 
infants using a simplified contrast between an informant and a non-informant, rather 
than more complex contrasts, such as those manipulating the degree of the informant’s 
reliability. This simplification allowed us to elucidate the basic cognitive mechanism 
which may underlie the later developing, more complex selective information seeking. 
Studies 1 and 3 aimed at replicating previous findings, while also making key 
modifications to investigate the target behaviours: e.g., extending the length of the trial 
in study 1 to detect spontaneously occurring social referencing (adapted from Parise & 
Csibra, 2012), and modifying precise utterances used by the experimenters in study 3 
(adapted from Vredenburgh et al., 2015). 
IV.i. Interactive nature of the design 
Research on cultural information transmission benefits from creating semi-
naturalistic environments in the laboratory settings (Miton & Charbonneau, 2018). The 
rich social context chosen to investigate the three research questions in this thesis was 
necessary to elucidate the core active social learning processes, but also presented 
additional methodological challenges as each study involved making a number of a 
priory decisions to shape social interactions.  
Extensive procedural piloting and training of caregivers and experimenters 
proved essential for collecting quality data. While infants had to encode the epistemic 
status of all adults they interacted with, it was crucial to control for the naturally 
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occurring (and unrelated to the experimental manipulations) emotional expressions, eye 
contact, gaze direction, voice pitch, and other social cues emitted by the interactive 
social partners. To mitigate the effect of these potential confounds, we counterbalanced 
the identity of the experimenters, the sides where they sat during the procedure, and the 
order of who spoke or acted first, as applicable.  
While training the experimenter to enable the manipulation allows standardizing 
the procedure, asking caregivers to do so has its notable advantages. At least for some 
infants, the presence of the caregiver made the laboratory testing environment less 
stressful. The research question of study 1 relied on the assumption that infants expected 
reliable information from trustworthy informants, which their primary caregivers are by 
default. In study 2, on the contrary, caregivers acted as impartial and genuinely 
unknowledgeable social partners, unable to provide helpful information to their children 
when they faced referential uncertainty. At the same time, by having caregivers present 
objects and pose the crucial questions at the test phase, we ensured that neither of the 
experimenters had the advantage of privileged access to the toys or through being the 
one verbalizing the key questions. Relatedly, despite its positive impact on ecological 
validity, the use of live objects presented a challenge for some infants when the toys 
were placed out of reach or had to be taken away. Here, again, the help of primary 
caregivers who knew the effective strategies for communicating with their infants was 
invaluable. As caregivers were instrumental to enabling the procedures in all three 
reported studies, unlike with trained researchers, it was impossible to rigorously control 
for individual differences in how they approached their task (e.g., variability in their 
emotional expressions, level of engagement, voice pitch, etc.). Therefore, to ensure 
caregivers did not systematically though inadvertently affect infants’ responses, we 
undertook additional coding of their behaviours, such as measuring responsivity to 
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infants’ social looks in study 1 and caregivers’ own looks towards the experimenters in 
study 2.  
IV.ii. Experimental design considerations 
While the within-subject design provides a rigorous test to isolate experimental 
effects, our study 1 demonstrated its less than optimal suitability in interactive social 
learning experimental setups: as the manipulation is inherently social, infants’ encoding 
of and reaction to inconsistent and mixed messages may lead to a different outcome. 
Here in study 1, our interpretation is that infants were not able to completely disengage 
from the previously formed social and epistemic profile of the caregiver at the onset of 
a new trial, instead making global inferences based on the inconsistency in labelling 
testimony, rather than isolating the effects of congruent and incongruent trials 
separately. Relatedly, while shorter trial durations, as used in cognitive and 
neuroscience fields, may help mitigate infants’ inattention, behavioural social learning 
studies in infancy typically employ longer trials. For instance, in relation to study 1, 
previous studies investigating infants’ looking response to repeated labelling events had 
trials lasting between 10 (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013) and 30 seconds (e.g., Dunn 
& Bremner, 2017; Koenig & Echols, 2003). Our choice of trial length aimed to 
minimize participant burden by keeping infants’ attention yet allowing sufficient time 
to generate discrete social looks. Importantly from both theoretical and methodological 
perspectives, we produced converging evidence that a between-subject design is better 
suited to investigate infants’ active communication in social learning context (for 
examples of between-subject designs in social learning studies, specifically testing 
infant-initiated explicit communicative cues, see Begus & Southgate, 2012; Koenig & 
Echols, 2003; Kovács et al., 2012; Vaish et al., 2011). 
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As relevant to studies 2 and 3, consideration was given to the single-
experimenter paradigms (where participants are only exposed to one type of 
manipulation, such as the informant’s uncontested testimony) as opposed to the two-
experimenter paradigms (where participants are in an active choice situation, such as 
receiving testimony from two informants who differ in their labelling accuracy or their 
mode of teaching). While the single-experimenter paradigms may be less cognitively 
taxing, the dynamic two-experimenter designs with higher task demands, such as those 
employed in studies 2 and 3, are more powerful in eliciting the behavioural outcomes 
of interest. Since in such designs each participant receives both experimental conditions, 
the effects are easier to isolate and interpret. An additional benefit of such paradigms is 
that a smaller sample size is sufficient to obtain high powered results. 
A number of experimental design considerations are specific to child-led 
information transmission studies. In our study 3, the transmission phase of the 
procedure, adapted from a previously published study (Vredenburgh et al., 2015), was 
enabled by an experimenter during a live interaction, rather than an experimenter-
operated puppet, as in most studies of action transmission with older children who 
reached ToM milestone (Clegg & Legare, 2016; Corriveau et al., 2018; Ronfard et al., 
2016). The experimenter presented herself as ignorant about the function of the novel 
toy and therefore explicitly prompted children to teach her what they know. This is in 
contrast to children’s spontaneous information transmission in observational studies 
and diffusion chain paradigms (Whiten & Flynn, 2008, 2010). It is unclear, however, 
whether children perceived the transmission episode in our study as an opportunity to 
teach rather than to further explore the toys, whether they believed that the experimenter 
was genuinely not knowledgeable about the toy, and whether they perceived the social 
context as possibly inducing normativity in their choice of actions. It is an empirical 
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question which of these factors may have impacted the children’s choice of actions, 
raising a general question about the level of detail with which infants interpret social 
contexts, social partners and subtle differences in phrasing. We further address some of 
these questions in the Limitations and Future Directions sections of this chapter. 
IV.iii. Choice of outcome measures 
We explored the relationships between multiple outcome measures (for a 
review, see LoBue et al., 2020) with the rationale that no measure on its own is 
inherently meaningful unless interpreted within the experimental context (Aslin, 2007; 
Bergmann et al., 2019; Sim & Xu, 2019). With this choice of measures in studies 1 and 
2, we were able to demonstrate that preverbal infants’ communicative and information 
seeking signals manifest through discrete social referencing looks. For example, 
previous research often used discrete number of social looks, accumulated looking time 
and duration of looks interchangeably, with studies reporting diverging results 
stemming from the different choice of measures (e.g., Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013; 
Koenig & Echols, 2003; Vaish et al., 2011). Therefore, in study 1, we chose three social 
looking measures (frequency of social looks, latency to first look, and duration of looks) 
in order to disentangle the exact meaning of different types of attention and 
communication cues in epistemic uncertainty. The discrepancy in findings between 
these measures may index these as distinct measures underlying different cognitive 
mechanisms. Building on study 1, in study 2, we focused on measuring infants’ discrete 
social looks (first looks and frequency of looks), while adding a complementary 
measure of the length of visual fixations as detected by the head-mounted eye-tracker.  
As discussed in more detail in the Discussion Chapter section II.i, infants’ 
looking at objects and at social partners may be subject to varying interpretations, as 
longer looking at the display of an object or physical event that violated infants’ 
 222 
expectations is traditionally interpreted as novelty response to the unexpected or 
impossible (Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Stahl & Feigenson, 2015), while 
longer looking at a person, rather than an object, whose actions violated infants’ 
expectations, may involve higher-order, communicative and intentional interpretations. 
At the same time, more research should be done to distinguish specifically between 
domain-general and domain-specific cognitive mechanisms in social interactive 
context, and the studies in the current thesis were not designed to resolve this long-
standing debate. It must be noted in this regard that the previous literature on VoE in 
live, social interaction domain is very limited, warranting further research and 
measurement selection to enable comparisons between findings from object-induced 
and person-induced VoE studies. 
While our choice of the main outcome measure in study 3 (first action) was 
consistent with the previously published paradigm (Vredenburgh et al., 2015), we 
included other measures, such as the frequency of both types of actions demonstrated 
and accidental discovery of non-demonstrated actions at the post-demonstration phase, 
and forfeited other previously used  measures deemed unusable in light of the 
implemented manipulation changes, such as duration of actions and the switch and 
sequence analyses. While such rich datasets obtained from video recordings of social 
interaction studies undoubtedly provide ample coding opportunities, making a justified 
choice of measures remains the main methodological challenge in developmental 
science, which can be at least in part mitigated by adhering to transparency and open 
science principles (Gennetian, Tamis‐LeMonda, & Frank, 2020; Frank, 2019). 
Overall, the field is ripe for extending the existing and developing novel 
paradigms to assess early developmental mechanisms of active social learning and 
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knowledge transmission, with the current thesis offering useful recommendations for 
such designs. 
IV.iv. General limitations  
In addition to studies-specific methodological and theoretical considerations 
highlighted above, several broad limitations warrant further discussion. First, the 
sample characteristics of the participants (although this is based on anecdotal evidence 
because no demographic questionnaires were administered as part of the experimental 
studies) suggest that they came primarily from monolingual English-speaking, middle 
class population, referred to as WEIRD (wealthy, educated, industrialized, rich and 
democratic; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). This limits the extent of the 
generalisability inferences that can be made from the current research. It may also have 
resulted in biased final samples submitted for analyses containing only the so-called 
‘good research babies’: those who managed to maintain attention during the 
experimental procedure, whose caregivers volunteered them for participation in the first 
place and did not interfere with the procedure. Further, the sample sizes and the number 
of trials per participant in all three studies were relatively small, with an average attrition 
rate of 16% across all six experiments in this thesis (which is nevertheless in line with 
the 14% reported in infant looking-time studies, Slaughter & Suddendorf, 2007). 
Despite these limitations, the calculations of the effect size and the accompanying Bayes 
Factor analyses increase our confidence in the reported results. Future research should 
focus on replicating the findings from the current studies, expanding the sample 
characteristics and increasing the effect size through recruiting a larger sample or 
performing statistical analyses on the trial-level rather than participant-level basis. To 
mitigate these issues, future studies may also take advantage of the emerging large-scale 
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collaborative protocols (Byers-Heinlein et al., 2020) and online data collection efforts 
(Chouinard, Scott, & Cusack, 2019; Scott & Schulz, 2017).  
In the studies reported in this thesis, we have not accounted for several 
individual factors, such as language, temperament, executive functioning, social 
cognition, and attachment, which may have affected infants’ comprehension and 
performance on the social learning tasks. The exclusive reliance on verbal information 
in studies 1 and 2 may have limited some of the infants’ understanding of the tasks and 
placed an unwarranted focus on variability in infants’ verbal development. Infants’ 
attachment to their caregivers may have also played a role in that infants with secure 
attachment may be more prone to learn from knowledgeable adults (as in study 2), while 
less securely attached infants may be unable to concentrate on forming the epistemic 
profiles of the experimenters and instead exclusively attend to their caregivers. The 
experimental procedures employed in this thesis were cognitively and socially intense 
as infants had to keep track of multiple people and objects. Having no immediate access 
to the novel and exciting toys in study 2 (during the opportunity to seek information 
phase of the test trials) may have been emotionally unsettling to some infants, thus 
interfering with their ability to engage in the epistemic appraisal of the situation. 
Differences in social development, including those which are characteristic of the 
autism spectrum disorder, may also impact social learning outcomes, such that while 
some children may effectively encode epistemic uncertainty, they still may not choose 
to ask social partners for help (as in study 2), or not show differentiation of information 
taught pedagogically and non-pedagogically (as in study 3). In light of these 
considerations, future research would benefit from obtaining data on individual 
differences to further probe the subtleties of social cognitive development. 
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While the experimental designs provided several crucial controls for a number 
of potential lower-level explanations of the effects, such as, in studies 2 and 3, the 
number of utterances and the order of speaking between the experimenters, several 
additional experimental controls would be beneficial. For instance, accounting for 
infants’ inherent preferences to the objects or people, such as asking them “Which one 
do you like best?” rather than “Which one is the [pseudoword]?” (study 2) and “Can 
you show me how to play with it?” (study 3), could be one way to discriminate whether 
infants indeed selectively sought information from social partners (study 2) and 
attempted to teach them (study 3). Directly contrasting social and non-social, 
independent exploration phases in the same paradigm, with an interleaved design, 
would help mitigate this limitation. Additionally, we did not perform a pilot study to 
examine the intrinsic attractiveness or saliency of the objects (e.g., based on outcome 
sound, colour or shape) used in study 3, which may have affected toddlers’ preferential 
choices. However, since the action complexity manipulation was operationalised as the 
tool-needed vs no tool-needed contrast, it is unlikely that lower-level properties played 
a major role. 
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 Future directions 
While the three research studies reported in the current thesis contribute to our 
understanding of behavioural manifestations of active social knowledge acquisition and 
transmission, the field is ripe for further investigation. Future work may benefit from 
extending the reported studies in several promising directions: the effect of active 
information seeking on decision making, learning and information transmission; 
exploring children’s responses to various situations of epistemic uncertainty across 
different information modalities; and conducting longitudinal investigations to 
elucidate developmental change. The following section outlines the rationale for some 
of these proposals.  
Future research should investigate preverbal infants’ active information seeking 
when they would be motivated to not only acquire but to also peruse obtained 
information. Such paradigms could present infants with a situation where learning 
would be necessary to either obtain an interesting object, to make a behavioural choice, 
or to share what they learned with others. Previous research demonstrated that infants 
and older children retained information better if they selectively expressed their interest 
in it using pointing and explicit question asking as information seeking tools (Begus et 
al., 2014; Lucca & Wilbourn, 2018, 2019; see Lucca, 2020 for a review). However, it 
is unknown whether this effect is also present earlier in development, when, as 
suggested in this thesis, social referencing serves a proto-interrogative function. 
Furthermore, in light of the proposed connections between curiosity and teaching (van 
Schaik, Pradhan, & Tennie, 2019), future studies should investigate how active 
solicitation of information impacts its subsequent transmission, such as whether 
curiosity-driven motivation to obtain new knowledge makes such knowledge more 
likely to be shared.  
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Infants’ active social learning across a variety of epistemic uncertainty situations 
is another promising avenue. For example, directly contrasting social (e.g., inaccurate 
labels) versus non-social (e.g., physical properties of objects) violations of expectation 
paradigms may help disentangle whether preverbal infants would prefer to seek 
information from social partners or instead engage in independent exploration. Along 
these lines, as discussed earlier, it would be important to further investigate social 
referencing in response to VoE scenarios that are social and non-social in nature, and in 
presence of one or more social partners, including those who are themselves a source 
of VoE (e.g., as a mislabelling adult) and those who are not. A variety of paradigms 
tapping into these issues would help to better understand the meaning of infants’ 
responses, and especially their looks, which can be interpreted as surprise, confusion, 
attention, or communicative intention to seek social input.  
To further elucidate infants’ selective information seeking and information 
giving strategies, it would be beneficial to study how they resolve various complex 
situations of epistemic uncertainty, such as receiving conflicting, explicitly incompetent 
(deceitful or inaccurate), or misinformed (unintentionally wrong, e.g., when facing 
away from the object in question or being blindfolded) testimony, when informants may 
or may not override their initial incongruent testimony, or when the domain of 
knowledge is inconsistent with the informant’s perceived expertise. Overall, future 
work with infants could shed light on early cognitive mechanisms underlying fact-
checking and fact-finding: seeking expert opinions, corroborative evidence, verifying 
others’ claims, and revising beliefs in face of new information (Butler, 2020; Koenig et 
al., 2004; Lane, 2018; Mills, 2013). The effects of these different knowledge acquisition 
parameters on transmission is also open for investigation, e.g., by asking under which 
epistemic conditions and what kind of information (e.g., surprising, contradictory, 
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confirmed by expert opinion, endorsed by majority, conforming to the norms, etc.) is 
more likely to spread widely (Corriveau et al., 2018). 
The active child-led knowledge transmission field would progress by 
investigating whether spontaneous transmission emerges naturally; at what age children 
begin to transmit cultural information; what drives transmission, e.g., prosocial 
motivations, co-exploration, optimal learning and retention, or natural drive; what kind 
of information is likely to be transmitted, e.g., familiar or novel, surprising or mundane, 
opaque or transparent, general or specific, obtained independently or through 
pedagogical learning; who benefits from children’s information transmission, e.g., 
social partners who are ignorant or knowledgeable, familiar or unfamiliar, reliable or 
unreliable, adults or peers, in-group or out-group members; and which social and 
emotional factors facilitate transmission. In addition to understanding the role of the 
learning context, future research should further elucidate the role of the type of 
information on transmission. In this thesis’ study 3, both demonstrators provided easy 
to acquire, developmentally appropriate, rewarding, causally unambiguous, and 
undisputedly accurate information. Would young children preferentially transmit 
information learned in a pedagogical context following demonstration of causally 
opaque, inefficient or irrelevant information (e.g., Burdett, McGuigan, Harrison, & 
2018; Corriveau, DiYanni, Clegg, Min, Chin, & Nasrini, 2017; Ronfard et al., 2016), 
socially conforming or more frequently endorsed (e.g., Morgan, Laland, & Harris, 
2015), or information deemed socially acceptable or tabooed (e.g., Sheehagen, 
Schneider, Miebach, Frigge, & Zmyj, 2017)? These and other lines of research remain 
open to many exciting possibilities (Pasquinelli & Strauss, 2018). 
Finally, understanding the dynamic changes in infants’ active participation in 
social knowledge exchange as they mature is of utmost importance. The field is lacking 
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longitudinal studies of information seeking and transmission strategies as children 
navigate the increasingly complex social world (Grammer, Coffman, Ornstein, & 
Morrison, 2013). As documented in this thesis, early signs of interrogative 
communication and emerging teaching are present early, but these strategies inevitably 
become more complex and sophisticated with development. Longitudinal study designs 
would allow to track communicative tools used for information seeking and information 
giving at different stages of development and across different types of epistemic 
testimony, informant’s characteristics, and information modalities. For example, future 
research could ask whether older children continue to use social referencing in the same 
manner as preverbal infants, or if they ‘grow out of it’ in favour of other strategies, such 
as pointing, with social referencing eventually losing its function as an interrogative 
tool (but see Hechenbaher et al., 2017, 2020, for social referencing in preschool aged 
children). While this thesis deliberately focused on the youngest populations to 
elucidate the earliest manifestations of information seeking and its transmission, future 
research would greatly benefit from longitudinal paradigms to track the developmental 
change in these cognitive abilities.  
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 Conclusion 
The current thesis contributes to our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms 
of active learning and active teaching as manifested in early development among 11-
24-month-olds. Experimental Chapters 1 and 2 were dedicated to the early developing 
active communicative and information seeking behaviours that preverbal infants use 
when facing epistemic uncertainty in a social context. Infants showed sensitivity to 
knowledge distribution among social partners, to their reliability and accuracy in 
information provision, and exhibited active social behaviours to help resolve epistemic 
uncertainty. Importantly, these studies underline the function of social referencing as 
communicative and information seeking, emerging prior to interrogative pointing, and 
occurring specifically in epistemic rather than the previously highlighted emotional or 
cognitive-perceptual uncertainty. Experimental Chapter 3 demonstrated infants’ early 
developing propensity to transmit knowledge to social partners who are less 
knowledgeable. Toddlers showed propensity for information transmission and ability 
to adjudicate what information to transmit preferentially as a function of its social and 
non-social properties. Furthermore, this study revealed the limits of the theories 
postulating the privileged role of pedagogy in cultural knowledge transmission by 
providing evidence for preferential transmission of less complex actions, but no 
evidence for preferential transmission of pedagogically communicated actions. Overall, 
the thesis makes a methodological contribution by highlighting the importance of live 
social interaction experimental paradigms in developmental research on cultural 
information transmission and a theoretical contribution by elucidating active 
behavioural manifestations of information seeking and information giving in infancy. 
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